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1.1 PROBLEM StAtEMEnt
1.1.1 The starting point of thought: the ‘trolley dilemma’
The famous ‘trolley dilemma’ was first introduced by Philippa Foot (1967) and then ex-
tended by Judith Thomson (1976, 1985) as follows:
A trolley is running on the railway. Ahead of the trolley, there are merely two direc-
tions (or tracks): five skilled workers are working on one direction while one skilled 
worker is working on the other direction. The trolley by schedule should be headed 
down the track where five men are, but if someone pulls the lever, the trolley will be 
headed down the track where the one man is. Supposing that the trolley could not 
stop and you were next to that lever, what would you do and what is the right action? 
The choice you made, either pulling the lever or not, could be justified by fairly persuasive 
arguments from two classic ethical theories: Consequentialism and Deontology (e.g. Kan-
tianism1). The debate between these two distinct schools of thoughts is long and historical, 
which has greatly affected the kind of public policies that governments enact (Table 1.1).
table 1.1 Two paths to right action and implications for public policy
two paths trolley dilemma Basic points Implications for public policy
Consequentialism Pull the lever to 
generate a greater 
positive effect on 
society
Value the consequences of 
acts
Pursue ‘the greatest good for 
the greatest number’ (Mill, 
1863)
A policy can be justified if, all things 
considered, it promotes the overall 
goal of maximising the utility
In some cases, the interests of the 
minority may be given less weight
Kantianism not pull the lever 
regardless of how 
appealing the 
results might be
Some acts are intuitively 
right while some are 
intuitively wrong 
People are ends-in-
themselves and should not 
be treated as merely means 
to ends
Respecting and protecting human 
rights should be the basis grounding 
all kinds of public policy
The interests, goals and values of 
every individual human being deserve 
to be equally respected
Consequentialism values the consequences of acts and treats intentions as irrelevant. The 
paradigm case of consequentialism is utilitarianism. In the eye of utilitarian, pulling the lever 
is the right thing to do because it is a way of maximising the utility, that is, saving five lives 
rather than merely one life is likely to generate a greater positive effect on society. Reflected 
in public policies, if implementing certain policies could benefit the majority of the society, 
1 Deontology is an ethical theory that focuses on assessing the rightness or wrongness of choices themselves, 
rather than the consequences of choices. Immanuel Kant’s moral philosophy is considered a deontological 
theory. For detailed introduction of deontology, please refer to Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy via https: 
/ / plato.stanford.edu/ entries/ ethics-deontological/ #DeoTheKan (last accessed 24 March 2019).
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it is morally permissible to ignore or even sacrifice the welfare of the minority. From this 
perspective, public policies should be designed and implemented with the aim of producing 
‘the greatest good for the greatest number’ (Mill, 1863).
Kantianism criticises consequentialism by stating that the welfare of the minority is 
equally important because people are ends-in-themselves and should not be treated as merely 
means to ends. To treat people as ends-in-themselves means to recognise the humanity of 
them, that is, to realise that every individual human being has his or her own goals, values 
and interests that deserve to be equally respected. Furthermore, according to Kant, telling 
the rightness from the wrongness of an action is to assess whether this action conforms to the 
universal moral law (i.e. a categorical imperative2). Kant (1785, p. 37) argued that ‘‘act only 
in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should 
become a universal law.’’ Accordingly, Kant would be highly unlikely to pull the lever regard-
less of how appealing the result might be because he would not wish ‘pull the lever’ to be a 
categorical imperative followed by people when they have to make this trade-off. Reflected in 
public policies, respecting the autonomy and rationality of human beings should always be 
the fundamental principle of policymaking no matter what the policy is about.
Seemingly, there is no single right answer to the trolley dilemma because the arguments 
given above have their own merits with different priority settings for public policy: either pur-
suing ‘the greatest good for the greatest number’ (Mill, 1863) or prioritising the autonomy and 
rationality of each individual human being. Actually, these priorities are at the two extremes 
of the spectrum of desirable policy goals, neither of which can be regarded as a policy panacea 
because of the changing conditions influenced by diverse socio-economic and cultural factors. 
Yet, it is this uncertainty that leaves us with an interesting question to be considered: 
In a given context, how do we achieve an optimal balance between protecting 
individual rights and benefiting the overall population in the long run, when hard 
choices are inescapable?
1.1.2 The trolley dilemma in healthcare
Healthcare is an important public policy issue in which tough questions are often raised in 
a close relationship with the trolley dilemma and its modifications. For instance, Leonard 
Fleck (2009, p. 72) once referred to the trolley dilemma when he argued about the inescap-
ability of healthcare rationing:
“This case (i.e. the ‘trolley dilemma’) does present well at least one dimension of health-
care rationing – namely, the inescapability of the need to make rationing decisions with 
life and death consequences for different individuals or different groups of individuals.”
2 “The categorical imperative would be that one which represented an action as objectively necessary for itself, 
without any reference to another end.” Kant I. (1785). p. 31.  
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Interpreting Fleck’s argument, it is impossible to satisfy the healthcare needs of every indi-
vidual patient, especially when it relates to some limited healthcare resources such as ICU 
beds and artificial hearts. Put differently, there exists an inevitable conflict between protect-
ing individual rights (e.g. satisfying the unlimited patient needs) and sustaining healthcare 
resources when taking the scarcity of healthcare resources into account. Thus, the interesting 
question raised in the above section can be modified as follows:
Given that healthcare resources are often limited, how do you achieve an optimal 
balance between protecting individual rights (e.g. satisfying patient needs) and 
sustaining healthcare resources?
Or
Given that healthcare resources are often limited, how should the conflict between 
the protection of individual rights (e.g. satisfying patient needs) and the sustain-
ability of healthcare resources be mitigated?
This is precisely the fundamental problem at stake that underlies this thesis. 
1.2 twO PROBLEM-SOLvIng PERSPECtIvES:  
PERSOnAL RESPOnSIBILItY AnD StAtE ACCOUntABILItY
From all relevant studies on dealing with the problem raised above, scholarly literature 
largely builds arguments on addressing state accountability in protecting and promoting 
individual right to health – namely, securing the ‘accessibility, acceptability, availability and 
quality (AAAQ)’3 of healthcare resources for patients. The rationale underlying this argu-
ment is the pricelessness of human life. Needless to say, limiting a patient’s access to certain 
medical services is counterintuitive when it relates to a concrete single case. However, such 
behaviour may become acceptable if we take a systematic point of view because sustain-
ability, as another key consideration, will come into play. 
In the field of health and healthcare where individuals have great control over their own 
health,4 encouraging every individual human being to play a more active role in taking 
care of their own health – namely, to be more responsible for one’s own health – is likely 
to be a plausible way to respond to the sustainability concern. In this regard, not only can 
3 For more information about AAAQ, please refer to https: / / www.who.int/ gender-equity-rights/ knowledge/ 
AAAQ.pdf?ua=1 (last accessed 24 March, 2019)
4 Scholarly literature has proved that there exists a causal relationship between disfavoured habits (e.g. exces-
sive smoking, eating disorders and alcoholism) and several chronic diseases (e.g. cardiovascular diseases, lung 
cancer, and overweight). For detailed discussion, please refer to Watson and Conte (1954); Rehm et al. (2009); 
Brownell and Walsh (2017).
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the health condition of every individual human being benefit from responsible individual 
behaviour but also, it will in turn contribute to the sustainability of healthcare resources. 
Thus, addressing personal responsibility in protecting and promoting one’s own health has 
been raised as another problem-solving perspective.
Hitherto, two problem-solving perspectives that are often used to mitigate the conflict 
between protecting individual rights and sustaining healthcare resources have been men-
tioned. In order to provide a deeper understanding, relevant studies concerning personal 
responsibility and state accountability are discussed separately below.
1.2.1 Personal responsibility
By and large, personal responsibility means letting people be responsible for their own 
choices. In health and healthcare, it can be identified in many ways and it is important to 
acknowledge that different ways of identifying personal responsibility will result in different, 
or even conflicting, reform strategies for promoting the healthcare system. That is, if one 
considered personal responsibility in health and healthcare as an excuse to blame or punish 
patients, then reform strategies would turn to limiting, rather than increasing, the accessibil-
ity of healthcare. On the contrary, if one identified the core value of personal responsibility 
in health and healthcare as taking good care of one’s own health, such as developing a healthy 
lifestyle and being active in preventive healthcare, then reform strategies would be more 
likely to reflect the common conceptual basis of a decent society that we owe to each other 
in matters of healthcare distribution. 
Thus, throughout this thesis, personal responsibility in health and healthcare is identified 
as follows: people should play a positive role in managing their own health. In the Chapter 3 of 
this thesis, a specific interpretation on what constitutes ‘a positive role’ is provided.5 
In practice, reform strategies addressing personal responsibility for health have already 
been taken by some countries; for instance, the bonus policy in the German healthcare 
system (Schmidt, 2008), and the West Virginia Medicaid State Plan in the United States 
(Steinbrook, 2006). Behind these reform measures, there are several philosophical founda-
tions, including liberal egalitarianism, luck egalitarianism and communitarianism.6 How to 
justify the role of personal responsibility in healthcare distribution is a key question attract-
ing attention from these philosophical traditions. 
From the perspective of liberal egalitarianism, people should be held accountable for their 
health-related choices, but not necessarily the consequences of their choices (Cappelen & 
Norheim, 2005, p. 478). According to liberal egalitarianisms, health policy should take two 
principles into account: holding people accountable for their own choices (i.e. ‘the principle 
5 Please refer to page 67 of this thesis.
6 Chapter 2 of this thesis includes a detailed introduction of each theory of justice and their potential implemen-
tations for reform policies. Please refer to page 55 of this thesis.
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of responsibility’) and people who make the same choices should be treated equally regardless 
of the resulting consequences (i.e. ‘the principle of equalisation’) (Cappelen & Norheim, 
2005, p. 478). The reason why liberal egalitarianism separates choices from consequences is 
that they believe the same choices may not lead to the same consequences. For instance, the 
chance of developing lung cancer may be increased by excessive smoking. If A and B are both 
highly addicted to cigarettes but only B develops lung cancer and needs healthcare badly, lib-
eral egalitarianism would argue that a just healthcare system should hold A and B accountable 
for their excessive smoking behaviour but not for the consequences (i.e. A is healthy but B has 
lung cancer). With regard to policy implications, liberal egalitarianism is in favour of using 
the tax mechanism to hold people accountable for their health-related choices (Cappelen 
& Norheim, 2005, p. 479). Reflected in the case above, imposing progressive taxation on 
cigarettes is a recommended way to hold A and B to be responsible for their choice to smoke. 
Whether choices are free or not is the core value of luck egalitarianism. Applied in health 
and healthcare, its basic standpoint implies that a just healthcare system cannot let people be 
responsible for inequalities caused by factors that are out of their control (Segall, 2009). That 
is, limiting people’s access to healthcare can be justified if people’s unhealthy condition resulted 
from their ‘option luck’7 (e.g. lifestyle choices). For those people, luck egalitarianism argues 
that health insurance is a way to protect themselves from bad consequences (Dworkin, 1978).
Different from the above two theories of justice, communitarianism values the common 
good of the society (Ezioni, 2010). People need to contribute to foster common good by 
taking responsibility for their own health (Callahan, 2003, p. 496). Communitarianism 
does not care about the diversity of healthcare needs (Houtepen & Ter Meulen, 2000, p. 
360). Accordingly, weighting public health over healthcare for rare diseases is justified in the 
eye of communitarianism.
Overall, personal responsibility in health and healthcare, if suitably interpreted, should 
be adopted as a key consideration in balancing individual interests (or rights) and the sus-
tainability of healthcare resources. 
1.2.2 State accountability
Drawn from literature, addressing state accountability is another perspective that is employed 
fairly often in discussions concerning how to achieve an optimal balance between protecting 
individual rights and sustaining healthcare resources. Roughly, there are two prominent 
aspects guiding the majority of discussions. 
7 Ronald Dworkin distinguished ‘brute luck’ and ‘option luck’. For a detailed introduction, please refer to Chap-
ter 2 of this thesis on pp. 53-54. Also, please refer to Dworkin (2000), p. 73.  
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Social determinants of health
Given that in certain situations where individual patient’s access to healthcare is impeded by fac-
tors that are out of their control (Figure 1.1), it is reasonable to assign responsibility to the state 
for the sake of empowering people to claim their denied medical needs and other dissatisfactions.
Apparently, not all determinants demonstrated by Figure 1.1 can be controlled by the 
state, for instance, the individual lifestyle factors. Nevertheless, the state is still assigned 
with a major responsibility to correct the injustice of some structural determinants, such 
as ‘poor social policies and programmes, unfair economic arrangements, and bad politics’ 
(Commission on Social Determinants of Health 2008, p. 26).
figure 1.1 The main determinants of health
Source: Dahlgren & Whitehead (1991), p. 11.
The social determinants of health (SDH) are often argued as key factors causing health 
inequalities (Sage, 2017, p. 10). Defined by the World Health Organization (WHO, 2008), 
SDH are the conditions ‘in which people are born, grow up, live, work and age, and the 
systems put in place to deal with illness.’8 In real-life situations, SDH are not always the same 
but de facto shaped differently within and between countries due to a wide range of forces 
(Box 1.1) and the interactions between those forces.
Box 1.1 The solid facts (driving forces underlie SDH)
In the booklet, Social Determinants of Health: The Solid Facts (Richard Wilkinson and Michael 
Marmot eds., 2nd ed., 2003), ten solid facts that greatly impact SDH have been summarised:
(1) the social gradient; (2) stress; (3) early life; (4) social exclusion; (5) work; (6) unemployment; (7) 
social support; (8) addiction; (9) food; (10) transport.
8 Retrieved from https: / / www.who.int/ social_ determinants/ thecommission/ finalreport/ en/ (last accessed 24 
March 2019). For more information on the social determinants of health, please refer to http: / / www.who.int/ 
social_ determinants/ thecommission/ finalreport/ key_ concepts/ en/ (last accessed 24 March 2019)
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Uncovering these solid facts helps to develop a richer understanding of SDH and thereby 
suggests clear directions for addressing state accountability in healthcare (Marmot, 2005).
Health and human rights
Addressing state accountability plays a central role in the widely employed human rights-
based approach to health (Potts & Hunt, 2008, p. 7; Yamin, 2008). According to this 
human rights-based approach, all health policies must integrate – or at least answer to – the 
principles of human rights (i.e. ‘universal and inalienable’, ‘interdependent and indivisible’, 
‘equal and non-discriminatory’, and ‘both rights and obligations’).9 The close relationship 
between health policies and human rights principles can be best justified by the treaties 
and instruments of international human rights law. Among these documents, Article 12 
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, Box 
1.2) and its General Comment No. 14 clearly stipulate that ‘States Parties to the present 
Covenant’ should be assigned with prime duties in protecting and promoting the health of 
its citizens – namely, to respect, protect and fulfil the right to health in line with the AAAQ 
standards for its citizens.
In most cases, states have committed to achieving AAAQ standards through implement-
ing policies on expanding accessibility (e.g. achieving the goal of universal health cover-
age) and improving the quality of healthcare (e.g. the goal of ‘building high-quality and 
value-based service delivery’10). Some countries, such as Costa Rica, even adopt health rights 
litigation and let the Supreme Court play a key role in assuring more fairness in access to 
healthcare for people (Norheim & Wilson, 2014).
Box 1.2 Article 12 of ICESCR: The Right to Health
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.
The steps to be taken by the State Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full realization of this 
right shall include those necessary for: 
(a)  The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and for the healthy 
development of the child; 
(b)  The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene; 
(c)  The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases; 
(d)  The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical attention in the 
event of sickness.
9 Retrieved from https: / / www.ohchr.org/ EN/ Issues/ Pages/ WhatareHumanRights.aspx (Last accessed 24 March 
2019) 
10 ‘Building high-quality and value-based service delivery’ is the goal of deepening healthcare system reform in 
China. For detailed information, please refer to Healthy China: deepening health reform in China. Retrieved 
from http: / / www.wpro.who.int/ china/ publications/ 2016-health-reform-in-china/ en/ (last accessed 24 March 
2019).
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Overall, studies either addressing personal responsibility or in favour of state account-
ability all seem to be plausible and have convincing arguments. However, I agree with what 
Martha Nussbaum once put, ‘a good analysis will attend both to personal and to structural 
factors’ (Nussbaum, 2011, p. xii). Thus, for the question concerned, the state should be 
assigned ‘a certain degree of responsibility’ (Schmidt, 2008, p. 200; Schmidt, 2016, p. 
219) in securing the health of its citizens while citizens, in return, should also take personal 
responsibility seriously. Holding a similar standpoint, this thesis is designed to give equal 
weight to personal responsibility and state accountability in exploring the problem at stake. 
1.3 SEttIng tHE COntExt: HEALtHCARE In CHInA At A gLAnCE
1.3.1 General background
China is a populous nation with 1.379 billion people living in mainland China in 2016.11 
The average life expectancy at birth was 76.09 years in 2015, which showed a tremendous 
increase compared with 1949 (i.e. average 35 years).12 As a rapid ageing nation, nearly 10% 
of the general population was older than 65 years in 2016 which is expected to increase to 
18.2% by the year 2030.13 Furthermore, the ratio of urban/rural residents changed from 1: 
2.3 in 1993 to 1: 1.43 in 2016 along with urbanisation and industrialisation.14 
The above factors and their interactions together contribute to a significant change of 
the disease spectrum in China: from communicable diseases to non-communicable diseases 
(NCDs). Data for 2012 demonstrate that cardiovascular diseases, diabetes, cancer, chronic 
respiratory diseases and other kinds of NCDs accounted for approximately 85% of all deaths 
and 70% of the total disease burden.15 As a consequence, the Chinese healthcare system, 
especially the scope and content of health services and the method of delivery, needs to be 
reformed in order to meet the changing health needs. 
1.3.2 The Chinese healthcare system
Generally, there are three essential dimensions of the Chinese healthcare system: delivery, 
financing and supervision (Meng et al., 2015, p. 14). In this section, these three dimensions 
will be briefly introduced through discussions on healthcare delivery system, health insur-
ance schemes, and health governance and legislation.  
11 Data source from the World Bank, please refer to https: / / data.worldbank.org/ indicator/ sp.pop.
totl?end=2016&name_ desc=false&start=1960 (last accessed 24 March 2019). 
12 Data source from the World Bank, please refer to https: / / data.worldbank.org/ indicator/ sp.dyn.le00.
in?end=2015&start=1960 (last accessed 24 March 2019).
13 Please refer to http: / / www.sic.gov.cn/ News/ 455/ 5900.htm (in Chinese, last accessed 24 March 2019).
14 Please refer to http: / / www.stats.gov.cn/ tjsj/ sjjd/ 201702/ t20170228_ 1467357.html (in Chinese, last accessed 
24 March 2019)
15 Ministry of Health, China National Plan for NCD Prevention and Treatment (2012-2015), retrieved from http: 
/ / www.chinacdc.cn/ en/ ne/ 201207/ t20120725_ 64430.html (last accessed 24 March 2019).
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Healthcare delivery system
In China, the healthcare delivery system has been established with a three-tier structure 
(Figure 1.2). Patients are allowed to choose from those medical institutions for healthcare 
(i.e. both outpatient and inpatient services) freely which means there is no mandatory 
gatekeeping in healthcare in China. Although lower level medical institutions are designed 
to undertake primary medical services (e.g. ‘health education, prevention, rehabilitation, 
family planning, and treatments for common diseases’16) for people, they do not play a 
gatekeeping role in healthcare delivery in China (Meng et al., 2015, p. 203). 
First Level
•Rural: Village clinics
•Urban: Community health stations/ 
centres
Second 
Level
•Rural: Township health centres
•Urban: District hospitals
Third Level
•Rural: County hospitals
•Urban: Tertiary hospitals
Figure 1.2
Primary medical service
Secondary and tertiary 
medical service
Medical Services
figure 1.2 Th ree-tier structure and medical services on three levels
Source: Meng Q., Yang H., Chen W., Sun Q., & Liu X. (2015). People’s Republic of China: health 
system review. Health Systems in Transition, 5(7): 1-246. p. 133.
With regard to patient pathways, they are likely to choose medical institutions on lower 
levels as their fi rst contact for diseases even though they are aware that the higher the level of 
the medical institution, the better facilities it will have. Furthermore, data show that there 
has been no big change in this preference from 2008 to 2013 (Figure 1.3).
However, medical institutions on the lower level, especially village clinics and community 
health stations, generally fall short of advanced medical facilities and qualifi ed healthcare 
professionals. Such defi ciency results in an awkward situation where healthcare services are 
indeed easy to access but the quality of services cannot be guaranteed. In some cases, patients 
have to go to higher level medical institutions for their unhealed diseases. Due to a poor 
referral system, patients often need to take certain medical tests for a second time in order 
to provide reliable information for doctors’ new diagnosis. During that period, not only will 
patients suff er more from extra medical tests and aggravated diseases but also, they will have 
to pay a higher medical bill with out-of-pocket money. Th e weak primary medical services 
and the poor referral system generate far-reaching consequences for healthcare in China 
16 Examples of primary medical services are summarized by Meng et al., 2015, p. 20. Retrieved from https: / / iris.
wpro.who.int/ bitstream/ handle/ 10665.1/ 11408/ 9789290617280_ ; jsessionid=6F183D3886BA2F4E81B8A9
996E64F036?sequence=1 (last accessed 24 March 2019)
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which are well expressed by a short phrase: ‘看病难，看病贵’ (to see a doctor is diffi  cult, 
to see a doctor is expensive).
Another issue that cannot be overlooked is the rapidly growing private sector in health-
care in China. By the end of 2016, the number of private medical institutions (PMIs) was 
increased to 16,432 which accounted for 56.39% of all medical institutions. Although the 
average size of PMIs is relatively small in China, they still took care of approximately 12.8% 
of total patient visits in 2016 (Meng et al., 2015, p. 112). Th e increasing involvement of the 
private sector in healthcare in China not only will make the healthcare delivery system more 
effi  cient, but it will also contribute to diversifying health services and thereby expanding the 
accessibility of medical services and protecting patient rights. Nevertheless, negative eff ects 
will also be generated if countries lack related advanced technical and administrative capacity 
(Roberts et al., 2008, p. 254).
Health insurance schemes
In China, health insurance schemes are roughly divided into social insurance schemes 
and private insurance schemes. Social insurance schemes include three basic types: Urban 
Employee Basic Medical Insurance (UEBMI), Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance 
(URBMI), and New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme (NRCMS). Easily observed 
from their names, enrolling in which insurance scheme is mainly based on the registered 
residence of people and their status of employment. Furthermore, UEBMI requires manda-
tory enrolment. URBMI, NRCMS and private insurance are voluntary insurance schemes. 
Contributions to social insurance schemes are designed diff erently in China. For example, 
UEBMI is relying on the employee and the employer; the contribution to URBMI is mainly 
made by individuals with limited government subsidies; NRCMS is fi nanced by individuals, 
collectives and government (Meng et al., 2015, p. 86).
73%
17%
8% 2%First
Level
Second
Level
Thrid
Level
Other
74%
17%
8%
1%
2008 2013
Figure 1.3
figure 1.3 First contact medical service (2008 vs. 2013)
Source: Developed by the author with data from the 5th National Health Service Survey in 2013 (Cen-
tre for Health Statistics and Information, 2013 p. 39)
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By the end of 2015, over 95% of the general population had been protected by one 
of these three social insurance schemes in China.17 Staying over 95% coverage contributes 
greatly to protecting and promoting the right to health, especially in terms of expanding the 
accessibility of healthcare by making services aff ordable for patients in China.18 
Nevertheless, diffi  cult issues still exist, such as the reimbursement problem of seeking 
healthcare in places other than the patients’ place of residence. For example, taking migrant 
workers,19 they are rural residents but working in the urban areas of China. Due to their 
registered place of residence, they can only enrol in NRCMS which may limit their access 
to healthcare in their working places for two reasons: (1) NRCMS has a relatively lower 
benefi t coverage than URBMI and UEBMI; (2) migrant workers have to go back to their 
place of residence to get reimbursement (Yu, 2015, p. 1149). Such reimbursement problems 
do not merely block migrate workers’ access to healthcare; people who want to seek better 
healthcare in a place other than their place of residence will also have to face this diffi  cult 
issue. In most cases they have no choice but to bear unaff ordable, out-of-pocket medical 
costs, which ultimately bankrupts many families in China. 
Health governance and legislation
In China, healthcare is governed by a complex set of policies, government agencies (central 
and local) and legislation. 
On the state level, healthcare issues are mainly administrated by the National Health and 
Family Planning Commission (NHFPC) and the State Administration of Traditional Chi-
nese Medicine (SATCM). On the provincial level, city level, and county/district level, these 
two governance bodies have their own affi  liations to assume and fulfi l their responsibilities 
(Meng et al., 2015, p. 21). Other departments of government, such as the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), the Ministry of Education (MOE), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), 
the Ministry of Human Resource and Social Security (MOHRSS), and the National De-
velopment and Reform Commission (NDRC), are assigned with their own responsibility in 
relation to healthcare (Meng et al., 2015, p. 21).
17 Please refer to http: / / www.mohrss.gov.cn/ SYrlzyhshbzb/ dongtaixinwen/ buneiyaowen/ 201612/ t20161214_ 
261978.html (in Chinese, last accessed 24 March 2019)
18 World Bank Group, World Health Organization, Ministry of Finance, National Health and Family Planning 
Commission, Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security. (2016). Deepening Health Reform in China: 
Building High-Quality and Value-Based Service Delivery. p. xxvi. Please refer to https: / / openknowledge.world-
bank.org/ bitstream/ handle/ 10986/ 24720/ HealthReformInChina.pdf (Last accessed 24 March 2019)
19 In 2016, China had over 281 million migrant workers (National Bureau of Statistics, 2016). Data is available 
online, please refer to http: / / www.stats.gov.cn/ tjsj/ zxfb/ 201704/ t20170428_ 1489334.html (in Chinese, last 
accessed 24 March 2019).
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table 1.2 Special health laws in China
Laws Date of Issued and Effective Concerns
Frontier Health and Quarantine Law 
(2009 Amendment)
Issued and Effective:
27/08/2009
Public Health
Law on Maternal and Infant Health Care Issued: 27/10/1994; Effective: 
27/08/2009
Women and Children
Law on Population and Family Planning 
(2015 Amendment)
Issued and Effective:  
27/12/2015
Public Health and 
Reproductive Rights
Law on Prevention and Treatment of Infectious 
Diseases (2013 Amendment)
Issued and Effective:  
29/06/2013
Public Health
Law on the Prevention and Control of 
Occupational Diseases (2011 Amendment)
Issued and Effective:  
31/12/2011
Public Health and 
Occupational Health
Law on Traditional Chinese Medicine Issued: 25/12/2016;
Effective: 01/07/2017
TCM
Law on Practicing Doctors of the PRC  
(2009 Revision)
Issued and Effective:  
6/26/1998
Medical Professionals
Law on Blood Donation Issued: 29/12/1997;
Effective: 01/10/1998
Public Health
Law on the Red Cross Society 
 (2009 Amendment)
Issued and Effective
27/08/2009
Humanitarian and Public 
Health
Mental Health Law Issued: 26/12/2012; 
Effective: 01/05/2013
Mental Health
Pharmaceutical Administration Law  
(2015 Amendment)
Issued and Effective:  
24/04/2015
Drug
Source: Developed by the author with data from pkulaw, please refer to http://en.pkulaw.cn/
Similar to many other countries, China has not yet enacted an ‘umbrella’ health law (Meng 
et al., 2015, p. 18). Nevertheless, there were eleven special health laws in China by 2017 
(Table 1.2). Besides these special health laws, other health-related legislations are stipulated 
in legal fields such as administrative law, contract law or even criminal law, which implies 
a characteristic of fragmentation of effective health-related legal rules. Lawmakers in China 
are now drafting an ‘umbrella health law’20 to connect the Constitution; eleven special health 
laws, and health-related legislations in other legal fields. 
1.3.3 Other considerations
Other considerations, especially cultural and political contexts, have a particular relevance 
to healthcare because they demonstrate the uniqueness of healthcare in certain countries. 
Therefore, those cultural and political considerations cannot be downplayed or overlooked 
when studying the Chinese healthcare system.  
20 The ‘umbrella health law’ is named as ‘Basic Healthcare and Health Promotion Law of People’s Republic of 
China’. It is still in its ‘drafting, discussing, and revising’ process. The first draft was discussed on December 
2017 and the second draft was discussed on August 2018. For more information, please refer to http: / / www.
npc.gov.cn/ npc/ lfzt/ rlyw/ node_ 33534.htm (in Chinese, last accessed 24 March 2019)
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Confucian tradition and Chinese bioethics
Confucian ethical tradition attaches great importance to the virtue of ‘仁’ (benevolence) and 
‘孝’ (filial piety).21 From a Confucian viewpoint, the individual human being is incomplete 
without belonging to a family (Chen & Fan, 2010, p. 577). Confucian societies (e.g. Sin-
gapore and China) therefore value close family ties and attach great importance to the role 
of the family when drafting social policies (Wong et al., 2009, p. 53). To a large extent, this 
viewpoint decides the family-based character of the healthcare system in these societies, such 
as emphasising the role of the family in healthcare decision-making.
Decentralised reform on administrative system
Due to three waves of decentralisation reform in China (1958, 1970 and 1978), the ad-
ministrative powers of central government have been gradually transferred to local govern-
ments and specific government agencies for the sake of maximising overall social welfare 
and satisfying the diverse sets of preferences of local people (Feng, 2016, pp. 13–14). As 
a consequence, health policies formed by central government are often enforced unevenly 
across local communities, which inevitably raises several concerns such as the vulnerability 
of local governments (e.g. local interest groups and private capital investment may greatly 
influence the autonomy of local governments in fully enforcing health policies) and the 
enhanced inequity in healthcare (Collins & Green, 1994, p. 465).
Household registration system
The household registration system (户口, hukou) has been in operation since 1949 for the 
administration of China’s residents. People born legally in China acquire a personal registration 
card (hukou page) to be added to a household registration record (hukou booklet). The household 
registration record is issued per family; it thus certifies not only the legal residence of a citizen, 
but, more importantly, the relationships between family members. At the very beginning, the 
household registration record was designed to identify an individual as a permanent resident of a 
specific place, either rural (agricultural household registration record) or urban (non-agricultural 
household registration record). Therefore, it exerts a significant influence on access to social ben-
efits, such as education and healthcare (Qiu, 2014, p. 113). However, the impacts of urban-rural 
differences regarding registered residence has been partially eliminated since the implementation 
of the Guiding Opinion of the State Council on Deepening the Reform of the Household 
Registration System in 2014.22 Following the Guiding Opinion, the reform focused on the 
innovation of population management by abolishing classification of the agricultural and non-
agricultural household registration records. The ongoing reform of the household registration 
system is believed to bring more fairness to the Chinese healthcare system. 
21 For the English translation of those basic virtues of Confucianism, please refer to Runes (1983), p. 338.
22 The State Council (2014). Guiding Opinion of State Council on Deepening the Reform of the Household 
Registration System, para. 9. Please refer to http: / / www.gov.cn/ zhengce/ content/ 2014-07/ 30/ content_ 8944.
htm (in Chinese, last accessed 24 March 2019).
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1.4 RESEARCH QUEStIOn AnD SUBQUEStIOnS
The general aim of this thesis is to develop proper strategies for balancing the protection of 
individual rights (e.g. satisfying patient needs) and the sustainability of healthcare resources 
in the context of Chinese healthcare system reforms. Special attention is given to drawing 
a fair ‘cut’ between personal responsibility and state accountability in order to make the 
reforms of the Chinese healthcare system more effective. Therefore, the central question of 
this thesis is designed as follows:
In the context of Chinese healthcare system reforms, how should the conflict between 
the protection of individual rights (e.g. satisfying patient needs) and the sustain-
ability of healthcare resources from ethical and legal perspectives be mitigated?
In order to address and answer this central question, I formulate five subquestions that can 
be mainly categorised into two major dimensions (i.e. personal responsibility and structural 
injustice) and three concrete topics (i.e. patient empowerment, healthcare delivery model 
and a supportive environment). These five subquestions will be explored and answered 
respectively by five independent but interrelated papers which are also in Chapters 2–6 of 
this thesis. The first two subquestions are mainly framed from the perspective of addressing 
personal responsibility in healthcare in China, while questions 3 to 5 are framed with a 
special concern given to the role of the state in correcting structural injustice in healthcare 
in China.
Given that healthcare systems worldwide are currently experiencing more pressure posed 
by the ageing population and the increasing burden of non-communicable diseases (e.g. 
chronic diseases),23 reform strategies (e.g. the WHO framework on integrated people-centred 
health services24) tend to suggest that policymakers should pay more attention to the role of 
personal responsibility in healthcare. Yet, what is personal responsibility in healthcare? How 
do we address personal responsibility properly to make healthcare reforms more effective 
in a given context? In order to address these concerns, the first two subquestions have been 
framed as follows:
Q 1. To what extent should personal responsibility be addressed in advancing the reform of 
the Chinese healthcare system?
23 World Bank Group, World Health Organization, China’s Ministry of Finance, National Health and Family 
Planning Commission, and Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security. Healthy China: deepening 
health reform in China, at xv–xvi. Please refer to http: / / www.wpro.who.int/ china/ publications/ 2016-health-
reform-in-china/ en/ (last accessed 24 March 2019).
24 For more information about integrated people-centered health services, please refer to http: / / www.who.int/ 
servicedeliverysafety/ areas/ people-centred-care/ en/ (last accessed 24 March 2019).
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Q 2. How do we place patient personal responsibility fairly in healthcare in China to make 
the reform measures (i.e. measures derived from the people-centred integrated care (PCIC) 
model) more effective?
Before governments embark on any restructure of healthcare systems, especially implementing 
market-oriented reform measures, questions such as whether those new health measures would 
actually benefit people’s health and whether they are formulated in line with existing priorities 
(e.g. the principle of solidarity and the goal of universal health coverage) need to be carefully 
addressed (Rosenblatt, 1981, p. 1067). In China, introducing GP services to strengthen pri-
mary healthcare is one of those measures. Therefore, the following question has been framed:
Q 3. Will the implementation of general practitioner (GP) services strengthen China’s 
primary healthcare delivery and how do we structure regulatory interventions to secure the 
successful nationwide implementation of GP services?
For the sake of driving more efficiency in delivering healthcare and preventing the inher-
ent coercion of certain public policies, market-oriented measures are gradually introduced 
to healthcare systems worldwide (Enthoven, 2002). Even countries with robust public 
healthcare systems (e.g. the Canadian healthcare system) tend to encourage more private 
sector involvement in healthcare. In China, despite the fact that the public sector (i.e. public 
hospitals) accounts for roughly 90% of health services, the private sector (i.e. both for-profit 
and not-for-profit medical institutions) have increased rapidly since 2009 along with achiev-
ing the goal of universal health coverage (Yip et al., 2012, p. 379). Nevertheless, promoting 
private sector involvement in healthcare shall not endanger other existing values, such as 
solidarity and universal health coverage (Cortez, 2011, p. 360). Therefore, the following 
question has been framed:
Q 4. To what extent does privatisation impact healthcare in China and how does the state 
fulfil its role in measuring the rapid growth of private medical institutions (especially using 
legal/regulatory measures) from a human rights perspective?
Preconditions for an effective nationwide implementation of new health policies should at 
least include a sound legal/regulatory framework (Sage, 2017, p. 19). Furthermore, adhering 
to the ‘rule of law’ requires using legislation to ensure the consistency and coherence of 
guidance on implementing policy priorities. In China, the 13th five-year plan for healthcare 
sets the integration of healthcare delivery and the consolidation of three health insurance 
schemes as reform priorities (Li & Fu, 2017). However, health law in China has a character-
istic of fragmentation, which is not likely to conform with these integrated-oriented reform 
priorities and may ultimately create obstacles reducing the effectiveness of reform policies. 
From this concern, the following question has been framed:
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Q 5. To what extent is the performance of the Chinese healthcare system tied to China’s 
health law and how do we form a coherent health law that will best meet China’s new 
health reform initiatives?
1.5 MEtHODOLOgY
This methodology section briefly outlines research materials and methods used by this thesis 
for exploring the central question and subquestions raised above. 
1.5.1 Research materials
Research materials used by this thesis can be roughly categorised into three main kinds: legal 
texts, statistical data, and monographs and scientific literature.
Legal texts refer not merely to laws and regulations on local, national and international 
levels that are relevant to health and healthcare, but also include certain case law. A vast array 
of laws and regulations on the domestic level was searched for via pkulaw (北大法宝)25 
which is a database of Chinese law. With regard to the international level, relevant sources 
are, to a large extent, directly available online to the public (e.g. International Covenant on 
Economic, Cultural, and Social Rights (ICESCR), International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR)). A systematic but brief review of these legal texts was performed to 
ground the basis of one essential segment of this thesis (Chapter 6). For the sake of simplify-
ing arguments, case law is also employed in certain parts of this thesis. Relevant materials are 
collected from searching the HUDOC database26 which is published by the European Court 
of Human Rights and the case law of the European Court of Justice. 
Materials such as statistical data are mainly second-hand data collected either by govern-
ment bureaus (e.g. National Bureaus of Statistics of China, National Health and Family 
Planning Commission of the PRC) or by relevant intergovernmental organisations (e.g. the 
World Health Organization, the World Bank Group); that is, data published in government 
documents, white papers or other authorised project reports is included.
Reviewing classic monographs and relevant literature aims at formulating a theoretical 
framework to ground this research, to link the five independent studies and thereby support 
the consistency and coherence of this thesis. Relevant literature also includes grey literature, 
which refers to documents and guidelines launched by governments, reports produced 
by non-governmental organisations, conference proceedings, theses and news released by 
websites sponsored by professional institutions. 
25 The pkulaw website is an online database, please refer to http: / / pkulaw.cn/ 
26 HUDOC database. Please refer to https: / / hudoc.echr.coe.int/ eng# and the case-law of the European Court of 
Justice. Please refer to http: / / curia.europa.eu/ juris/ .
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1.5.2 Research methods
Given that the research question at the heart of this thesis is essentially a question that 
is at the interface of disciplinary boundaries, research methods applied therefore have an 
interdisciplinary character. Specifically, the methods applied in this thesis mainly include 
theoretical analysis, historical analysis and classic legal analysis. In certain parts of this thesis, 
case study is also applied for the sake of simplifying specific arguments.
Employing theoretical analysis aims to address two fundamental issues that are not only 
relevant to the whole research but also essential to each individual study included: (1) to 
clarify terminologies and thereby define the scope of this research; (2) to explain the reason-
ing behind the research question and subquestions. 
Historical analysis is conducted for this research. It is a method of discovering and 
examining past evidence and thereby helps to understand why things happened (Thorpe 
& Holt, 2008). Institutions like healthcare systems have their unique developing history, 
which could profoundly influence the subsequent performance of these institutions. Thus, 
examining historical evidence is of great importance, especially in terms of helping to de-
velop a better understanding of the system design. Taking China’s healthcare system for 
example, employing historical analysis will help to explain why its delivery system now has 
a three-tier structure. Furthermore, historical analysis can provide evidence and justification 
for explaining why certain old institutions prove to be incompatible with reality and need 
to be revised or even abolished, such as China’s three basic healthcare insurance schemes. In 
addition, historical analysis is a meaningful method to evaluate past experience and thereby 
provide lessons for new developments. 
In order to answer the final subquestion regarding the interactions between the perfor-
mance of the Chinese healthcare system and China’s health-related legislation, classic legal 
analysis is used to evaluate laws and regulations on both national and international levels that 
are effective in governing health and healthcare in China. The analysing process follows the 
IRAC framework, which consists of four sections: issue, rule, application and conclusion; 
that is, identifying the issue in concern, exploring the applicable legal rules, applying relevant 
legal rules to the facts of the issue, and drawing a conclusion (Miller & Charles, 2009, p. 193). 
The section of application also requires an explanation of the reason why certain legal rules are 
applicable or not applicable to the issue concerned. Furthermore, case study is also employed 
in answering this subquestion, because typical cases are useful to identify the issue concerned. 
1.6 StRUCtURE Of tHE tHESIS
This thesis consists of seven chapters. Besides the introduction (Chapter 1) and the conclu-
sion (Chapter 7), Chapters 2 to 6 are independent but interrelated papers, which are designed 
around the central research question (Figure 1.4). These five papers can be arranged into two 
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major perspectives (personal responsibility and structural injustice) and three specific themes 
(patient empowerment, healthcare delivery model and a supportive legal environment). 
patient rights
sustainable health 
care 
Health care 
delivery 
model 
(private 
sector & GPs)
Supportive 
environment (health 
care law-making)
Patient 
empowerme
nt (personal 
responsibility 
& family 
support)
chapter 6
Correct 
structural 
injustice
Figure 1.4
figure 1.4 Structure of thesis
In the part of patient empowerment, I claim that personal responsibility is a plausible crite-
rion in achieving distributive justice in healthcare (Chapter 2). Meanwhile, I argue that it is 
of great importance to involve family as a supplementary consideration to assist the imple-
mentation of the principle of personal responsibility in healthcare when taking the Chinese 
context (e.g. the Confucian tradition and the Chinese bioethics) into account (Chapter 3). 
Nevertheless, designing a healthcare delivery model is de facto setting the scope of ‘choice 
architects’27 for patients. Therefore, in the part considering the healthcare delivery model, 
I argue that the hospital-based healthcare delivery system needs to be reoriented. In this 
regard, I focus my attention on two evolving parties: the general practitioner (Chapter 4), 
and the private medical institutions (Chapter 5). The conditions under which patients are 
empowered to claim their denied but reasonable medical needs and the healthcare delivery 
system is structured and operated are of great importance. Therefore, a supportive environ-
ment, especially a sound legal framework, is in great need. To respond to this concern, I 
briefly review all health-related laws and regulations on both national and international 
levels, draw lessons from representative theoretical debate on the coherence of health law, 
and thereby make corresponding recommendations (Chapter 6).
27 ‘Choice architects’ is a concept formulated by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein. It refers to an organised 
context in which people are able to make better choices. For detailed explanations, please refer to Thaler & 
Sunstein, (2003, 2008); Sunstein & Thaler, (2003). 
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ABStRACt
Aim: This chapter aims to answer the question: To what extent should personal responsibility 
be addressed in advancing the reform of the Chinese healthcare system?
Background: Great achievements have been made by China’s healthcare system since it 
started its first round of reform in 1978. However, a number of problems such as ‘to see a 
doctor is difficult, to see a doctor is expensive’ are remaining, which indicates that reform 
efforts are still insufficient and future steps may need to be taken in an innovative way. 
Methods: Theoretical analysis is employed to clarify certain conceptions and to explore the 
reasoning behind certain reform measures. Historical analysis is also adopted to track the 
development of China’s healthcare system and thereby form the contextual basis for future 
innovative healthcare reform.
findings: Addressing state accountability in health and healthcare is widely accepted and 
discussed in literature while personal responsibility receives relatively less attention. A back-
and-forth feature of reform has been identified after a historical analysis of China’s healthcare 
system development. Given that new challenges occur along with the ageing population 
and the increasing burden of non-communicable diseases, it is unlikely to succeed if reform 
efforts continued to merely focus on addressing the responsibility of the state. Reform atten-
tion needs to be switched to encourage people to be responsible for their own health, namely 
to play an active role in taking care of their own health. All in all, addressing personal re-
sponsibility in health and healthcare should be an integral part of China’s healthcare system.
Keywords: China’s healthcare system, reform, state accountability, personal responsibility
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2.1 IntRODUCtIOn 
In literature, discussions mainly focus on addressing state accountability in protecting and 
promoting the right to health (Chapman, 1994, 2010; Chapman et al., 2015; Toebes, 1999a, 
1999b, 2006, 2015; Daniels, 2001, 2008, 2011; Fisher et al., 2010; Schrecker et al., 2010). 
Yet, under the influence of inefficient utilisation and the free-rider problem28, protecting and 
promoting the right to health through emphasising the state accountability corresponds poorly 
with reality. Situations are likely to be even worse after healthcare systems encounter new 
problems caused by the ageing population and the increasing burden of non-communicable 
diseases. Thus, it is time to bring other stakeholders into account. Given that individuals are 
believed to have a great control over their own health whereas the active role that individuals 
can play in healthcare system reforms has long been simply overlooked, this chapter aims 
at addressing this gap and then provides recommendations on how and where personal 
responsibility should be addressed in health policies in China. Furthermore, considering the 
diversified conditions of healthcare systems, this chapter mainly embeds discussions in the 
context of the Chinese healthcare system. Although recommendations for policy options are 
largely context-based, other nations can still draw meaningful lessons from this study. 
2.2 A CASE StUDY Of tHE CHInESE HEALtHCARE SYStEM
2.2.1 Basic structure
From a macro perspective, the Chinese healthcare system has a multilevel structure, including 
a public health service system, a medical care system and a medical security system. It is also 
a hybrid of public and private elements, allocating healthcare resources via state intervention 
and market transactions (Ho, 2014). Specifically, the public health service system with a 
nationwide function accounts for ‘disease prevention and control, health education, mater-
nity and child care, mental health, health emergency response, blood collection and supply, 
health supervision, and family planning as well.’29 Unlike the public health service system, the 
medical care system is constructed differently in rural and urban China. In rural areas, medi-
cal care is mainly delivered by three institutions: the county hospitals, the township hospitals 
and the village clinics. In urban China, however, medical care is delivered by the general 
hospitals and the specialised hospitals. Besides the above regular medical institutions, several 
community clinics have emerged to take care of the preliminary diagnosis and treatment of 
28 The free-rider problem often occurs when people benefit from certain kinds of goods but do not pay for them, 
which brings about an underprovision of these goods or public services. For detailed discussion, please refer to 
William (1965). 
29 Information Office of the State Council. (2012). White Paper on Medical and Health Services in China. Please 
refer to http: / / xinhuanet.com/ politics/ 2012-12/ 27/ c_ 124156559.htm (last accessed 24 March 2019).
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certain ordinary illnesses, such as colds and fever. With regard to the medical security system, 
it is a multilevel insurance scheme that comprises three basic health insurance schemes: the 
urban resident basic medical insurance scheme (URBMI), the urban employee basic medical 
insurance scheme (UEBMI) and the new rural cooperative medical system (NRCMS). In 
2012, nearly 95% of Chinese people were under the protection of these three basic health 
insurance schemes. Despite the high rate of health insurance coverage, the Chinese healthcare 
system still faces with great challenges posed by both old problems, such as ‘to see a doctor 
is difficult, to see a doctor is expensive’ (看病难，看病贵), and new problems such as the 
ageing population and the increasing burden of non-communicable diseases.30
From a micro perspective, the Chinese healthcare system is special in terms of its financial 
support and administrative structure, as well as legal regulations. These special aspects in turn 
aggravate the existing formidable problems over time. First, the financial budget is mainly 
guaranteed by local governments rather than by central government. As a consequence, 
health policies launched by central government are carried out unevenly from province to 
province, which results in an increasing geographical disparity in healthcare delivery and 
becomes a crucial impediment to equal access to healthcare. Second, the Chinese healthcare 
system is administrated uniquely. Nearly all of the general hospitals in China are state-owned 
institutions (公共事业单位), which refers to organisations that are established by the gov-
ernment with state-owned facilities. Furthermore, the employees of these organisations enjoy 
the same welfare conditions as civil servants (Ho, 2014). Third, the legislative and judicial 
supports for the Chinese healthcare system are far from adequate. The Chinese healthcare 
system performs poorly when it relates to judicial remedy because China’s judicial system 
has often been criticised for lacking independence from the government (Liu, 2015, p. 440). 
According to an authoritative statistic, most health-related cases are solved without resorting 
to judicial process but through petition (上访). Compared to going through the judicial 
process, the petition (上访) is believed to be a more accessible and friendly alternative. It 
depends on an administrative system called ‘letters and visits’ (信访) which allows citizens to 
solve their conflicts by means of writing a letter of complaint or visiting certain departments 
of the government directly for redress (Ho, 2014, p. 273). Yet, patients often feel reluctant 
to use the petition (上访) as well, due to the fact that the government actually plays not only 
as an executant but also as a supervisor of the Chinese healthcare system. As a consequence, 
conflicts between doctors and patients cannot be released properly, which eventually results 
in threats or violence against doctors and other medical staff (Hesketh, 2012). All these 
tough issues mentioned above are de facto incentives triggering the progressive reforms of 
the Chinese healthcare system.
30 The World Bank Group, World Health Organization, China’s Ministry of Finance, National Health and Fam-
ily Planning Commission, and Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security. Healthy China: deepening 
health reform in China, at xv–xvi. Please refer to http: / / www.wpro.who.int/ china/ publications/ 2016-health-
reform-in-china/ en/ (last accessed 24 March 2019).
41
Re
affi
rm
in
g 
pe
rs
on
al
 re
sp
on
sib
ili
ty
 in
 h
ea
lth
ca
re
 in
 C
hi
na
2.2.2 Progressive reforms and the back-and-forth feature
The principle of solidarity has a long history of being valued by Chinese society. Influenced 
by this principle, it is the government that plays a leading role in nearly all kinds of social 
services in China (Yip & Hsiao, 2015). Almost every aspect of social life is controlled by 
state-owned enterprises, which are de facto established, managed and monitored by the 
government. In healthcare, the financial budget was adequate because priority was given to 
a nationwide coverage rather than the quality of service. The annual reports show a great 
decrease in mortality and a steady increase in life expectancy.31 Apparently, the healthcare 
system functioned well at the very beginning without any noticeable problems concerning 
availability and affordability (financial accessibility). However, developments are accompa-
nied by some hidden troubles. The first trouble relates to the ‘barefoot doctor’ (赤脚医
生). It represents a group of people who have not received formal education but are in 
charge of providing healthcare for people living in the rural areas of China. Along with the 
establishment of a cooperative healthcare scheme (合作医疗) and a three-tier preventive 
healthcare net (三层保障), the mechanism of healthcare in rural China was recommended 
by the WHO as a model at that time. Yet, as time goes on, the legitimacy of the barefoot 
doctors’ medical practices has become questionable, which has turned out to be an impedi-
ment threatening the whole healthcare system of rural China. The second trouble relates 
to the financial budget. The national coverage of healthcare was achieved on a rather low 
level. Every small increase in the quality of healthcare demands a large additional financial 
support. These increasing demands might put the realisation of other social goods on hold. 
The third trouble relates to inefficient utilisation. Inefficient utilisation is not a special issue 
that merely happens in the sphere of healthcare, but the entire Chinese society suffers from 
it in different ways. The lack of competition threw the state-run centrally planned strategy 
into a tight corner, which unexpectedly simulates free market thinking.
The first round of healthcare system reform was initiated in 1978. At that time, the 
Chinese government liberalised its economic system from a central-planning economy to a 
socialistic market economy, with a premise that the free market should be more productive 
by virtue of efficient distributive mechanisms. It is certainly an innovative strategy, trying to 
find a third way to balance the government’s central planning and the free market mechanism 
in the context of China. Furthermore, the Chinese government became increasingly active in 
the international arena at that time, signing a series of international documents32 and mak-
31 According to the analysis conducted by Yip & Hsiao (2015) pp. 54–55, infant mortality has decreased ‘from 
200 to 57 per 1,000 while the life expectancy has extended from 45 to 68 years.’ Data is available online, please 
refer to http: / / esa.un.org/ wpp/ (last accessed 24 March 2019).
32 Those international documents are issued from diverse perspectives. The following list of documents with sig-
nifying/ ratifying time in brackets is only concerning the field of healthcare. The International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (only ratifying in 1981); The International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (only signifying in 1998); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
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ing great efforts to cooperate with the international community. With such a background, 
the first round of healthcare system reform was launched. Consistent efforts were devoted to 
various aspects, including slowing down the increasing financial budget and modifying the 
salary structure of physicians. During that time, public hospitals were changed from ‘public 
good-oriented’ institutions into ‘for-profit’ entities. Undeniably, achievements were made. 
For instance, the life expectancy grew to 71.8 years in 2001, higher than the average of the 
whole world (65 years) (Wang, 2004). Nevertheless, deficiencies were obvious. First of all, 
efficiency might be improved at the expense of fairness in distributing healthcare. Although 
the market mechanism in China had a due consideration to fairness, it still gave priority to 
efficiency.33 Addressing the market mechanism intensifies the tendency to treat healthcare as 
a kind of exchangeable commodity, which implied that the ability to pay decides the alloca-
tion of healthcare resources. Yet, healthcare is special. Humane caring cannot be abandoned 
when distributing healthcare. As a response, a mechanism of price control was put forward 
by central government with the aim of protecting vulnerable groups from the potential side 
effects of the market mechanism. However, the price controlling mechanism unexpectedly 
contributed to the practice of compensating for low health services charges with high drug 
prices (以药补医). Compensating for low health services charges with high drug prices (
以药补医) allowed the public hospitals to make extra profits through prescriptions, which 
unexpectedly strengthened the interest in relations between physicians, hospitals and phar-
maceutical companies. It deviated public hospitals from their original goals (i.e. curing and 
caring) and drove them crazy to make as much money as possible. The increased medical 
expenses, which often could not be reimbursed by the three basic insurance schemes, became 
the financial burden that was ultimately placed on the patients.34 If a family member unfor-
tunately suffers from an incurable disease, such as cancer, it would be equal to bankrupting 
their family due to the catastrophically expensive healthcare. Even worse, due to a lack of 
effective regulations, the market mechanism opened the door to corruption in healthcare, 
such as the so-called red envelope (红包) custom. The red envelope (红包) custom created 
an extra financial burden for patients and their families. The potential heavy financial burden 
made people, especially the worse off, hesitant to access healthcare. Furthermore, it caused 
healthcare disparities to be more pronounced, not only geographically but also in terms of 
Rights (1997/ 2001); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1980/ 
1980); Convention on the Rights of the Child (1990/ 1992); Convention on the Rights of Persons with Dis-
abilities (2007/ 2008).
33 ‘Give priority to efficiency with due consideration to fairness’ was first put forwarded by the 14th National 
Congress of the Communist Party of China as a solitary principle and then reaffirmed by the 15th National 
Congress of the Communist Party of China. For detailed explanation, please refer to Zhang & Chang, (2016) 
p. 47.
34 According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, patients paid 20% of total health expenditure out-of-
pocket in 1978 while they shouldered 60% in 2001. For more information, please refer to National Bureau of 
Statistics of China. (2011). 
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wealthy and poverty. These problems were aggravated after the epidemic of SARS in 2003. 
Some scholars argued that it was the market-oriented reform that deteriorated the situation 
(Liu, 2004; Wang, 2004; Li et al., 2012). Seemingly, this round of reform led the Chinese 
healthcare system to the other extreme where too much emphasis was given to marketability 
and therefore inevitably resulted in overriding the right to health of patients.
To deal with these parameters that emerged in the first round of reform, the Chinese 
government planned to reshape the whole healthcare system with an aim to provide safe, 
efficient and affordable basic healthcare for all Chinese residents by 2020. It was a starting 
point of the second round of reform, launched in 2009. Besides the regular budget, an extra 
amount of 850 billion Chinese yuan has been committed to support the coming round 
of reform (Meng & Tang, 2013, p. 331). Going over all the efforts, the second round of 
reform moved backwards to emphasise the state accountability in distributing healthcare. 
Influenced by the Primary Health Care35 project of the World Health Organization, the 
fundamental goal of the Chinese healthcare system was readjusted to guarantee a decent 
minimum of care. To achieve this goal, the Chinese government reaffirmed its obligation 
and increased its financial budget for healthcare. According to authority reports, the total 
amount of healthcare expenses in China was on the rise, occupying 5.57%of GDP in 2013. 
Among these healthcare expenses, the expenditure of the Chinese government accounted 
for 30.1%, which is 2.6% higher than in 2009 (Fang, 2015, p. 38). Guaranteed by virtue 
of the government, nearly all of the Chinese people could get access to the basic healthcare. 
Nevertheless, the quality of healthcare still needs to be improved according to the AAAQ 
standards. One possible reason is that ‘a decent minimum’ has a drawback that it might limit 
the scope and the content of the state-supported healthcare. The majority of costly diseases 
are actually not on the list of diseases that can be reimbursed. As a consequence, many 
patients still suffer from catastrophically expensive medical services. In addition, there are 
two contradictions. One is that the majority of healthcare demands are converged to large 
hospitals where medical facilities are believed to be the most advanced, while very few medi-
cal functions are used by hospitals and clinics in the countryside. The other contradiction 
is that the number of physicians is decreasing while the number of patients is increasing. As 
mentioned before, the ‘barefoot doctors’ (赤脚医生) used to be the major force in providing 
healthcare for people living in rural China. However, they are no longer allowed by law to 
practice healthcare these days, which results in a lack of health personnel in rural China. 
Meanwhile, urban China also confronts the same problem but for different reasons. It is 
partially because of the decreasing number of medical graduates; the high risk but unstable 
income makes people reluctant to choose the medical profession as a lifelong career.
Reacting to this, the Chinese government planned to take extra steps to deepen the 
healthcare system reform in 2014. Among newly issued reform measures, major steps in-
35 Please refer to http: / / www.who.int/ whr/ 2008/ en/ (last accessed 24 March 2019)
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clude formulating a system of tiered diagnosis and treatment (分级诊疗), reorganising the 
institutional structure of public hospitals, and abolishing the practice of compensating for 
low health service charges with high drug prices (以药补医). Yet, none of them is easy to 
achieve. Taking the practice of compensating for low health service charges with high drug 
prices (以药补医) as a simple illustration, it is tough to abolish a system as such. Th is is not 
only because of the existing solid interest in relations but also due to the fact that the practice 
of compensating for low health services charges with high drug prices’ (以药补医) accounts 
for one part of physician’s income. Unfortunately, there is no alternative way except increas-
ing the fi nancial budget to make up that part. However, healthcare is not the only good that 
needs fi nancial support from the government. Th e increased fi nancial budget on healthcare 
might negatively infl uence the realisation of other social goods. Th is is the problem that the 
Chinese healthcare system had met before the fi rst round of reform. 
figure 2.1 Progressive Chinese healthcare system reforms
* In 1992, the State Council launched Opinions on further reforming healthcare systems. Th is govern-
ment document stimulated the profi t-seeking behaviours of public medical institutions. For more 
information, please refer to http://www.reformdata.org/content/19920923/25367.html (in Chinese, 
last accessed 24 March 2019)
Source: Yip & Hsiao (2015).
Drawing from the progressive Chinese healthcare system reforms, it is easy to observe that 
reforms hitherto present a back-and-forth feature (Figure 2.1): from addressing the role of the 
state (1949–1978) to introducing market forces (1978), then to reaffi  rming the role of the 
state (2009), then to readdressing the decisive role of market in allocating resources (2014). 
Th e rationale behind the back-and-forth feature is essentially a trade-off  between two 
driving forces – the state and the market – for Chinese healthcare system reforms. Owing to 
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such a trade-off relationship, big achievements have been made over the past few decades. 
Yet, old problems, such as ‘to see a doctor is difficult, to see doctor is expensive’ (看病难，
看病贵), remain largely unsolved and, therefore, raise a question for consideration: besides 
the state and the market, are there any powerful forces that actually play an essential role in 
Chinese healthcare system reforms but have long been overlooked?
2.3 ADDRESSIng PERSOnAL RESPOnSIBILItY In HEALtHCARE 
Scholarly literature has proved that there exists a causal relationship between disfavoured 
habits (e.g. excessive smoking, eating disorders and alcoholism) and certain kinds of chronic 
diseases (e.g. lung cancer, cardiovascular diseases and obesity).36 In this regard, it is safe to 
claim that people do have a great control over their health status. Yet, the active role that 
individuals can play in healthcare system reforms has long been simply overlooked because 
addressing the responsibility of the state (often known as ‘state accountability’) to protect 
and promote the healthcare interests of individuals is regarded as the mainstream. Thus, 
discussions in this section mainly focus on addressing personal responsibility in healthcare 
with special attention given to both theoretical and applied aspects. 
In a general sense, addressing personal responsibility in healthcare means to hold in-
dividuals accountable for their own health. However, this general definition leaves some 
ambiguity, such as when it is just to address personal responsibility in healthcare and how 
to address personal responsibility in ways that are just. Before embarking on the applied 
aspect (i.e. developing policy recommendations), it is important to have some theoretical 
reflections on what the personal responsibility is in the sphere of healthcare and the necessity 
of addressing personal responsibility in promoting healthcare delivery.
2.3.1 Theoretical reflections on personal responsibility in healthcare
In theory, how to place personal responsibility fairly in health policies and practices has 
long been the key question for many prominent philosophical traditions, including liberal 
egalitarianism (Cappelen & Norheim, 2005, 2006), luck egalitarianism (Dworkin, 2000; 
Cohen, 2008; Roemer, 1993; Arneson, 1989; Knight, 2009; Knight & Stemplowska, 2011; 
Segall, 2007, 2009) and communitarianism (Callahan, 2003).
36 For detailed discussion, please refer to Watson & Conte, (1954); Rehm et al., (2009); Brownell & Walsh, 
(2017).
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Liberal egalitarianism
Liberal egalitarianism is a theoretical approach that mainly focuses on assessing the direct 
relationship between health disadvantages and individual choices. According to liberal 
egalitarianism, people should be responsible for their health-related choices, but not neces-
sarily for the consequences of these choices (Cappelen & Norheim 2005, p. 478). To a 
larger extent, society should concentrate on eliminating the inequalities in health that arise 
from individual choices but not from factors that are out of individual control, namely, 
circumstances (Cappelen & Norheim 2006, p. 313). By taking this standpoint, liberal 
egalitarianism sets itself apart from typical liberal arguments and thereby largely escapes the 
critique that risky behaviours are hardly recognised as the direct and sole factor to negative 
health outcomes. With regard to how to place personal responsibility fairly in related policies 
and practices, Cappelen & Norheim (2005, p. 479) who are active proponents of liberal 
egalitarianism, are in favour of using a tax mechanism to hold people accountable for their 
health-related choices. That is, it is legitimate for the government to tax people’s unhealthy 
choices beforehand while guaranteeing equal access to treatment for all people. 
Nevertheless, criticisms such as ‘bottomless pit’ (Buyx, 2008, p. 872), ‘coherence, 
non-monetary shortage and ignoring social determinants’ (Albertsen, 2016, pp. 563–565), 
increasingly appear in scholarly literature which suggest the need for further perfection. 
Luck egalitarianism
Luck egalitarianism is a theoretical framework that assigns personal responsibility a central 
role to play in assuring the distributive justice of healthcare. Despite a variety of ideals,37 luck 
egalitarians have reached a consensus on one basic claim: it is morally unacceptable that people 
suffer from inequalities in care caused by factors that are beyond their control (Segall, 2009). 
Being sensitive to individual choices can be traced back to a special distinction between ‘brute 
luck’ and ‘option luck’ developed by Ronald Dworkin.38 According to Dworkin, a just society 
should be sensitive to people’s voluntary choices (‘option luck’) while remaining insensitive to 
their ‘brute luck’ when distributing resources.39 Taking tobacco use as an example, according 
to the data collected by the WHO more than 1.1 billion people smoked tobacco worldwide in 
2015 and up to half of tobacco users died from smoking.40 If an individual chooses to smoke 
37 There are diverse views of luck egalitarianism. They are different from one another primarily on the way of advo-
cating equality. For instance, Ronald Dworkin’s equality of resources; Richard Arneson’s equality of welfare; G. A. 
Cohen’s equality of access to advantages; Eric Rakowski’s equality of fortune; John Roemer’s equality of opportunity.
38 According to Dworkin, ‘option luck is a matter of how deliberate and calculated gambles turn out … Brute 
luck is a matter of how risks turn out which are not in that sense deliberate gambles.’ Please refer to Dworkin 
(2000), p. 73. 
39 Dworkin, (2000). Sovereign virtue, p. 334. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
40 For more information about the prevalence of tobacco and tobacco control, please refer to http: / / www.who.
int/ gho/ tobacco/ use/ en/ (last accessed 24 March 2019) and http: / / www.who.int/ mediacentre/ factsheets/ 
fs339/ en/ (last accessed 24 March 2019).
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tobacco with full awareness of possible health disadvantages, then this option is like taking 
a gamble on their health. If they lose the gamble (i.e. heath problems happen), that person 
should be held accountable for the loss, not the healthcare system or even the community. 
Yet, this argument generates some difficulties. One major difficulty relates to the causal 
relationship between individual choices and health problems because health problems are 
often caused by complex factors. Factors other than individual choices (e.g. gene structure) 
may be the key driving force for diseases. Furthermore, criticised by Buyx (2008, p. 872), 
merely relying on the criterion of ‘free choice’ not only makes luck egalitarianism a one-sided 
theory, but also would make it easily fall into a situation where one can either ‘choose freely’ 
or ‘not choose at all’. Another strong critique is raised by Elizabeth Anderson. She argues 
against luck egalitarianism by expressing her special concern for ‘negligent victims’ and the 
Good Samaritan (Anderson, 1999). According to her analysis, using the principle of free 
choice to distribute healthcare would increase the risk of abandoning people who freely 
choose to sacrifice themselves for the sake of other people’s interests (or rights).  
Communitarianism
Communitarianism addresses the social characteristics of individual human beings and the 
importance of fostering shared values in designing policies and practices (Etzioni, 2010; 
Callahan, 2003, p. 496). Since health is endorsed as one such shared value, the state, in 
the eyes of communitarians, is justified to require individual human beings to make their 
best contribution to fostering health – namely, to be responsible for their health-related 
behaviours and choices (Buyx, 2008, p. 871). In this regard, personal responsibility features 
in the communitarianism’s view of health policies and practices.
However, criticisms are strongly persuaded, which are mainly against some built-in 
problems such as ‘the inability of communitarianism to deal with the diversity of healthcare 
needs and preferences’ (Houtepen & Ter Meulen, 2000, p. 360) and the problem of ‘being 
a paternalistic approach’ (Buyx, 2008, p. 872).
Overall, despite all limitations discussed above, these three philosophical traditions do 
have distinct meaningful policy implications for the government regarding how to improve 
healthcare delivery through the lens of addressing personal responsibility (Table 2.1). 
2.3.2 Practical advice on addressing personal responsibility in healthcare in China
Policy implications from the above philosophical traditions are of equally great value to 
healthcare systems with different models of governance. In this section, discussions mainly 
focus on assessing these policy implications in the context of the Chinese healthcare system 
with a specific aim of developing practical advice for policymakers in China on how to 
address personal responsibility properly when designing and implementing health policies. 
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Addressing personal responsibility by taxing unhealthy choices beforehand
The central argument of liberal egalitarianism is to tax unhealthy choices with the goal of 
providing equal access to treatment for all people, even for those who choose unhealthy 
behaviours. To put it simply, liberal egalitarianism holds people accountable for their health-
related choices by taxing unhealthy choices beforehand. 
Many choices can be classified as being unhealthy, among which smoking tobacco and 
consuming unhealthy food and drinks are the two leading risk factors accounting for a 
large proportion of avoidable illness in China. According to the World Health Organization 
(2015), the tax rate on tobacco in China (approximately 44.43% of retail prices in 2015) 
needs to be raised up to 75% of retail prices.41 This suggestion addresses the significant role 
that the tax mechanism plays in averting illness and deaths that would otherwise be caused 
by smoking tobacco. With regard to controlling unhealthy food and drinks, several countries 
have already started to tax unhealthy food and drinks, such as ‘fat tax’ in Denmark42 and 
41 World Health Organization. (2015). WHO report on the global tobacco epidemic: raising taxes on tobacco. 
Please refer to http: / / apps.who.int/ iris/ bitstream/ 10665/ 178574/ 1/ 9789240694606_ eng.pdf?ua=1&ua=1 
(last accessed 24 March 2019)
42 In 2012, the Danish Parliament repealed the ‘fat tax’ due to the threat of job losses. This kind of taxation lasted 
only one year in Denmark. For detailed analysis, please refer to Stafford (2012). 
table 2.1 Three philosophical traditions on addressing personal responsibility 
Three Philosophical traditions on Addressing Personal Responsibility in Health Care
Liberal
Egalitarianism
Basic 
Arguments
Two supreme principles: responsibility and equalization
Focus on assessing health disadvantages that reflect individual choices
Holding people accountable for their health-related choices but not for the 
consequences of these choices
Policy
Implication
Tax people’s unhealthy choices beforehand while guarantee equal access to 
treatment for all people
Luck
Egalitarianism
Basic 
Arguments
It is morally unacceptable that people suffer from inequalities in health care 
caused by factors that are beyond their control.
A just society should be sensitive to people’s free choices (‘option luck’) 
while remains insensitive to people’s ‘brute luck’ when distributing health 
care resources.
Policy
Implication
A hypothetical insurance market for health care (Dworkin, 2000)
Health incentive schemes (Schmidt, 2009)
From an ex-ante perspective, empowering patients (e.g. cultivating health 
literacy, strengthening self-management skills, encouraging shared decision-
making, etc.)
Communitarianism
Basic 
Arguments
Common good overweighs individual preference
Individuals should contribute to the common good by choosing responsible 
health behaviors
Policy 
Implication
Health policies should be designed and implemented with the goal of 
fostering the shared values of the community.
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‘junk food tax’ in Hungary43 and Mexico44. In China, however, improving health by taxing 
unhealthy food and drinks is merely a recent interest among researchers and policymakers. 
Given that the Chinese healthcare system is currently faced with a great challenge posed 
by the increasing burden of non-communicable diseases (NCDs), using a tax mechanism 
may serve as a good strategy for not only protecting people from the harm of NCDs but 
also helping to sustain the Chinese healthcare system. Yet, due to lack of general guidelines, 
introducing a tax mechanism may also bring about negative effects on society. For instance, 
taxing unhealthy food and drinks is likely to put an extra burden on low-income families, 
which may ultimately widen the existing disparities between the rich and the poor in China. 
Thus, empirical evidence needs to be collected and analysed critically before introducing a 
tax mechanism.
Addressing personal responsibility from an ex ante perspective: developing health 
incentive schemes and empowering people in their own health
Addressing personal responsibility from either an ex ante perspective or an ex post perspec-
tive makes a difference, especially in terms of understanding the policy implications of luck 
egalitarianism. The ex ante aspect concerns prevention while the ex post aspect is often 
related to the attribution of blame, and punishment. Addressing personal responsibility in 
healthcare from an ex post perspective brings counterintuitive feelings because it is most 
likely to use personal responsibility as an excuse to punish people for avoidable losses. Con-
versely, addressing personal responsibility in healthcare from an ex ante perspective cultivates 
an attitude of risk prevention because it provides people with opportunities to prevent or, at 
least alleviate, the negative influence of avoidable suffering. 
A typical example of addressing personal responsibility in healthcare from an ex ante 
perspective is the health incentive schemes of the German healthcare system. According to 
Schmidt’s (2007) study, Germany’s statutory sickness fund has been offering diverse kinds 
of bonuses for people who actively participate in preventive care, since 2004. Among all 
kinds of bonuses, awarding healthy behaviours with reward points is a normal measure. 
People can gain reward points for their healthy behaviours and thereby use these points to 
redeem against sports equipment, health books, iPods, and gift cards for music download 
(Schmidt, 2007, p. 243). In this regard, policymakers in China should learn from Germany’s 
experience to develop context-based incentive schemes to encourage people to be active in 
taking care of their own health. 
43 The ‘junk food tax’ is put on a wide range of prepackaged foods which contain high salt and sugar. For detailed 
analysis, please refer to Holt (2011). 
44 In 2014, the Mexico government introduced an 8% tax on unhealthy food and drinks. According to the policy, 
the ‘unhealthy food and drinks’ refers to ‘non-essential foods with energy density ≥275 kcal/ 100g and sugar-
sweetened beverages (SSBs).’ For more analysis on the effects of this tax, please refer to Batis et al. (2016). 
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Another example relates to engaging people in their own health and healthcare. It mainly 
refers to encouraging people to play a more active role in taking care of their own health, 
such as leading a healthy lifestyle, strengthening self-management skills and improving 
shared decision-making.45 Some countries have already enacted special laws to improve 
people’s engagement in their own health and healthcare. Referring to a study by Schmidt 
(2007, pp. 242–243), the citizens of German are required by law (i.e. Article 1 of Book 
V of Germany’s Social Security Code) to take a kind of ‘co-responsibility’ for their health, 
which essentially means that the citizens of German should ‘lead a health-conscious lifestyle, 
take part in appropriately timed preventive measures and play an active role in treatment 
and rehabilitation, avoid sickness and disability, and overcome the respective consequences.’ 
However, China has not yet enacted a similar law addressing the importance of engaging in 
their own health, which may point out a meaningful direction for future lawmaking efforts 
in China.     
Addressing personal responsibility with a special concern to foster the shared values of 
the Chinese community
Drawing from the policy implication of communitarianism, designing and implementing 
health policies should aim at fostering the shared values of the community. In China, the 
majority of the shared values lie in the Confucian ethical tradition. Confucian ethical tradi-
tion attaches great importance to the virtue of ren (benevolence) and xiao (filial piety).46 
From a Confucian viewpoint, the individual human being is incomplete without belonging 
to a family (Chen & Fan, 2010, p. 577). Confucian societies (e.g. Singapore and China) 
therefore value close family ties and attach great importance to the role of the family when 
drafting social policies (Wong et al., 2009, p. 53). To a large extent, this viewpoint decides 
the family-based character of the healthcare system in China, such as emphasising the role of 
the family in healthcare decision-making. Thus, personal responsibility in healthcare should 
be addressed so it is compatible with the aim of fostering the shared value of the Chinese 
community, such as its long tradition of valuing family ties.
45 These measures are recommended by the World Health Organization for the sake of achieving integrated, 
people-centered care. Chapter 3 of this thesis provides a more detailed analysis on how to implement these 
measures in the Chinese context. Here, for more information about the policy options for this framework, 
please refer to http: / / www.who.int/ servicedeliverysafety/ areas/ people-centred-care/ strategicapproach.pdf?ua=1 
(last accessed on 24 March 2019)
46 The English translation of those basic virtues of Confucianism, Please refer to Runes (1983), p. 338.
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2.4 COnCLUDIng REMARKS
Given that the reforms of the Chinese healthcare system hitherto have a back-and-forth 
characteristic and the system encounters an increasingly heavy burden posed by the age-
ing population and non-communicable diseases, it is time to bring other stakeholders into 
consideration for the sake of the success of future reforms. Thus, this paper focuses on ad-
dressing personal responsibility in healthcare by stating that every individual needs to play 
a more active role in taking care of their own health. In order to develop practical advice 
for policymakers in China, supportive evidence from three typical theoretical frameworks 
and their policy implications are collected and analysed. Practical advice is largely context-
specific recommendations, yet other nations can still derive meaningful lessons from the 
above analysis when similar problems occur.
Although the main focus of this paper is to raise the concern of how and where personal 
responsibility should be addressed in healthcare, it by no means denies the primary role of 
the state in protecting and promoting people’s health, but rather to remind policymakers 
the importance of including every stakeholder and drawing a clear boundary between their 
responsibilities.
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household level: A feasible way to 
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delivery system towards people-
centred* integrated care*
* Th is chapter is based on a published paper. Alternations 
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ABStRACt
Aim: The general aim of this chapter is to assess the recent reform proposal for China’s 
healthcare system (i.e. Healthy China 2030) and to figure out the question: How do we place 
patient personal responsibility fairly in healthcare in China to make the reform measures (i.e. 
measures derived from the people-centred integrated care (PCIC) model) more effective?
Background: Influenced by the PCIC model, Healthy China 2030 was drafted recently 
with a special concern given to patient engagement. Although there are three levels of en-
gagement (i.e. individual, household and community), engaging patients at the household 
level appears to have been overlooked so far. 
Methods: This chapter performs a theoretical analysis on personal responsibility and luck 
egalitarianism. Furthermore, context-based study is also adopted.    
findings: Discussion in this chapter identifies an attribution of Chinese bioethics; that is, 
family-centred. Furthermore, it collects some practical evidence in supportive of addressing 
personal responsibility in health and healthcare. Supported by ethical values and practical 
evidence, it is safe to conclude that engaging patients at the household level is a feasible 
approach to shape the Chinese healthcare system with the PCIC model orientation. Ac-
cordingly, four strategies are recommended for empowering and activating patients at the 
household level in the Chinese context.
Keywords: patient engagement, personal responsibility, family, Chinese bioethics, China
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3.1 IntRODUCtIOn 
‘Healthy China 2030’ (WB et al., 2016, p. 52) was drafted recently to deal with the 
emerging challenges of China’s rapidly ageing population and its increasing burden of non-
communicable diseases. Supported by the World Health Organization (WHO), the World 
Bank Group (WB) and correlative governmental agencies, Healthy China 2030 aims to 
restructure the Chinese healthcare delivery system by using the people-centred integrated 
care (PCIC) model. Under this model, the Chinese healthcare delivery system should be re-
organised around satisfying the healthcare needs of individual patients and families through 
the use of five strategies: (1) empowering and engaging people; (2) reorienting the model 
of care; (3) coordinating services within and across sectors; (4) strengthening governance 
and accountability; and (5) creating and enabling the environment.47 Accordingly, how to 
improve patient engagement is the top concern of Healthy China 2030.
Patient engagement has been recognised widely as a fundamental component in con-
structing a high-quality and value-based healthcare delivery system. Questions on patient 
engagement have been discussed intensively in academia, addressing the conceptualisation 
of patient engagement, the importance of engaging patients and the feasible measures 
for improving the engagement of patients, e.g. cultivating health literacy, strengthening 
self-management skills, improving shared decision-making and creating a supportive en-
vironment. (See Barlow et al., 2002; Forbat et al., 2009; McCarley, 2009; Gruman et al., 
2010; Barello et al., 2012; Ishikawa & Yano, 2011; Berkman et al., 2011; Carman et al., 
2012; Hibbard & Greene, 2013; Castro et al., 2016). Likewise, the measures proposed 
above de facto implicate the core action areas of empowering and engaging patients that are 
recommended by Healthy China 2030. Although there are three levels of engagement (i.e. 
individual, household and community) (WB et al., 2016, p. 51), patients are more likely 
to be empowered through an individualistic approach, because contemporary bioethics 
has a remarkable ability to address patient autonomy (Wang, 2014). Considerable research 
concentrates on how to protect and promote patient autonomy from different perspectives, 
including discussion of the protection of patient rights, the liability of healthcare providers 
and the accountability of the state. There is also growing research advocating patients’ per-
sonal responsibility associated with the increasing burden of lifestyle-related chronic diseases 
(Denier et al., 2013). As one crucial party in healthcare, the patient’s family appears to have 
been overlooked thus far.
Engaging patients at the household level refers mainly to empowering and activating 
patients with the assistance of the family in building health literacy, strengthening self-man-
agement skills, improving shared decision-making and creating a supportive environment. 
47 For a detailed introduction, please refer to http: / / www.who.int/ servicedeliverysafety/ areas/ people-centred-
care/ strategies/ en/ (last accessed 24 March 2019).
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One matter needs to be clarified in terms of what we mean by ‘family’. To avoid any ambigu-
ity, family (or ‘household’) is conceptualised within a narrow scope, to include ‘two or more 
individuals who are related by birth, by marriage or by adoption.’48 In this context, family 
refers to the ‘nuclear family’ that merely includes mother, father and children. Therefore, it 
excludes all other kinships, such as grandparents and siblings. Admittedly, addressing the es-
sential function of involving family in assisting patient engagement is highly contextual and 
culture-based. Chinese values and traditions show a high level of coherence in this respect. 
Engaging patients at the household level is thus the key element that should not be missing 
when discussing how to construct an effective Chinese healthcare delivery system oriented 
towards the PCIC model targets.
Accordingly, this chapter attempts to address the importance of engaging patients at the 
household level in shaping the Chinese healthcare system with a PCIC model orientation, 
and thus provides several recommendations on how to engage patients at the household level 
in the Chinese context. We begin with a philosophical reflection on defining what is meant 
by engaging patients at the household level. By invoking the notion of personal responsibility, 
and by briefly introducing luck egalitarianism, which is a responsibility-sensitive theoretical 
framework of healthcare justice, we believe that using personal responsibility as a distribu-
tive criterion, while adopting family support as a complementary consideration, should be 
plausible for achieving distributive justice in healthcare in China. To certify the feasibility of 
engaging patients at the household level from a practical perspective, we explore four dimen-
sions of the Chinese context (i.e. Confucian tradition, the household registration system, 
health insurance schemes and correlative legislation). Based on the analysis above, we intend 
to approach the core action areas of patient engagement, as recommended by Healthy China 
2030, by placing more emphasis on the role of the family to develop proper strategies for 
engaging patients at the household level in China. Specifically, we recommend the following 
four strategies: (1) cultivating health literacy as a family asset; (2) advocating family monitor-
ing and family support to assist the improvement of patients’ self-management skills; (3) 
adopting family-based informed consent in the shared decision-making process; and (4) 
using the development of healthy families as a parallel pathway for creating a supportive 
environment for patient engagement.
48 US Census Bureau, Census 2000 Profiles of General Demographic Characteristics; please refer to https: / / www.
census.gov/ prod/ cen2000/ doc/ ProfilesTD.pdf (last accessed 24 March 2019)
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3.2 EngAgIng PAtIEntS At tHE HOUSEHOLD LEvEL: PERSOnAL 
RESPOnSIBILItY PLUS fAMILY SUPPORt
As already summarised, engaging patients at the household level refers mainly to empower-
ing and activating patients with the assistance of the family. Compared with the individual 
and community levels, empowering and activating patients at the household level can easily 
be overlooked, especially when considering the individualistic feature of medical ethics. This 
subsection will therefore illustrate the importance of engaging patients at the household level 
from a philosophical perspective.
The underlying philosophical foundation for patient engagement is that people can 
take care of their own health if they are adequately empowered, which invokes the notion 
of personal responsibility. By and large, personal responsibility means holding individuals 
accountable for their own choices. This can be identified in a number of ways in healthcare, 
but in broad terms it means that people should manage their own health through building 
health literacy, improving self-management skills and being active in shared decision-making 
(Vincent, 2009). Emphasising personal responsibility in distributing healthcare resources is 
preferable, especially when there is a great need to secure the sustainability of a healthcare 
system.
Luck egalitarianism is a theoretical framework that assigns personal responsibility a cen-
tral role to play in assuring the distributive justice of healthcare. Despite varied ideals,49 luck 
egalitarians have reached an overlapping consensus on one basic claim: it is morally unac-
ceptable that people suffer from inequalities in care caused by factors beyond their control 
(Segall, 2015). In concrete terms, if two people are equally well-off at the very beginning, and 
one of them opts to reduce their wealth in some way voluntarily, then the eventual inequality 
between their wealth statuses is justified (Huseby, 2016). This basic standpoint can be traced 
back to a special distinction between ‘brute luck’ and ‘option luck’ from Ronald Dworkin.50 
Accordingly, a just society should be sensitive to people’s voluntary choices (‘option luck’) 
while remaining insensitive to their ‘brute luck’ in distributing resources (Dworkin, 1981, 
p. 293; Dworkin, 2002, p. 287; Brown, 2005, p. 25). In order to distinguish ‘option luck’ 
from ‘brute luck’, luck egalitarianism adopts personal responsibility as its basic criterion. 
In health and healthcare, this means that individuals may get no reimbursement for their 
disadvantages if those disadvantages are the result of their own imprudent behaviour. Be-
49 There are diverse views of luck egalitarianism. They are different from one another primarily in the way of 
advocating equality. For instance, see Ronald Dworkin’s equality of resources; Richard Arneson’s equality of wel-
fare; G. A. Cohen’s equality of access to advantages; Eric Rakowski’s equality of fortune; John Roemer’s equality of 
opportunity.
50 According to Dworkin, ‘option luck is a matter of how deliberate and calculated gambles turn out … Brute 
luck is a matter of how risks turn out which are not in that sense deliberate gambles.’ Please refer to Dworkin, 
(1981), p. 293. 
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cause of this viewpoint, luck egalitarianism has long been criticised for abandoning negligent 
victims (Anderson, 1999). To defend luck egalitarianism, meaningful countermeasures have 
been raised from different perspectives, such as Ronald Dworkin’s (2013, p. 299) mandatory 
health insurance scheme, Shlomi Segall’s (2007) adoption of the principle of solidarity and 
Nicholas Berry’s (2006) strategy of multiple principles.
Among these plausible proposals, adopting the principle of solidarity to complement 
luck egalitarianism is likely to be more feasible in the Chinese healthcare system, because 
China is a Confucian society prioritising the value of solidarity. In other words, the Chinese 
people attach great importance to the welfare of society above individual gains. But this is 
not to say that the Chinese people are absolutely willing to share their fate with strangers 
without calculating gains and losses. Yet sacrificing individual gains for family members is 
common behaviour within the Chinese families, because family relationships (e.g. through 
birth, marriage or adoption), as a solid source of family support, bind family members 
together.51 The way we propose adopting the principle of solidarity thus differs slightly from 
that of Shlomi Segall. Alongside personal and social responsibility, we assert that a position 
should also be accorded to family support and care in light of Chinese values and traditions. 
In other words, family members should accept the obligation to support each other when 
‘the abandonment of negligent victims’ (Anderson, 1999, p. 296) occurs. To offer a simple 
example: luck egalitarianism holds that a just healthcare system should not compensate indi-
viduals when they choose reckless behaviour voluntarily. In this case, individual patients are 
‘abandoned’ by the healthcare system, but they could still ask for financial support from their 
family members in order to obtain healthcare, because their family members are obliged 
to offer support. Understanding the principle of solidarity by preserving a place for the 
family thus makes sense, in terms of defending the implementation of luck egalitarianism in 
shaping the Chinese healthcare delivery system towards balancing people-centred care and 
sustainability.
The preliminary idea behind engaging patients at the household level is to emphasise the 
patient’s personal responsibility in managing their own health, while adopting family support 
as a supplementary consideration to prevent the individual patient from being abandoned 
by the healthcare system. Admittedly, laying stress on the mutual support and care between 
family members implies that the feasibility of engaging patients at the household level is 
51 Marriage Law of the People’s Republic of China (2001 Amendment): Article 21 (related by birth), Article 26 
(related by adoption), and Article 20 and 27 (related by marriage). The English translation of these Articles is 
available online, please refer to http: / / en.pkulaw.cn/ display.aspx?id=1793&lib=law&SearchKeyword=&Searc
hCKeyword=%bb%e9%d2%f6 (last accessed 24 March 2019). Law of the People’s Republic of China on the 
Protection of the Rights and Interests of the Elderly (2015 Amendment): Article 15. The English translation 
of this Article is available online, please refer to http: / / en.pkulaw.cn/ display.aspx?id=19790&lib=law&Search
Keyword=&SearchCKeyword=%c0%cf%c4%ea%c8%cb (last accessed 24 March 2019). Also, please refer to 
Moskowitz (2001). p. 711. 
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highly contextual and culture-based. We therefore provide a detailed explanation concern-
ing four dimensions of the basic Chinese context (i.e. Confucian tradition and bioethics, 
the household registration system, health insurance schemes and correlative legislation), in 
order to find more practical evidence for justifying the feasibility of engaging patients at the 
household level in China.
3.3 PRACtICAL EvIDEnCE fOR tHE fEASIBILItY Of EngAgIng 
PAtIEntS At tHE HOUSEHOLD LEvEL In CHInA
3.3.1 Confucian society and Chinese bioethics
Confucian ethical tradition attaches great importance to the virtue of ren (benevolence) and 
xiao (filial piety).52 From a Confucian viewpoint, the individual human being is incomplete 
without belonging to a family (Chen & Fan, 2010, p. 577). Confucian societies (e.g. Sin-
gapore and China) therefore value close family ties and attach great importance to the role 
of the family when drafting social policies (Wong et al., 2009, p. 53). To a large extent, this 
viewpoint decides the family-based character of the healthcare system in these societies, such 
as emphasising the role of the family in healthcare decision-making.
As a Confucian society, China preserves the tradition that family plays a crucial role in 
healthcare decision-making (Fan & Li, 2004; Chen & Fan, 2010, p. 579). As Ruiping Fan 
(2004, p. 179) states,
‘China medical ethics … remains committed to hiding the truth as well as to lying 
when necessary to achieve the family’s view of the best interests of patients.’
In most cases, physicians would comply with the opinions of family members even when 
the patient is competent (2002). This indicates that Chinese bioethics assigns the family 
a privileged position in the essential dimensions of healthcare (e.g. informed consent and 
decision-making), thus differing from Western bioethics which prioritises patient autonomy. 
But laying stress on the importance of family in healthcare does not equate to Chinese 
bioethics taking patient autonomy for granted. On the contrary, it attaches great importance 
to protecting patient autonomy, because family members are the people who are supposed 
to know the patient best, and who are able to provide the best interpretation of patient 
expectations and preferences, and who can therefore take the most appropriate healthcare 
decisions in the best interests of the patient (Lee, 2014). Furthermore, with family support, 
patients are believed to be better prepared in both psychological and physical aspects (Yung, 
2014). Contrary to the traditional relationship between one doctor and one patient, Chinese 
52 For the English translation of those basic virtues of Confucianism, please refer to Runes (1983), p. 338. 
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bioethics tends to cultivate the doctor-patient relationship with a strong involvement of 
family members. Studies show that in Confucian societies, patients, especially older ones, 
are likely to give up life-sustaining treatments for the sake of reducing the financial burden 
on their family members (Choi, 2004, p. 86). Involving family members in healthcare is 
therefore a way of preventing such self-sacrificing behaviour. Family support is also of great 
importance for patients who need long-term care (e.g. the elderly with disabilities) or suffer-
ing from life-threatening illnesses (e.g. a severe heart attack or cancer). Studies indicate that 
family support is a primary factor influencing the survival rate of such patients (Ell, 1996).
The Confucian ethical tradition thus underpins Chinese bioethics in terms of involv-
ing family in healthcare, thereby providing a cultural and ethical foundation for engaging 
patients at the household level in China.
3.3.2 Household registration system
The household registration system (hukou) has been in operation since 1949 for the adminis-
tration of China’s residents. People born legally in China acquire a personal registration card 
(hukou page) to be added to a household registration record (hukou booklet). The household 
registration record is issued per family; it thus certifies not only the legal residence of a 
citizen, but, more importantly, the relationships between family members.
The household registration system exerts a significant influence on access to social 
benefits, such as education and healthcare (Qiu, 2014, p. 113). At the very beginning, the 
household registration record was designed to identify an individual as a permanent resident 
of a specific place, either rural (agricultural household registration record) or urban (non-
agricultural household registration record). Studies show it is this categorisation that has 
generated the inequality in social benefits in China so fundamentally, in particular the access 
to healthcare (Qiu, 2014, p. 113). This argument may be partially true, but the negative 
effects resulting from this classification should be eliminated with the implementation of 
the Guiding Opinion of the State Council on Deepening the Reform of the Household 
Registration System in 2014.53 Following the Guiding Opinion, the reform focused on the 
innovation of population management by abolishing the classification of the agricultural 
and non-agricultural household registration records.
This ongoing household registration system reform is therefore believed to provide ad-
ministrative support for corresponding policies regarding patients’ household engagement, 
such as contracting each family as a unit with general practitioners (GPs), and creating a 
household-based medical file system.
53 State Council. (2014). Guiding Opinion of State Council on Deepening the Reform of the Household Regis-
tration System, para 9. Please refer to http: / / www.gov.cn/ zhengce/ content/ 2014-07/ 30/ content_ 8944.htm (in 
Chinese, last accessed 24 March 2019).
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3.3.3 Integrated health insurance
Influenced by the rural-urban household registration system, China’s health insurance sys-
tem also features a similar classification (with three basic types of health insurance schemes): 
people born in the rural areas participate in a health insurance scheme called the New Rural 
Cooperative Medical Scheme (NRCMS); people born and employed in urban China should 
participate in the Urban Employees’ Basic Medical Insurance (UEBMI); and people born 
in urban China but without employment should participate in the Urban Residents’ Basic 
Medical Insurance (URBMI). These three schemes differ slightly in terms of their reimburse-
ment rates and benefit package. Some scholars argue that the different reimbursement rates 
may aggravate unequal accessibility to healthcare in China (Wang et al., 2012, p. 80). But de 
facto, the casual relation is very weak which can be demonstrated by the example of UEBMI 
and URBMI. 
For quite a long time, sharing social medical insurance with family members has been 
customary among urban residents. In other words, if the patient has been insured by the 
URBMI, but their father is insured by the UEBMI and the reimbursement rate of the 
URBMI is slightly lower than that of the UEBMI, it would not be a surprise that the father 
is willing to use his health insurance to help the patient to get medication and treatment not 
included in the URBMI. Actually, it was seen as dishonest behaviour in the past and, there-
fore, prohibited at that time. Nowadays, due to the strong incentives of the mass population 
to share their social medical insurance, more and more local governments have selected 
pilot cities to implement a household-based ‘sharing insurance’ in the urban areas of China, 
which is de facto the integration of URBMI and UEBMI.54 Furthermore, scholars advocate 
integrating the URBMI and the UEBMI, or even integrating all three health insurance 
schemes into one household-based rural-urban basic health insurance scheme (Zhou, 2010; 
Xia & Yin, 2010; Zheng, 2012; Yuan et al., 2015).
Although the integration of these health insurance schemes is still under discussion, 
the direction of these discussions has already indicated the potential feasibility of engaging 
patients at the household level in China. More importantly, it is believed that integrated 
health insurance schemes would contribute to the effectiveness of household-based engage-
ment in terms of providing financial support.
3.3.4 Legislation in relation to family and healthcare
Although China, like many other countries, does not have a unified health law legislation 
relating to family and healthcare comprises many regulations. These include Article 15 of 
the Law on Protection of the Rights and Interests of the Elderly (2015 Amendment) which 
54 In 2012, Guangzhou province initiated the experiment of family-based ‘sharing insurance’. Thereafter, Cheng-
du and Shenzhen became the pilot areas of family-based sharing insurance in 2015. In 2017, the local govern-
ment of Zhejiang province issued a series of supportive policies to encourage the development of family-based 
sharing insurance.
64
C
ha
pt
er
 3
stipulates filial responsibility; Article 11 of the Law on the Protection of Minors (2012 
Amendment) which regulates parental responsibility; Article 15 of the Law on Blood Dona-
tion; Article 21 of the Mental Health Law; four regulations (Article 20, Article 21, Article 
26 and Article 27) of the Marriage Law relating to reciprocal responsibility between family 
members; and Article 26 of the Law on Practising Doctors (2009 Amendment), which 
stipulates the involvement of family in informed consent.55
Take elderly care and filial responsibility, for example. In the Confucian ethical tradition, 
the virtue of respecting and caring for older generations in a family is named xiao (filial 
piety). Xiao is not only a moral virtue that is valued and advocated by Chinese society, but 
it is also a mandatory responsibility affirmed by China’s legislation, such as Article 15 of the 
Law on Protection of the Rights and Interests of the Elderly (2015 Amendment):
‘The supporters shall ensure that the elderly suffering from illness receive timely treat-
ment and care, and shall pay medical expenses for the elderly in financial hardship. 
For the elderly who cannot take care of themselves, their supporters shall bear the 
responsibility of taking care of them; and if they cannot take care of the elderly in 
person, they may, according to the will of the elderly, delegate the responsibility of 
caring to other individuals or institutions.’56
As stated in the second paragraph of Article 14 of the Law on Protection of the Rights and 
Interests of the Elderly, ‘supporters’ in this law refers mainly to the children of the elderly. 
Accordingly, it is stipulated in law that children owe their parents a duty of medical care. 
The value of family involvement is therefore clearly affirmed. Yet some scholars express their 
concern at the effectiveness of enforcing this Article, because parents may be reluctant to 
bring a lawsuit against their children (Moskowitz, 2001, p. 709; Edelstone, 2002; Ting & 
Woo, 2008).
Another typical example of family involvement relates to informed consent. In Western 
bioethics, informed consent should be given by the patient except in certain circumstances, 
such as emergency cases or situations where patients exercise their right not to know. How-
ever, Article 26 of the Law on Practising Doctors (2009 Amendment) affirms the involve-
ment of the patient’s family when informed consent is required:
‘Doctors shall tell the patients or their family members the patient’s condition 
truthfully. However, care shall be taken to avoid any adverse impact on the patients. 
55 The English version of the legislation is available at the pkulaw database. Please refer to http: / / en.pkulaw.cn/ 
(last accessed 24 March 2019).
56 The English translation of this Article is available online, please refer to http: / / en.pkulaw.cn/ display.aspx?id
=19790&lib=law&SearchKeyword=&SearchCKeyword=%c0%cf%c4%ea%c8%cb (last accessed 24 March 
2019).
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Doctors shall get approval from the hospital and the consent of the patient or family 
members before conducting clinical treatment on an experimental basis.’57
This Article carries two layers of meaning: doctors must tell the patient’s condition to the 
family members truthfully and without delay, but doctors must also take the patient’s fam-
ily’s expectations and preferences into consideration, along with the patient’s psychological 
condition, before letting the patient know their health condition. It also indicates that, with 
such a provision, patients cannot exercise any self-sacrificing behaviour for the sake of their 
family, and doctors are able to comply with their truth-telling obligation.
These regulations all legitimise the involvement of family in healthcare, and thus explain 
the legal reason why engaging patients at the household level is feasible in China.
3.4 RECOMMEnDAtIOnS fOR EngAgIng PAtIEntS At tHE 
HOUSEHOLD LEvEL
‘Healthy China 2030 lists four core action areas of patient engagement, and correspondingly 
provides detailed guidance on how to approach these areas’ (WB et al., 2016, pp. 52–64). 
Contrary to what is recommended in Healthy China 2030, we try to approach these areas 
by laying more emphasis on the role of the family in order to develop feasible strategies for 
engaging patients at the household level in China.
3.4.1 Building health literacy: health literacy as a family asset
As Healthy China 2030 summarised, health literacy is the ability to read and understand 
health-related information so that people are able to take care of their health (WB, 2016, 
p. 52). As Don Nutbaum (2008) summarised, health literacy can be interpreted from both 
negative and positive perspectives. The negative perspective interprets health literacy as a risk 
factor focusing on dealing with the impacts of low health literacy on health outcomes, while 
the positive perspective regards health literacy as an asset, which implies that a high level of 
knowledge and skills can be beneficial to personal health. Engaging patients at the household 
level mainly interprets health literacy from the positive perspective, meaning cultivating 
health literacy as a family asset.
Building health literacy is not merely an individual task, but a family issue. According to 
Healthy China 2030, accessible and understandable health information is fundamental to 
patient engagement. But health information is merely one prerequisite in assisting patient 
engagement. Patients with a low level of health literacy are still likely to experience more 
57 The English translation of this Article is available online, please refer to http: / / en.pkulaw.cn/ display.aspx?id
=22771&lib=law&SearchKeyword=&SearchCKeyword=%D6%B4%D2%B5%D2%BD%CA%A6 (last ac-
cessed 24 March 2019).
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mistakes in understanding and adhering to a doctor’s prescribed treatments (Coulter & 
Ellins, 2007, p. 24). So involving a patient’s family members in assisting patients to read, 
understand and adhere to a doctor’s diagnosis and treatment is favourable and important, 
especially when considered alongside the evolving telecare services.
Younger generations of the family are generally considered to be more open to accepting 
and using new technologies such as e-health. So regarding health literacy as a family asset 
requires the provision of more opportunities to educate the younger generation in the use 
of e-health, expecting them to help the family’s older generations. This is not, however, to 
say that the older generation can shirk their responsibilities in cultivating health literacy. 
As a family asset, the earlier high health literacy has been built, the more beneficial it will 
be for the family members, especially for the family’s younger generations. Children under 
a certain age are highly influenced by their parents in terms of forming their eating style, 
undertaking physical activities and cultivating their personal characters (Trost et al., 2003). 
The level of the older generation’s health literacy is a decisive factor in controlling the risks 
of certain illnesses, such as childhood obesity and autism. Here, taking health literacy as a 
family asset lays more emphasis on the responsibility of the older generation in terms of 
cultivating a healthy lifestyle.
3.4.2 Strengthening self-management skills: Family monitoring and family support
In accordance with Healthy China 2030, self-management education, self-monitoring, 
self-administered treatment and telecare are the essential dimensions of a patient’s self-
management skills (WB et al., 2016, p. 52). These dimensions indicate that the individual 
patient may face the situation where they are forced to perform certain duties (e.g. recording 
blood sugar, adhering to prescribed medication and performing the rehabilitation practice 
at home) or to give up bad habits (e.g. being addicted to drink, cigarettes or even drugs). 
But none of them are easy to achieve, so extra assistance is required such as support from 
peers, family and friends (Greca et al., 1995; Toljamo & Hentinen, 2001). Here, Healthy 
China 2030 suggests that patients should participate in self-help groups in order to acquire 
peer support (WB et al., 2016, p. 52). Nevertheless, studies show the effectiveness of peer 
support to have mixed results (positive effects for certain illnesses, but no obvious influence 
for some others) (Van Uden-Kraan et al., 2009; Van Uden-Kraan et al., 2011; McGowan 
,2012; Chan et al., 2014; Markowitz, 2015; Zhong et al., 2015). Concerns are also raised 
in terms of a patient’s willingness to seek peer support, and the potential negative influence 
arising from patients’ experience-sharing.
Compared to peer support, family support seems to be more emotional and functional in 
helping patients overcome their illnesses. The relationships (e.g. birth, marriage or adoption) 
between family members are acknowledged as a solid source of family support, motivating 
family members to share their fate with one another voluntarily. But some studies observe 
that there is a link between family support and certain negative outcomes in healthcare. For 
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instance, patients may feel self-blaming or even take self-sacrificing actions for the sake of 
their families (Carter-Edwards et al., 2004; Miller & Dimatteo, 2013; Choi, 2014, p. 86). 
Yet these negative outcomes could be prevented by involving family members at the earliest 
stage of diagnosis and treatment, such as emphasising the involvement of the family in the 
shared decision-making healthcare process.
3.4.3 Shared decision-making: Family-based informed consent
Being respectful and responsive to a patient’s expectations and preferences in healthcare 
stimulates the adoption of a shared decision-making process (WB et al., 2016, p. 58). The 
shared decision-making process, as the essential element of the PCIC delivery model, is 
believed to be beneficial to a doctor’s diagnosis and treatment, not only in terms of improv-
ing the correction and effectiveness of healthcare services, but also in restoring trust in the 
doctor-patient relationship.
It is noteworthy that a difference exists between Western and Chinese bioethics in how 
to interpret ‘shared’. In many Western countries, ‘shared’ means that patients and their 
doctors are working together to discuss treatment plans and to set treatment goals. For this 
kind of ‘shared’, respecting and protecting patient autonomy is the ‘golden rule’ guiding the 
healthcare decision-making process. For example, patients in the Netherlands are entitled 
to a ‘right not to know’58. In effect, this leaves it up to the patient rather than the family to 
decide whether they will be told certain healthcare information. Even in the most extreme 
case where telling the truth may impose a heavy psychological burden on the patient, doctors 
still need to inform the patient rather than the family when the patient’s health condition 
allows.59
As already discussed, Chinese bioethics attaches great importance to the role of family 
in healthcare. Accordingly, ‘shared’ in the Chinese context should mean joint efforts not 
only by patients and their doctor, but also by patients’ family members. There are several 
evidence-based studies demonstrating that treatment plans are usually finalised on the basis 
of the opinions of patient’s family members in China (Li et al., 2016, p. 237). Therefore, 
besides professional knowledge and patient preferences, doctors should also take the expec-
tations of the patient’s family members into consideration, or even assign priority to the 
opinions of the patient’s family members, when drawing up the treatment plan. Involving 
family in the shared decision-making process has already been put into practice by some 
local governments in China. For instance, Shanghai has implemented a family doctor system 
that encourages patients and families to exercise joint efforts in setting treatment plans and 
goals (WB et al., 2016, pp. 59–60).
58 Dutch Civil Code, Article 7, 449.
59 Dutch Civil Code, Article 7, 448, para. 3.
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3.4.4 Creating a supportive environment: healthy families as a parallel pathway
Healthy China 2030 concentrates on creating a supportive environment by developing 
healthy cities and using environmental ‘nudges’60 to complement regulations. To date, ten 
cities have joined the healthy cities movement as pilot cities in China (WB et al., 2016, 
p. 62). Although people’s health is affected de facto by the interactions of environmental 
and social factors, developing healthy families is likely to bring benefits to the individual 
patient more directly than promoting healthy cities. But the intention is not to replace the 
healthy cities movement with healthy families; it is rather to adopt the promotion of healthy 
families as a parallel pathway for engaging the patient. Developing healthy families will also 
contribute to the development of healthy cities, because the family is always regarded as the 
basic societal unit.
Developing healthy families should be approached with corresponding institutional 
support. Here the Chinese government has responded actively. Taking the field of primary 
care as an example, the Chinese government has initiated nationwide implementation of GP 
services aimed at establishing and strengthening the primary care gatekeeping.61 The system’s 
design mandates that GP services are administered on the basis of Chinese households. In 
other words, it is each household, rather than the individual patient, which is encouraged 
to contract a GP who practises medicine in the neighbourhood. Meanwhile, the household 
registration system and the integrated reform of the health insurance schemes are paving the 
way for contracting GP services that are household based.
Another example of providing institutional support for healthy families is to create one 
united medical file for each household, along with the nationwide implementation of the 
GP services. The household-based medical file will be particularly helpful for detecting and 
diagnosing illnesses, especially hereditary diseases, at the earliest stage. As the responsible 
party, GPs are the most appropriate candidates to keep their clients’ medical files confiden-
tial. They may only release an individual patient’s health information if required by law or 
by a patient’s family members. Although this statement appears to conflict with Western 
bioethics which prioritises respect for, and the protection of, patient autonomy, it is not 
prohibited by Chinese bioethics.
60 ‘Nudges’ is a new concept developed by Richard Thaler and Cass Sustein. It refers to an organised context 
(‘choice architects’) in which people are able to make better choices. A given example is that doctors have to 
provide alternative treatments for their patients. The activity of providing alternative treatments is exactly mak-
ing a ‘choice architect’. For detailed analysis, please refer to Thaler & Sustein, (2003, 2008); Sustein & Thaler, 
(2003).
61 National Health and Family Planning Commission of the P. R. China 2016: Guiding opinions on advancing 
the contracts with general practitioners. Please refer to http: / / www.nhfpc.gov.cn/ tigs/ s3577/ 201606/ e3e7d-
2670a8b4163b1fe8e409c7887af.shtml (last accessed 24 March 2019).
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3.5 COnCLUDIng REMARKS
Overall, engaging patients at the household level is believed to be more feasible in shaping 
the Chinese healthcare system towards the PCIC model.
The Confucian tradition and Chinese bioethics provide a solid cultural foundation 
for engaging patients at the household level. The household registration system and the 
integrating health insurance reform also provide the institutional basis for engaging patients 
at the household level. Family-related laws and regulations also explain the legal reasons 
why engaging patients at the household level is feasible in China. In light of the Chinese 
traditions and values, it is safe to conclude that involving the family should be beneficial in 
protecting patient rights. Future efforts need to be devoted, at least partially, to cultivating 
health literacy as a family asset, to emphasising family support in promoting a patient’s 
self-management skills, to involving families in shared decision-making, and to developing 
healthy families as a parallel pathway for creating the supportive environment for patient 
engagement.
Although the feasibility of engaging patients at the household level is highly contextual 
and culture-based, emphasising the essential role of the family in healthcare is a valuable 
experience from Chinese bioethics that could also be beneficial for Western bioethics.
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ABStRACt
Aim: To assess the regulation of the Chinese healthcare system in assisting a nationwide 
implementation of general practitioner (GP) services. 
Background: Along with the perennial problems of unaffordable and inequitable health-
care, a rapidly ageing population and the increasing burden of non-communicable diseases 
pose challenges to the Chinese healthcare system. Recognising these challenges and to satisfy 
people’s demands for more and better healthcare, China has initiated a plan, named Healthy 
China 2030, based on the findings from a two-year joint study by the World Health Orga-
nization (WHO) and the World Bank Group (WB) in collaboration with Chinese agencies. 
The Chinese healthcare plan, officially approved in 2016, is an attempt to use the people-
centred, integrated care (PCIC) model recommended by the WHO and the WB to shape 
the Chinese healthcare system. In accordance with PCIC, China began the implementation 
of gatekeeping primary care by introducing GP services to local communities. 
Methods: A comparative analysis was employed to point out the importance of introducing 
GP services. A systematic assessment was carried out to evaluate the regulatory sector of the 
Chinese healthcare system, including a critical review of related legal norms and a theoreti-
cal exploration of external impediments (e.g. cultural attitudes, government capacity and 
interest groups). 
findings: Results demonstrate that the current regulatory sector of the Chinese healthcare 
system needs to be improved in order to assist the nationwide implementation of GP services 
and to strengthen its gatekeeping role. Major deficiencies include the problematic relation-
ship between legal norms and health policies, the lack of coherent laws, the low rate of social 
acceptance of GP services and the lack of continuing support for GP services from both 
formal and informal interest groups. To address those challenges, this paper recommends 
that preliminary efforts be devoted, in part, to two changes in the legal structure: enacting a 
specific law, and creating an independent regulatory oversight body.
Keywords: Chinese healthcare system reform, GP services, gatekeeping primary care, legis-
lation, regulatory strategies
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4.1 IntRODUCtIOn
Along with the perennial problems of unaffordable and less equitable healthcare, a rapidly 
ageing population and the increasing burden of non-communicable diseases pose challenges 
to the Chinese healthcare system (Anonymous, 2011; Huang, 2011; Tang et al., 2013; Xiao 
et al., 2014). Recognising these challenges, China initiated a healthcare reform plan in 2016 
named Healthy China 2030 (WB et al., 2016). The plan was developed in response to a 
joint study by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the World Bank Group (WB) in 
collaboration with government agencies in China. Healthy China is oriented towards satisfy-
ing people’s demands for more and better healthcare. It is an attempt to reform Chinese 
healthcare services by adopting the people-centred, integrated care (PCIC)62 model.
In general, the PCIC model requires health planners to divert attention from treatment 
to preventive care, and from merely curing diseases to satisfying people’s healthcare needs 
and expectations (WHO, 2015; Wiley, 2016). The backbone of a successful PCIC model is 
a strong primary care system (Starfield et al., 2005). Accordingly, Healthy China prioritises 
the rebuilding of the healthcare delivery system at the level of the local community with an 
attempt to strengthen the gatekeeping role of its primary care. To ensure the accessibility 
and quality of primary care gatekeeping, general practitioner (GP) services (or family doc-
tor services) have been introduced to replace the traditional hospital-based delivery system. 
Major reform efforts are devoted towards providing a GP for every household in China and 
establishing electronic personal health records for each Chinese citizen before 2020.63
Although much of the existing literature is centred on evaluating and promoting the 
performance of GPs in high-income countries, it is still a new concept for low and middle-
income countries like China. Therefore, many questions need to be answered. What services 
will the GP provide? Why does the Chinese healthcare system need the GP system? Will the 
primary care gatekeeping in China be strengthened by introducing GP services? What is the 
proper role of the GP in the Chinese healthcare system? Will the adoption of the GP system 
expand access to healthcare? Will the adoption of the GP system reduce medical expenses, or 
slow the rate of escalation, while increasing the efficiency of the Chinese healthcare system? 
Will the GP strategy relieve the tension and restore the trust between doctors and patients? 
What is the most effective and feasible way to adapt the GP system to the Chinese healthcare 
system? Finally, the most important question: is the Chinese healthcare system, or even 
China’s entire society, prepared to embrace the GP system?
62 World Health Organization, (2016). Framework on integrated, people-centered health services. Please refer to 
http: / / www.who.int/ servicedeliverysafety/ areas/ people-centred-care/ en/ . (last accessed 24 March 2019)
63 National Health and Family Planning Commission of the P. R. China. (2015). Guiding opinions on advanc-
ing the management and the quality of community health care. Please refer to http: / / www.nhfpc.gov.cn/ jws/ 
s3581r/ 201511/ 1742007746a64005a16e32de00cc5fc5.shtml (In Chinese, last accessed 24 March 2019)
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Our study attempts to respond to these questions. First and foremost, the chapter af-
firms that the core and unique function of the GP is to provide front-line and preventive 
healthcare. By comparing community-based healthcare services designed earlier with the 
new concept of GP services, the chapter acknowledges the necessity of introducing GP 
services to establish and strengthen the primary care gatekeeping in China, but cautions 
that the regulatory sector of the Chinese healthcare system may need to be improved prior 
to the nationwide transition to GP services. To support this position, the paper appraises the 
regulatory sector of the Chinese healthcare system, in terms of not only relevant legal norms, 
but also external factors. Results show that major deficiencies in the regulatory sector include 
the problematic relationship between legal norms and health policies, the lack of effective 
and coherent laws, the low rate of social acceptance of GP services, and the lack of sup-
port for GPs from both formal and informal interest groups. Recognising these challenges, 
the chapter recommends that future efforts be devoted, in part, to the following two legal 
changes: enacting a specific law, and creating an independent regulatory supervisory body.
4.2 gP SERvICES: EStABLISHIng AnD StREngtHEnIng tHE 
PRIMARY CARE gAtEKEEPIng
Mariner once said that ‘the change from medical terminology to market terminology both 
reflects and encourages conceptualising healthcare [as] a market commodity’ (Mariner, 1998, 
p. 3) Likewise, identifying the GP’s role is clearly of great importance, not only for policy-
making, but also for further improvement. The GP (or family doctor) has been recognised 
as someone skilled in a medical discipline, who is as important as, or complementary to, a 
doctor practising a medical specialty (Olesen et al., 2000). Despite the fact that no consensus 
has been reached on the definition so far, all interpretations should at least reflect the core 
and unique function of GP services, which is to practise at the front line of healthcare 
(Franks et al., 1992; Yip & Hsiao, 2009a).
4.2.1 Primary care in China before the implementation of GP services
The current Chinese healthcare system is a hospital-based delivery one where public hos-
pitals, as ‘one-stop shops’, take care of the majority of healthcare demands. At the local 
level, primary care is supposed to be guaranteed by community health centres (CHCs) and 
community health stations (CHSs) in urban China, and by township health centres (THCs) 
and village health stations (VHSs) in rural areas (Bhattacharyya et al., 2011). These medical 
institutions should, in principle, serve as the gatekeepers to hospitals and specialised medical 
care, but in reality, they fail to play this role.
This failure is partially because patients in China can access walk-in services in public 
hospitals without a referral letter. Even worse, two factors aggravate the problem. One is 
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the current Chinese health insurance scheme, which has covered over 95% of the Chinese 
population since 2012 (Meng et al., 2015, p. 78). It consists of multiple schemes: the Urban 
Employee Basic Health Insurance (1998), the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme 
(2003), the Urban Resident Basic Health Insurance (2007), and the Medical Financial As-
sistance System (2012). In general, these schemes prioritise the reimbursement of inpatient 
care over outpatient care (Xiao et al., 2014); furthermore, the reimbursement rates of these 
schemes differ. The priority of reimbursement and the different reimbursement rates drive 
patients to seek inpatient care provided by public hospitals without considering whether 
it is necessary or not, which, in turn, results in a comparatively low rate of outpatient care 
provided by the community-based medical institutions. Although the community-based 
medical institutions also provide limited inpatient care, their major function still focuses 
on expanding the accessibility of outpatient care. The other impediment to discouraging 
hospital use concerns the quality of medical services. Compared with the community-based 
medical institutions, public hospitals are believed to have advanced facilities and better-
educated medical professionals. Naturally patients demand high-quality medical services. 
The lower level of trust in the quality of medical services provided by medical institutions, 
such as CHCs, causes patients to hesitate to access community resources as their ‘first contact 
care’ (Bhattacharyya et al., 2011, p. 179).
The combination of easy access to public hospitals and distrust in the quality of com-
munity care results in a tricky dilemma: public hospitals are overwhelmed with patients, 
while community-based medical institutions receive and treat fewer patients. To tackle the 
imbalance, public hospitals used to cut the number of beds, rather than cooperate with the 
community-based medical institutions. Unsurprisingly, cutting beds worsened the situation 
by causing inaccessibility of medical services, particularly tertiary care, and escalating medi-
cal expenses.
The public hospital dilemma was exacerbated by drug mark-ups (WB et al., 2016), 
which refers to the system by which ‘hospitals receive kickbacks from drug companies for 
prescribing their products’ (Yip & Hsiao, 2008, p. 463). This system gives health profes-
sionals financial incentives to overprescribe drugs with high profit margins. Even worse, the 
problem of overprescription results in some patients’ resistance to certain drugs and increases 
tensions in the doctor-patient relationship (Yip & Hsiao, 2009a, 2009b; Ling et al., 2011).
The traditional hospital-based delivery system needs to be changed, with special atten-
tion devoted to improving preventive care. In this regard, the primary care gatekeeping is 
of vital importance and should be addressed as the top concern. Either as a supplement or 
an alternative to the current system of community-based healthcare services, GP services 
represent a step forward, and should be introduced in China in line with the PCIC model.
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4.2.2 A brief overview of the GP system
Under current conditions in China, the GP system refers to a small group of medical profes-
sionals who provide basic medical care, public health and any contractual health manage-
ment services.64 Regardless of whether the GP is considered a supplement or an alternative to 
community-based medical institutions, how will the GP system be characterised?
Table 4.1 outlines GP services and compares them with community-based healthcare 
services. As shown in Table 4.1, GP services should include, but not be limited to, ‘common 
diseases management; immunisation and primary community health prevention; rehabilita-
tion and family planning’ (Kong & Yang, 2015). Furthermore, the qualified GP should, 
in principle, be fully educated and trained to provide these services, but the system cur-
rently permits practising specialists and medical professionals with a background in Chinese 
medicine to be GPs, in order to address the shortage (Bhattacharyya et al., 2011). Moreover, 
medical expenses should be covered by health insurance mechanisms, the public health 
budget and patient co-payments. In addition, the regulatory strategy should adopt incentive 
schemes to encourage patients to use the GP as the first contact for healthcare, and should 
rely on the power of the local communities to monitor and assess the performance of these 
doctors. Leadership should also be clarified and strengthened by smoothing communica-
tion and fostering collaboration among different government agencies, with an appropriate 
division of labour. Last but not least, an information-sharing system and an effective referral 
network are required to improve the performance of GPs.
In 2015, the Chinese government introduced the GP concept to limited areas, such as 
Shanghai (Jing et al., 2015), Chongqing (Chen et al., 2015), and Guangdong (Kuang et al., 
2015), to study the impact. A great deal of positive evidence has been reported, especially 
enhanced and timely medical services and a growing satisfaction with the medical experi-
ence. These promising outcomes accelerate the progress of nationwide implementation. 
Nevertheless, the selected experimental areas are mainly well-developed cities where people 
enjoy a higher level of social welfare, including education and medical care, than the average 
person in China.
Situations will be different, or even more complicated, when GP services are extended to 
the whole nation. Admittedly, it is necessary to introduce the GP to establish and strengthen 
the primary care gatekeeping in China, but it might turn out to be a problem if the Chinese 
healthcare system or even the entire society is unprepared. Thus, it is important for central 
government to secure a sound legal environment for GP services before nationwide imple-
mentation.
64 National Health and Family Planning Commission of the P. R. China, (2016). Guiding opinions on advancing 
the contracts with general practitioners. Please refer to http: / / www.nhfpc.gov.cn/ tigs/ s3577/ 201606/ e3e7d-
2670a8b4163b1fe8e409c7887af.shtml (in Chinese, last accessed 24 March 2019).
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4.3 PREPARED OR nOt: ASSESSMEnt Of tHE REgULAtORY SECtOR 
fOR gP SERvICES
Roberts and colleagues proposed a ‘five-control knob’ (Roberts et al., 2004) framework to 
measure the achievement of healthcare system reform goals. The control knobs are financing, 
payment, organisation, regulation and behaviour. By using the regulation knob, we have 
appraised the current Chinese healthcare system in terms of whether it is prepared for the 
national rollout of GP services. The appraisal consists of assessing the internal structure and 
table 4.1 Comparative analysis of the current community-based healthcare system and the general 
practitioner (GP) services under the PCIC model
 
Current community-based 
healthcare system gP services under the PCIC model
Medical Providers CHCs, CHSs, THCs, VHSs GP Group
Accountable Sector(s) CHCs, CHSs, THCs, VHSs GP
Major Services CHC example: Disease Prevention and 
Control; Healthcare Survey and Education; 
Common Diseases Management; 
Rehabilitation and Family Planning.
Common Diseases Management; 
Immunisation and Community Health 
Prevention; Rehabilitation and Family 
Planning; Any Contractual Services of 
Health Management
First Contact Care or 
Not
Flexible Choice of Patients Strict
Referral Method Allow Patient Self-Refer to Higher-Level 
Medical Institutions
Encourage a Strict Referral Method: 
‘1+1+1’ Contract Model[1]
Relationship with 
Secondary and Tertiary 
Hospitals
Weak Communication,
Loose Collaboration,
Ambiguous Division of Labour[2]
More Integrated Collaboration;
A Clear Division of Labour
Reimbursement Less Rate of Reimbursement Health Insurance Schemes; Public 
Health Budget; Co-Pay of Patients
Regulation (legal) Government as Provider
Doctor-patient relationship is mainly 
regulated by legal norms in public law area.
Government as Regulator
Doctor-patient relationship should be 
regulated by legal norms in private law 
area.
CHC = community health centres; CHS = community health stations; THC = township health cen-
tres; VHS = village health stations.
Notes: 
[1] National Health and Family Planning Commission of the P. R. China. (2016). Guiding Opinions 
on Advancing the Contracts with General Practitioners. Please refer to http://www.nhfpc.gov.cn/tigs/
s3577/201606/e3e7d2670a8b4163b1fe8e409c7887af.shtml (in Chinese, last accessed 24 March 2019). 
2] There are roughly three models of collaboration between hospitals and community-based medical 
institutions: loose collaboration model, medical consortium model and direct management model. 
The above three traits are generated from the loose collaboration model since it is employed more often 
than the other two models. For detailed analysis, please refer to Xu et al., (2016) p. 8.
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external factors. The internal structure assessment mainly focuses on analysing relevant legal 
norms, while external factors are explored by answering three questions: (1) What are the 
general and specific cultural attitudes towards regulation of the Chinese healthcare system? 
(2) Do the relevant government agencies have adequate capacity to assure the enforcement 
of regulations? (3) Does the regulatory sector have enough support from relevant interest 
groups to promote the GP system?
4.3.1 Assessing internal structure: current effective laws and regulations
Theoretical studies involving legal norms and GPs mainly concentrate on altering individual 
behaviours in the healthcare sector, such as from the perspective of controlling the overpre-
scription of drugs and medical malpractice, or from the perspective of dealing with violence 
against GPs.65
Specifically, Chinese lawmakers have enacted the Tort Law (2009) to control medical 
malpractice, the Law on Practising Doctors (Revision, 2009) to deter and punish physician 
misbehaviours, and Amendment (IX, 2015) to the criminal law to punish perpetrators of 
physical violence against medical professionals. 
Table 4.2 outlines provisions contained in a select group of relevant laws and regulations 
covering the important areas of medical practice. It is easy to see that the majority of cur-
rent legal norms have been effective since 2009. This is partially because a deep reform of 
the Chinese healthcare system was initiated in that year. In truth, legal norms have served 
mostly as tools for achieving certain political goals, rather than as a means of an independent 
supervisory function to monitor and assess the performance of government agencies. This 
practice has placed the authority of legal norms at risk. Thus, the proper role of legal norms 
in improving the Chinese healthcare system needs to be reaffirmed deliberately.
The fragmented legal norms may also be incompatible with the concept of GP services, 
since they were issued to deal with the problems generated by the hospital-based delivery 
system. Put differently, the current version of Chinese healthcare was designed with less 
attention to support integrated care, and there was hardly any attempt to consolidate the 
fragmented legal norms. Thus, the fragmentation of legal norms needs to be taken seriously 
before any substantial steps are taken to implement GP services nationwide.
The current legislative method also has a deficiency. Regulations are more likely to 
be issued in the domain where bad behaviour causes the worst consequences (Roberts, 
2004). Consequently, certain domains are overwhelmed by overlapping legal norms, while 
some domains are regulated either implicitly or far from adequately. For instance, informed 
consent, which is the essential element of patient rights, is merely protected by Article 26 
of the Law on Practising Doctors, which stipulates: ‘Doctors shall tell the patients or their 
65 In literature, related discussions include: Sage et al., (1994); Allen, (2000); Hoffmann & Tarzian, (2003); 
Durand et al., (2015); Xiao et al., (2014); Hesketh et al., (2012).
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family members the patients’ condition truthfully. However, care shall be taken to avoid 
an adverse impact on the patient. Doctors shall get the approval from the hospital and the 
consent of the patient or family members before conducting clinical treatment on an experi-
mental basis’ (Article 26, Law on Practising Doctors, 2009 Revision). Thus, doctors have 
a ‘notification responsibility’ (Meng et al., 2015) to honestly provide medical information 
(e.g. illness conditions, risks and treatment options) to patients and their families, but there 
is no explicit regulation on the extent and scope of discourse. Since no consensus has been 
reached regarding whether informed consent is a legal mandate or merely an ethical require-
table 4.2 Effective legal norms concerning important areas of medical practice [1]
 
Medical 
Malpractice Confidentiality
Informed 
Consent
Physical 
violence
Issuing Authority: Standing Committee of the national People’s Congress[2]
Law on Practising Doctors  
(Revision, 2009)
Article 29
Article 37-38
Article 42
Article 37 (9) Article 26 Article 40
Tort Law (2009) Article 54-64      
Amendment (VII, 2009)  
to the Criminal Law
  Article 253 (A)    
Amendment (IX, 2015)  
to the Criminal Law
      Amend Article 
290
Public Security Administration 
Punishments Law (Amendment, 2012)
Article 72     Article 23 (1)
Law on Prevention and Treatment of 
Infectious Diseases (Amendment, 2013)
  Article 12
Article 68 (5)
   
Issuing Authority: State Council
Regulation on the Handling of  
Medical Accidents (2002)
  Article 10    
Regulation on the Prevention and 
Treatment of HIV/AIDS (2006)
  Article 39
Article 56
   
Issuing Authority: Department Regulatory Documents
Notice of the Ministry of Health on 
Issuing the Basic Norms for  
Electronic Medical Records  
(for Trial Implementation, 2010)
  √    
Regulations on Medical Institutions for 
Medical Records Management (2013)
  √    
Notes: 
[1] English translation of laws and regulations is from pkulaw.cn http://en.pkulaw.cn/ (last accessed 
24 March 2019). 
[2] The 2013 National People’s Congress announced the establishment of the National Health and 
Family Planning agency to replace the former Ministry of Health and National Population and Family 
Planning Commission.
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ment, this implicit way of regulation seems to be fine for the current Chinese healthcare 
system. Nevertheless, it would no longer be sufficient after transition to the GP system, 
since the good performance of GPs relies on a higher level of mutual trust and a closer, 
contractual doctor-patient relationship. In the new context, informed consent should be 
affirmed as a mandatory duty, and should be regulated strictly in terms of both extent and 
scope. Therefore, optimisation of the legislative method to cover all related domains needs 
to be addressed in order to regulate GP services effectively.
In summary, the regulatory sector of the Chinese healthcare system is unprepared in 
terms of its internal legal structure. Before the nationwide implementation of GP services, 
relevant government agencies need to make a joint effort to alter the problematic role of 
legal norms, to consolidate fragmented legal norms and to optimise the legislative method.
4.3.2 Exploring external factors: cultural attitudes, government capacity and interest groups
Which external factors are impediments to the regulatory changes required for reform of 
the Chinese healthcare system? According to the ‘five-control knob’ (Roberts et al., 2004) 
framework, there are three external factors influencing reform efforts in the regulatory sec-
tor: cultural attitudes, government capacity and political support. In our analysis, we have 
replaced the third benchmark with ‘interest groups’. Although Roberts and colleagues (2004) 
have briefly discussed the organised interest groups and their potential influence on the 
reform efforts, their major concern is not to identify those interest groups, but to use them 
as a juncture to address the importance of strengthening political support (i.e. political skills, 
regulatory process and effective implementation) in regulation design. However, the aim 
of this section is to identify the external factors that actually impede the reform of China’s 
primary care. Thus, we use ‘interest groups’ instead of ‘political support’ with a conviction 
that the solid alliance that has been formulated between pharmaceutical companies and 
major hospitals deserves equal attention.
External factors will be explored by answering questions. What is the cultural attitude, 
generally and specifically, about using regulations to drive the performance of the Chinese 
healthcare system? Do the relevant government agencies have adequate capacity to assure the 
enforcement of regulations? Does the regulatory sector have enough support to ensure the 
effectiveness of the GP system?
Cultural attitudes
Roberts and colleagues concluded that the majority of Chinese citizens are likely to find 
ways of avoiding regulations instead of complying with them, since they are more vulner-
able and are more likely to suffer from rule violations when compared to people living in 
countries like Denmark (Roberts et al., 2004). Besides, yansu (antipathy to litigation) solidly 
underpins traditional Chinese culture, which assigns a low priority to resorting to court to 
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resolve disputes (Meng et al., 2015, p. 63). This general cultural attitude may impede the 
substantive function of legal norms in advancing the performance of GP services.
With regard to the cultural attitude specific to healthcare, Mathers and Huang point out 
that ‘the Chinese people tend to seek high-level care even for minor, self-limiting conditions’ 
(Mathers & Huang, 2014, p. 270) To change this attitude, should legal norms take up the 
responsibility of educating patients to use healthcare resources more reasonably? What about 
the personal preferences of GPs regarding where to practise healthcare? Should legal norms 
be issued to influence GPs to serve rural areas? Some countries, such as India, have forced 
medical graduates to serve resource-scarce areas for a certain period of time (Bhattacharyya, 
2014). As for China, however, medical graduates are encouraged, rather than forced, to serve 
rural areas by some incentive schemes, including a high salary and more opportunities to re-
ceive advanced training. Further investigation is needed as to whether the interference of law 
is appropriate in these personal aspects. After all, both general and specific cultural attitudes 
are of great importance for the effectiveness of regulations in advancing the performance of 
the new GP system. Thus, regulators should be fully aware of these attitudes.
Government capacity
According to the analysis of Roberts and colleagues (2004), countries with a high-quality 
civil service, well-functioning police and court systems and effective tax-reporting are more 
likely to achieve success in constructing an effective regulatory agency for their healthcare 
systems. Using these criteria as benchmarks, China seems to fall short of capacity.
Table 4.2 shows relevant legal norms concerning practising doctors launched by different 
levels of authority in China. The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress has 
the highest authority in enacting laws and regulations, followed by the State Council and the 
National Health and Family Planning Commission. Although China is governed by a single 
party, these central government agencies have a clear division of labour in line with a strict le-
gal order. By the same token, a clear division of labour does not equally imply effective checks 
and balances. The deficiency of government capacity becomes aggravated in the implementa-
tion process, since there is substantial discretion by local governments.66 Regulations issued 
by central government are presumed to be subject to uneven reactions at the local level, either 
because of different socio-economic conditions, or due to the uneven organisational capacity 
of different regions. Therefore, the substantial discretion of local governments should be 
taken into account by regulators before issuing any regulation of GP services.
66 Roberts, M., Hsiao, W. C., and Berman, P. (2004). Getting health reform tight: A guide to improve performance 
and equity. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
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Interest groups
The reform efforts will confront resistance from formal and informal organised interest 
groups for various reasons. In the healthcare sector, pharmaceutical companies and major 
medical institutions – in particular public hospitals – have formed a solid alliance since phar-
maceutical incentives, known as drug mark-ups, have become a popular source of hospital 
revenue in the Chinese healthcare system. Although this activity has now been recognised 
as illegitimate and forbidden (WB et al., 2016), the solid alliance is not that easy to destroy. 
Any reform that may pose a threat to vested interests will certainly face great opposition.
A nationwide shift to GP services is believed to be one of those efforts that will engender 
stiff opposition, since the intention is to change the traditional hospital-based delivery 
system fundamentally. Likewise, any new regulation proposed in support of GP services 
will be influenced by these powerful players in the Chinese healthcare system. Regulators 
should therefore be clear about their expectations regarding those vital players, including 
their roles, attitudes and potential for compromise. Only by recognising sources of support 
and opposition realistically can legal norms be issued effectively, with the full engagement 
of every relevant player.
In summary, the regulatory sector of the Chinese healthcare system is unprepared to 
address the influence of external factors, such as cultural attitudes, government capacity 
and organised interest groups. Cultural attitudes, both general and specific, show a rather 
low acceptance of regulatory engagement with the GP system. Moreover, the substantial 
discretion of local governments results in self-interested enforcement of regulations. The un-
even regional implementation will impede the effectiveness of regulations in protecting and 
improving the GP system. In addition, players such as public hospitals and pharmaceutical 
companies lack incentives to engage in reform. How to obtain adequate support from them 
is of great importance for a well-established GP system.
4.4 RECOMMEnDAtIOn: EnACt A SPECIfIC LAw AnD CREAtE An 
InDEPEnDEnt REgULAtORY SUPERvISORY BODY
Recognising that the regulatory sector is unprepared for the challenge posed by the nation-
wide implementation of GP services, we propose two ways to improve internal structure and 
address external factors, respectively. We recommend that, prior to the nationwide imple-
mentation of GP services, efforts should be devoted to, but not limited to, the following two 
directions: enacting a specific law, and creating an independent regulatory supervisory body.
4.4.1 Internal reform: enactment of a specific law
Legal norms should be issued and organised to shield people from the potential adverse 
effects of the GP system. Apparently, the current effective legal norms concerning practising 
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doctors are incompatible with the proposed GP services. A review of the laws and regula-
tions, as listed in Table 4.2, indicates a great need to eliminate fragmentation to prevent 
conflict between overlapping legal norms.
In the future, steps can be taken to revise the Law on Practising Doctors by amending 
and inserting articles in line with the requirements for the administration of GP services. 
Take licensing and accreditation as simple examples. Medical institutions in China, whether 
focusing on medical treatment or disease prevention, have an affirmative responsibility to 
measure the performance of all doctors who have registered in their institutions, not only 
in terms of reporting malpractice and medical accidents (Article 16), but also in terms of 
providing training and continued education (Article 35). With regard to the proposed GP 
services, who should take up those responsibilities? In accordance with the Guiding Opinions 
on Advancing the Contracts with General Practitioners (2016), the GP is an identifiable 
person with primary responsibility for their medical group (Jing et al., 2015). Put differently, 
the GP has to self-report malpractice and medical accidents, which seems difficult or even 
impossible to do. Such regulations should therefore be revised with a thorough consideration 
of feasibility.
Furthermore, the GP system adopts a ‘1+1+1’ contract model, which means that patients 
are encouraged to sign the contract with one GP group plus one secondary hospital plus 
one tertiary hospital. This contractual character of the doctor-patient relationship under 
the GP system deserves special attention. It implies that people living in China need to be 
empowered and activated in order to choose the best contract. Once again, regulators have 
to be cautious when adopting new concepts. If GP services are governed by contractual 
considerations, then regulations have to deal with the unequal positions of GPs and their 
patients. In this respect, regulations should be formulated with special attention devoted to 
creating a supportive legal environment, such as securing patients’ rights to information, 
providing an effective complaint process and other empowering measures (e.g. ‘building 
health literacy, improving self-management skills, cultivating shared decision-making and 
creating a supportive environment’ (WB et al., 2016)).
Moreover, does the GP have the right to choose patients when the contractual relation-
ship implies an exclusive relationship? According to Article 24 of the Law on Practising 
Doctors, doctors have an affirmative responsibility to take care of patients under emergency 
situations. Certainly, any emergency case should be excluded from contractual conditions 
due to humanitarian values. How about other cases? If the GP is entitled to select patients, is 
there any difference between commercial insurance companies and the GP? Will the rights 
of doctors or insurance companies limit the accessibility of healthcare for patients who suffer 
from severe chronic diseases? Since the law will affect everyone, Chinese lawmakers need to 
consider this issue carefully.
Last but not least, considering the fact that there exists a wide disparity between urban 
and rural areas in primary care in China (Shi, 1993; Liu et al., 1999; Zhang et al., 2016), 
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future legislation should pay special attention to assisting the implementation of GP services 
in the rural areas of China where people are more likely to suffer from lack of medication 
and qualified personnel in healthcare. However, this raises many other questions, such as: 
should legislation interfere in the career choices of medical graduates for the sake of dealing 
with the shortage of healthcare personnel in rural China? Questions like this are crucial for 
future legislation and thus need to be considered fully during legislative design.
4.4.2 External reform: creation of an independent regulatory supervisory body
In general, Chinese healthcare reform has been managed in a multileadership style. The 
government agencies in charge are the National Health and Family Planning Commission, 
the Ministry of Finance, the National Development and Reform Commission, and the Min-
istry of Human Resources and Social Security. Each government agency represents its own 
political constituency, which results in weak interagency communication and collaboration. 
Reform plans developed in this multileadership style are highly likely to fall short in ac-
countability provisions for each sector, and contain contradictory arrangements. Although a 
typical example of multisector cooperation exists in China – the ‘Patriotic Health Campaign’ 
(Meng et al., 2015, p. 15) – this cross-sector coordination mainly focuses on protecting 
and promoting public health services instead of the entire primary care sector. Given these 
drawbacks, together with the substantial discretion of local governments and the physicians’ 
self-reporting dilemma, the enforcement process performs poorly in practice. Successful 
implementation of the GP system calls for greater attention to the regulatory body. Creation 
of an independent regulatory supervisory body may be a feasible strategy to pave the way for 
nationwide implementation.
There are two essential elements of the proposed independent regulatory supervisory 
body. One refers to the involvement of professionals with multidisciplinary backgrounds. 
Since healthcare reforms depend on consistent systematic efforts, the proposed body should 
recruit physicians who are able to provide clinical insight due to their front-line role in the 
healthcare system, economists who can provide input on sustainability and effectiveness, 
legal professionals who can draft laws and regulations to prevent misbehaviour and shield 
people from the adverse effects of reform, ethicists who can provide guidance on humanitar-
ian performance, and professionals from social media who can cultivate cultural attitudes by 
educating people to be responsible and rational beneficiaries of the reform.
Procedural justice is another concern. Formulating an independent regulatory supervisory 
body should not be regarded as an attempt to replace any effective government agency. On 
the contrary, it should function independently as a bridge to mitigate the conflicts resulting 
from the multileadership style. In addition, the supervisory body should not only serve as a 
surveillance tool, but should also provide an open process for mediating medical disputes.
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4.5 COnCLUDIng REMARKS
As the cornerstone of the people-centred, integrated care framework, the evolving GP sys-
tem has been introduced to establish and strengthen the primary care gatekeeping in China. 
Compared with the previous system of community-based medical services, GP services are 
believed to perform better in serving the gatekeeper role. The new GP system is promising, 
not only in terms of restoring trust between doctors and patients, but also with regard to the 
enhanced referral mechanism, which will contribute to improvements in communication 
and collaboration among different levels of medical institutions. However, these promis-
ing aspects could also produce unexpected adverse effects if the healthcare system, or even 
the entire society, is unprepared. In this regard, we have considered the current Chinese 
healthcare system, with special attention paid to the regulatory sector. Results show that 
major deficiencies in the regulatory sector include the problematic relationship between legal 
norms and health policies, the lack of effective and consistent new legislation, the low rate of 
social acceptance of GP services, and the lack of support for GPs from government agencies. 
Therefore, neither the internal structure nor the external environment of the regulatory sec-
tor is prepared. Recognising that a well-developed regulatory sector is of vital importance for 
the effective nationwide implementation of the GP system, future efforts should be directed, 
at least in part, towards enacting a specific law and establishing an independent regulatory 
supervisory body. Only after these requirements are met can GP services be implemented 
effectively on a nationwide scale.
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Regulating private medical 
institutions: A case study of China*
*Liu, Z. Health Economics, Policy and Law, in press.
94
C
ha
pt
er
 5
ABStRACt
Aim and Background: The expansion of privatisation in healthcare has been discussed 
extensively in most European countries and remains a hot topic nowadays. In China, priva-
tisation has resulted in considerable changes in its healthcare system, especially accelerating 
the ever-growing private medical institutions (PMIs). The rapid growth of PMIs raises the 
question of regulation for the Chinese government. Given the fact that few studies are 
available on the regulation of PMIs in China, I attempted to fill that gap by discussing the 
development of PMIs with a special focus on legal regulatory strategies.
Methods: Adhering to the guidelines of PRISMA (Preferred Reporting Items for System-
atic Rviews and Meta-Analyses), literature has been selected through electronic databases, 
including PubMed and Google Scholar, by using keywords: ‘Privatisation’, ‘Private medical 
institutions’, ‘Health care’, ‘Regulation’ and ‘China’. With regard to searching legislations, I 
use a law database: pkulaw. The benchmarks of the diagnostic process (Figure 6.1) are mainly 
originated by the ‘control knob’ framework in Roberts et al.’s book: Getting Health Reform 
Right: A Guide to Improve Performance and Equity. Key findings have been summarised in 
Figure 6.2 and two tables.
findings: After assessing current legal/regulatory strategies concerning PMIs, the paper iden-
tifies three major concerns regarding effective legal rules (i.e. weak coherence, inconsistency, 
and legislative vacancy) and three difficult issues regarding government capacity (i.e. the 
negative effects of decentralised political structure, the low professionalism of bureaucrats, 
and lack of reliability) that impede the well-functioning of regulatory agencies in China. As 
a plausible response, the paper recommends enacting an ‘umbrella health law’ in which a 
separate chapter should be assigned to regulating PMIs and also establishing an independent 
regulatory body to manage the issues of PMIs in China. Detailed recommendations are the 
practical implications of ICESCR General Comment No. 14. The increasingly involvement 
of private sector in healthcare is not identified as purely a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ tendency in itself. 
In most cases, how the state plays its role in regulating and governing the rapidly developing 
private sector is the key issue and of crucial importance. 
Keywords: Private medical institutions, privatisation, international human rights law, 
regulation, China
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5.1 BACKgROUnD
The increasing involvement of the private sector in healthcare has been discussed extensively 
in most European countries and remains a hot topic nowadays (Mackintosh et al., 2016; 
Morgan et al., 2016; Montagu & Goodman, 2016; McPake & Hanson, 2016). As a result of 
privatisation, the rapidly growing involvement of the private sector in healthcare is gradually 
challenging the role of the state, implying an urgent need to rebalance public and private 
sectors in delivering health services (Marshall & Bindman, 2016). Scholarly literature has 
not presented a single attitude towards private sector involvement in services like healthcare 
(Barlow et al., 2013; Roehrich et al., 2014; Torchia et al., 2015; Mills, 2014; Andre & Bati-
foulier, 2016). Similarly, this paper will not explore whether gradually relying on the private 
sector is an effective approach for expanding the accessibility of better quality healthcare 
or not. It aims rather to address special concerns about how to measure the private sector 
properly (especially using legal measures) in order to secure an efficient and sustainable way 
of delivering health services and, more importantly, enabling people to optimally benefit 
from the increasing involvement of the private sector in healthcare.
In general, existing literature tends to be context-specific.67 Thus this paper takes the 
Chinese healthcare system as its basic context, taking into account that the private sector has 
been offered a great opportunity to grow in China and is having a significant impact on the 
Chinese healthcare system. Although a great deal of literature is available on private sector 
involvement in healthcare in China (Yu, 2007, pp. 223–224; Ramesh & Wu, 2009; Liu & 
Darimont, 2013; Tu et al., 2015; Blumenthal & Hsiao, 2005, 2015; Yip & Hsiao, 2014), 
discussions rarely include a human rights perspective. This chapter therefore attempts to fill 
this gap by approaching the question from a human rights perspective. In order to develop a 
better understanding of private sector involvement in healthcare in China, the chapter takes 
private medical institutions (PMIs) as an example. By studying the case of PMIs, the chapter 
attempts to find the answer to the following question: given the great influence of privatisa-
tion on the Chinese healthcare system, how will the Chinese government fulfil its role in 
measuring the rapid growth of private medical institutions from a human rights perspective?
5.1.1 Context: Private medical institutions (PMIs) in China
The very first PMI was set up in 1984, encouraged by Chinese economic innovation (Liu et 
al., 1994, p. 167), the decentralised reforms of China’s administrative system and the 1982 
edition of the Chinese Constitution. Thereafter, the State Council and its General Office 
released a series of administrative regulations and interpretations to support and promote 
the development of PMIs. Nevertheless, the development of PMIs was slower than expected 
67 Researches concerning privatisation and healthcare are often embedded with special social contexts, such as 
Blumenthal and Hsiao (2005, 2015), Yip and Hsiao (2014), Maarse (2006), Toebes (2006), and Larsen (2015). 
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due to the lack of explicit internal classification at that time. Recognising this impediment, 
in 2000 the State Council and the Ministry of Health issued guiding opinions and detailed 
implementations on differentiating for-profit PMIs from not-for-profit ones. Since then, 
for-profit and not-for-profit PMIs have both had many opportunities to improve. Besides 
these supportive polices, public medical institutions tend to ease their financial burden, 
resulting from reduced governmental subsidies, by contracting out certain parts of their 
healthcare services to PMIs. Contracting out activities effectively contributed to the rapid 
development of PMIs in China. In the 2009 healthcare reform, the Chinese government 
affirmed the supplementary role of PMIs in its healthcare system. From then onwards, the 
Chinese government released a series of provisions to support and encourage the develop-
ment of PMIs, such as the recently released Guiding Principle on the Establishment of 
Medical Institutions in China (2016–2020).
The rapidly growing PMIs do expand healthcare accessibility and improve the quality 
of health services (Mills et al., 2002; Albreht, 2009). However, they also inevitably result in 
certain risks, such as the violation of human rights and the deterioration of public health 
delivery (Horton & Clark, 2016; Bloche, 2005, Toebes, 2006). However, as Bloche (2005) 
argued, these risks can be minimised if the healthcare system is facilitated with effective 
regulatory strategies, especially legal regulatory measures.
5.1.2 Structure: Map the discussion
The chapter is structured as follows: it describes the background of this study by a selec-
tive literature review and a brief narrative on the context. In order to avoid any ambiguity, 
the chapter includes a conceptual clarification of various key terms, such as privatisation, 
in the section Conceptual Clarification and Theoretical Background. Thereafter, it briefly 
explores the reasons and risks (advantages and disadvantages) of involving the private sector 
in healthcare and emphasises the importance of how the state fulfils its role in measur-
ing the gradually evolving private sector. The chapter then describes in detail the relevant 
international human rights law, thereby observing that the state is required to assume an 
active regulatory role rather than play a ‘provider’ role in controlling and supporting the 
development of the private sector in healthcare. Thus, the major concern of the following 
discussion shifts to address the regulatory role of the state in dealing with the rapidly growing 
private sector in healthcare. In ‘Method’, the searching criteria and assessing tools (Figure 
5.1: The diagnostic process) are introduced. These originated from the PRISMA guidelines 
and the ‘control knob’ framework developed by Roberts and his colleagues. The Results 
and Discussion section evaluates current legal regulatory strategies (including effective legal 
rules and related regulatory bodies) concerning PMIs in China and provides corresponding 
recommendations for improving these strategies. Finally, the chapter reaffirms the need to 
strengthen and improve the regulatory role of the state in order to guide and support the 
rapidly growing private sector in healthcare in China.
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figure 5.1 Diagnostic process
Source: Adapted from the ‘regulation control knob’ of the ‘control knob framework’ in Roberts et al., 
(2004), pp. 248–280.
5.2 COnCEPtUAL CLARIfICAtIOn AnD tHEOREtICAL 
BACKgROUnD
5.2.1 Privatisation in healthcare 
According to the World Health Organization defi nition, privatisation involves the change 
of ‘ownership and government functions from public to private bodies.’68 Potential benefi ts 
of privatisation in healthcare include increasing effi  ciency (Kozinski & Bentz, 2013–2014; 
Bloche, 2005), promoting patient rights (e.g. diversifying health services, expanding 
individual choices and improving the quality of healthcare) (Albreht, 2009), and cover-
ing remote areas which are beyond the attention of the public sector (Mills et al., 2002). 
Inevitably, there are also certain concerns, such as the risk of human rights violation and 
deteriorating public health delivery due to the profi t-seeking behaviour of private actors 
(Horton & Clarks, 2016; Bloche, 2005, Toebes, 2006).
In general, there are two prominent types of privatisation: full privatisation (i.e. the 
transfer of ownership from public sector to private sector), and contracting out (or out-
sourcing) (Feyter & Isa, 2005; Toebes, 2006). In contrast to full privatisation, contracting 
out (outsourcing) in healthcare refers to the situation whereby the public sector merely 
delegates responsibility for providing healthcare and the corresponding risk management 
to the private sector on the basis of contracts but retains ownership (Graham, 2005). Th ese 
two types of privatisation cover a wide range of models regarding public-private partner-
68 Health Systems Strengthening Glossary. Please refer to
http: / / www.who.int/ healthsystems/ hss_ glossary/ en/ index3.html (last accessed 24 March 2019).
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ships in healthcare (Barlow et al., 2013, p. 147). Research shows that cultivating a healthy 
public-private partnership is a plausible way to manage the gradually evolving private sector 
in healthcare and will be better able to secure the accessibility of good quality health services 
(Roehrich, 2013; 2014, p. 110). In this regard, the question is how to optimally balance 
public and private sectors in healthcare from a human rights perspective. I intend to explore 
the answer to this question with a special focus on the role of the state. 
5.2.2 International human rights law and state accountability 
International human rights law requires state members to take state accountability to protect 
and promote the right to health. However, the gradually increasing reliance on the private 
sector is easily misunderstood as a process of reducing state accountability in healthcare. 
Although increasing privatisation in healthcare accelerates the transfer of ‘ownership and 
government functions’ from public medical institutions to the private sector, thus promot-
ing the development of private sector, the state is still responsible for ensuring that healthcare 
delivery remains the answer to the basic principles of human rights.
General Comment No. 3 of Article 2 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) broadly stipulates that the state should have a minimum 
core obligation in ensuring the satisfaction of the rights recognised by ICESCR, which 
includes guaranteeing primary healthcare services. Specifically, Article 12 of ICESCR recog-
nises ‘the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical 
and mental health’ and state accountability in protecting and promoting this right. This 
highly abstracted stipulation is very difficult to enforce. In response, the UN Commission 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights issued General Comment No. 14 to provide a 
further interpretation. General Comment No. 14 requires the state members of ICESCR to 
protect and promote the right to health according to the standards of ‘availability, accessibil-
ity (non-discrimination, physical accessibility, affordability and information accessibility), 
acceptability and quality (AAAQ).’ Furthermore, in line with General Comment No. 3 
and General Comment No. 14, the scope and extent of implementation may differ and be 
achieved progressively in accordance with the diverse conditions of the member states, but 
actions towards AAAQ must be taken ‘within a reasonably short time after the Covenant’s 
entry into force for the States concerned.’
There are other international human rights treaties and provisions which generate an 
indirect but profound influence on state accountability in regulating the private sector in 
healthcare services. For instance, General Comment No. 31 of Article 2 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) specifies the general legal obligations of 
states in regulating private entities. General Comment No. 15 of Article 11 and Article 
12 of ICESCR and General Comment No. 22 of Article 12 of ICESCR delineate state 
accountability in monitoring and controlling the behaviour of the private sector in protect-
ing and promoting the right to water. General Comment No. 16 of Article 17 of ICCPR 
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stipulates the importance of the private sector such as databanks in protecting the right to 
privacy. With regard to vulnerable groups, such as women and children, there are articles 
(e.g. General Comment No. 15 and General Comment No. 24) which stipulate that state 
accountability in protecting and promoting the right to health of women and children can-
not be absolved by delegating medical services to the private sector.
5.2.3 ICESCR General Comment No. 14 and the regulatory role of the state
Specifically, regulating the private sector mainly relies on ICESCR General Comment No. 
14. According to General Comment No. 14, states should take their obligation to protect 
the right to health from third party infringements. In other words, it requires states to adopt 
their regulatory role to ensure the fulfilment of the following guidelines before allowing the 
expansion of privatisation in their healthcare systems:
(1) Ensuring that the privatisation of the health sector does not constitute a threat to 
the availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality of health facilities, goods and 
services; (2) ensuring that harmful social or traditional practices do not interfere with 
access to prenatal and postnatal care and family planning; (3) ensuring that third 
parties do not limit people’s access to health-related information and services; (4) to 
ensure equal access to health care and health-related services provided by third parties; 
(5) to control the marketing of medical equipment and medicines by third parties; (6) 
to ensure that medical practitioners and other health professionals meet appropriate 
standards of education, skill and ethical codes of conduct; (7) to prevent third parties 
from coercing women to undergo traditional practices; (8) to protect all vulnerable or 
marginalised groups of society, in particular women, children, adolescents and older 
persons, in the light of gender-based expressions of violence.
(ICESCR General Comment No. 14, para. 35)
Overall, the increasing involvement of the private sector does not change ‘the role of the 
state as the ultimate guarantor of the realisation of health rights obligations’ (Minow 2003, 
p. 1257). In contrast, the state should assume an active regulatory role in controlling, sup-
porting and encouraging the private sector towards achieving national health goals (Mills et 
al. 2002).
5.3 MEtHODS
This section explains strategies and criteria in searching and selecting existing literature and 
related legislation in China. Furthermore, tools for assessing legal regulatory strategies are 
also briefly introduced. 
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5.3.1 Selection strategy and search criteria 
This research follows the PRISMA guidelines.69 To capture peer-reviewed literature, I 
searched for information through electronic databases, including PubMed and Google 
Scholar, using the timeline between 1 January 1990 and 1 January 2017. Besides peer-
reviewed literature, classic monographs were also included for the sake of analysis, such as 
Getting Health Reform Right: A Guide to Improve Performance and Equity which was edited 
by Roberts and colleagues, The Privatization of Health Care Reform: Legal and Regulatory 
Perspectives, which was edited by Bloche, and Privatization and Human Rights: In the Age of 
Globalization which was edited by Feyter and Isa. 
Details of the literature search are given below with an example from PubMed: I used 
five key terms (‘private medical institutions’, ‘privatisation’, ‘health care’, ‘China’ and ‘regu-
lation’) to search for the information through the PubMed advanced search builder. The 
search details are: 
Key term 1: (“private”[All Fields]) AND “medical” [All Fields] AND 
(“Institutions”[Journal] OR “institutions”[All Fields])
OR
Key term 2: (“privatisation”[MeSH Terms] OR “privatisation”[All Fields])
AND
Key term 3: (“delivery of health care”[MeSH Terms] OR (“delivery”[All Fields] AND 
“health”[All Fields] AND “care”[All Fields]) OR “delivery of health care”[All Fields] 
OR “health care”[All Fields])
AND
Key term 4: (“China”[MeSH Terms] OR “China”[All Fields])
AND
Key term 5: (“social control, formal”[MeSH Terms] OR (“social”[All Fields] AND 
“control”[All Fields] AND “formal”[All Fields]) OR “formal social control”[All Fields] 
OR “regulation”[All Fields])
The results showed that there were only 24 studies in PubMed that met the selection criteria. 
The same strategy was used to search for studies in Google Scholar. The results were fairly 
similar to those in PubMed. Given the fact that few studies are available on the regulation 
69 PRISMA (Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses) [Online]. Please refer to http: 
/ / www.prisma-statement.org/ (last accessed 24 March 2019).
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of PMIs in China, I attempted to fill that gap by discussing the development of PMIs with 
a special focus on legal regulatory strategies.
With regard to the legislation search, I used a law database, pkulaw, to collect China’s 
laws and regulations relating to PMIs. Presented in Figure 5.2, many legal rules, including 
laws, administrative regulations, the interpretations of administrative regulations, the regula-
tory documents of the State Council and department rules concerning PMIs have been 
released since 2000. 
          
Department Rules*
Interpretations of Administrative Regulations and
Regulatory Documents of the State Council*
Administrative Regulations
Laws
Numbers (1982-2016)
figure 5.2 Legal rules concerning PMIs at the state level
* Notes: 
The Interpretations of Administrative Regulations and the Regulatory Documents of the State Council 
are separated from the Administrative Regulations because the Legislation Law of the People’s Republic 
of China (2015 Amendment) does not have an explicit stipulation on the authority of these legal rules.
Source: pkulaw, please refer to http://en.pkulaw.cn/ (last accessed 24 March 2019) 
In terms of the assessment strategy, I used the ‘regulation control knob’ as the basis for my 
diagnostic process (Figure 5.1) to assess current legal regulatory strategies (including legal 
rules and regulatory agencies) of PMIs in China. The benchmarks used for the assessment 
were originated by the control knob framework in Roberts et al.’s (2004) book: Getting 
Health Reform Right: A Guide to Improve Performance and Equity. Specifically, in terms of 
assessing legal rules, I focused more on assessing the consistency and coherence of legal rules 
because they are also the key to the rule of law (Fuller, 1969, p. 39). Regarding the assess-
ment of regulatory agencies, the benchmark is government capacity (i.e. political structure, 
professionalism of bureaucrats and reliability). Through the diagnostic process, I intended 
to answer the question: does China have effective legal regulatory strategies to control and 
support the development of PMIs? 
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5.3.2 Bias 
The bias of the literature search was minimised by including the analysis of classic mono-
graphs. Some search results from Google Scholar were excluded due to not being published 
in English or in the form of books. 
With regard to the selection of legislation, I merely focused on assessing legal rules which 
had been enacted by the National People’s Congress or the Standing Committee of the Na-
tional People’s Congress (Table 5.1). These legal rules have higher legal authority in China’s 
legal system, but there was actually a lack of such legal rules regulating PMIs. 
In terms of my diagnostic process, however, the control knob framework was formulated 
to provide guidelines for improving healthcare reform. These guidelines may also be helpful 
for diagnosing the performance of healthcare systems and adjusting the direction of govern-
ment actions (Roberts et al., 2004, p. 128).
5.4 RESULtS AnD DISCUSSIOn
5.4.1 Deficiencies in legal regulatory strategies concerning PMIs in China
Effective legal rules: weak coherence, inconsistency and legislative vacancy
Like many other countries, China has not yet enacted an umbrella health law. Protecting 
and promoting the right to health in China is therefore mainly achieved by enforcing legal 
rules in other legal fields, such as administrative law, contract/tort law or even criminal law. 
As a consequence, legal rules regarding healthcare tend to be fragmented, as are the legal 
rules related to PMIs. Figure 5.2 presents a macro view of effective legal rules concerning 
PMIs in China. The majority of effective legal rules relating to PMIs seem to have lower legal 
authority in the Chinese legal system, making it very difficult to enforce them. According 
to the Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China (2015 Amendment), Constitution 
in China has the highest legal authority. Below this are laws, administrative regulations, 
department rules and local regulatory documents. Compared to laws and administrative 
regulations, department rules and local regulatory documents have lower legal authority in 
the Chinese legal system. These are likely to be less stable, easily clash with each other and 
endanger substantive discretion during enforcement. PMIs are mainly regulated through 
department rules and local regulatory documents in China. For instance, a department 
regulatory document issued by the State Administration for Industry and Commerce deals 
with the question of whether the drug mark-ups of not-for-profit PMIs should be regulated 
by the Anti-unfair Competition Law or not. Although some legal rules with higher legal 
authority (i.e. laws and administrative regulations) do exist for regulating PMIs in China 
(Table 5.1), they are few and not specifically designed for regulating PMIs. Due to the 
lack of legal rules with high legal authority at central government level, PMIs are regulated 
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unevenly across local governments. As a consequence, the coherence of legal rules relating to 
PMIs in China is relatively weak. 
Furthermore, legal rules concerning PMIs also encounter the problem of inconsistency. 
The strictest part of regulation is always centralised at the registration stage, while less ef-
fort is devoted to regulating the behaviour of PMIs after they obtain a certificate from the 
relevant registration agencies. As Chapman (2014) said, it is crucial to take measures in 
advance (e.g. registration and licensing strategies) to control the upcoming behaviour of the 
private sector in line with human rights principles. Nevertheless, it is equally important to 
monitor and control the behaviour of PMIs after they obtain the certificate. Therefore, this 
deserves more attention at the current stage because regulating PMIs after registration is 
more likely to be overlooked. 
Besides inconsistency and weak coherence, a marked disagreement regarding the legal 
attribute of PMIs, especially for-profit ones, may present an extra challenge for enforce-
ment because of a legislative vacancy. In literature, the question of whether for-profit PMIs 
should be treated as social institutions or as market entities has been discussed intensively 
(Bloom, 2001; Nichols et al., 2004). Scholars, especially human rights professionals, lean 
in favour of regarding for-profit PMIs as social institutions, considering the special nature 
of healthcare in terms of morality and ethics. Conversely, for-profit PMIs themselves are 
willing to be identified as free market competitors, even though they run a ‘business’ that 
influences people’s lives. This controversial issue is made worse by some health policies in 
China. The Chinese government tends to force for-profit PMIs to increasingly assume social 
responsibility while requiring them to deliver healthcare services as efficient and productive 
as other free competitors in the market. As illustrated in Table 5.1, for-profit PMIs are 
temporarily treated as business entities in China. However, the ‘business’ run by for-profit 
PMIs is a health service which is in a morally special position and which cannot therefore be 
totally handed over to the market (Daniels, 1996, p. 179; 2001, p. 2). Thus, the legislative 
vacancy leaves patients at the mercy of a laissez-faire policy in healthcare in China (Roberts 
et al., 2004, p. 253).
Relative regulatory agencies: the negative effects of decentralised political structure, the 
low professionalism of bureaucrats and lack of reliability  
Government capacity is an essential determinant of regulatory success, especially in terms 
of promulgating and enforcing regulations (Roberts et al., 2004). As argued by Roberts 
et al. (2004, p. 254), government capacity has an interactive relationship with the level of 
economic development and cultural attitude. Thus low and middle-income countries have 
relatively lower administrative capacity and less support from citizens. This section therefore 
aims at verifying this assumption by assessing relative regulatory agencies concerning PMIs 
in China with three benchmarks: political structure, bureaucratic professionalism and reli-
ability.
104
C
ha
pt
er
 5
ta
bl
e 
5.
1 
La
w
s a
nd
 a
dm
in
ist
ra
tiv
e 
re
gu
la
tio
ns
 c
on
ce
rn
in
g 
PM
Is
 in
 C
hi
na
n
am
e
Is
su
in
g 
A
ut
ho
ri
ty
Le
ve
l o
f A
ut
ho
ri
ty
D
at
e 
of
 Is
su
e 
an
d 
Eff
ec
ti
ve
R
ev
is
io
n
Su
m
m
ar
y
C
on
sti
tu
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
Pe
op
le’
s 
Re
pu
bl
ic
 o
f C
hi
na
 (1
98
2)
N
at
io
na
l P
eo
pl
e’s
 C
on
gr
es
s
La
w
s
Is
su
e:
 
4 
O
ct
 1
98
2
Ye
s
19
88
/1
99
3/
19
99
/ 2
00
4 
Am
en
dm
en
ts
Ar
tic
le
 2
1 
affi
rm
s t
he
 e
vo
lv
in
g 
so
ci
al
 c
ap
ita
l i
n 
es
ta
bl
ish
in
g 
m
ed
ic
al
 in
sti
tu
tio
ns
.
La
w
 o
n 
Pr
ac
tis
in
g 
D
oc
to
rs
 o
f 
th
e 
Pe
op
le’
s R
ep
ub
lic
 o
f C
hi
na
St
an
di
ng
 C
om
m
itt
ee
 
of
 th
e 
N
at
io
na
l P
eo
pl
e’s
 
C
on
gr
es
s
La
w
s
Is
su
e:
 
26
 Ju
n 
19
98
;
Eff
ec
tiv
e:
 
1 
M
ay
 1
99
9
Ye
s
D
at
e:
 
27
 A
ug
 2
00
9
Re
vi
se
d 
Ar
tic
le
 4
0
D
oc
to
rs
 w
ho
 a
re
 p
ra
ct
isi
ng
 m
ed
ic
in
e 
in
 P
M
Is
 
sh
ou
ld
 a
lso
 p
as
s t
he
 e
xa
m
in
at
io
n 
fo
r a
 d
oc
to
r’s
 
qu
al
ifi
ca
tio
n 
an
d 
ap
pl
y 
fo
r r
eg
ist
ra
tio
n 
w
ith
 th
e 
re
le
va
nt
 h
ea
lth
 a
dm
in
ist
ra
tio
n 
de
pa
rt
m
en
t o
f, 
or
 
ab
ov
e,
 th
e 
co
un
ty
 le
ve
l.
La
w
 o
f t
he
 P
eo
pl
e’s
 R
ep
ub
lic
 o
f 
C
hi
na
 o
n 
Tr
ad
iti
on
al
 C
hi
ne
se
 
M
ed
ic
in
e
St
an
di
ng
 C
om
m
itt
ee
 
of
 th
e 
N
at
io
na
l P
eo
pl
e’s
 
C
on
gr
es
s
La
w
s
Is
su
e:
 2
5 
D
ec
 
20
16
;
Eff
ec
tiv
e:
 
1 
Ju
l 2
01
7
N
o
Ar
tic
le
 1
3 
affi
rm
s t
ha
t t
he
 st
at
e 
su
pp
or
ts 
so
ci
al
 
fo
rc
es
 in
 th
ei
r l
au
nc
hi
ng
 o
f t
ra
di
tio
na
l C
hi
ne
se
 
m
ed
ic
in
e 
m
ed
ic
al
 in
sti
tu
tio
ns
, a
nd
 th
os
e 
PM
Is
 
sh
ou
ld
 e
nj
oy
 e
qu
al
 ri
gh
ts 
w
ith
 m
ed
ic
al
 in
sti
tu
tio
ns
 
la
un
ch
ed
 b
y 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t.
To
rt
 L
aw
 o
f t
he
 P
eo
pl
e’s
 
Re
pu
bl
ic
 o
f C
hi
na
 
St
an
di
ng
 C
om
m
itt
ee
 
of
 th
e 
N
at
io
na
l P
eo
pl
e’s
 
C
on
gr
es
s
La
w
s
Is
su
e:
 2
6 
D
ec
 
20
09
;
Eff
ec
tiv
e:
 
1 
Ju
l 2
01
0
N
o
C
ha
pt
er
 V
II
 re
gu
la
te
s t
he
 li
ab
ili
ty
 o
f m
ed
ic
al
 
m
al
pr
ac
tic
e,
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
th
e 
co
m
pe
ns
at
or
y 
lia
bi
lit
y 
of
 
m
ed
ic
al
 in
sti
tu
tio
ns
. 
En
te
rp
ris
e 
In
co
m
e T
ax
 L
aw
 o
f 
th
e 
Pe
op
le’
s R
ep
ub
lic
 o
f C
hi
na
N
at
io
na
l P
eo
pl
e’s
 C
on
gr
es
s
La
w
s
Is
su
e:
 1
6 
M
ar
 
20
07
;
Eff
ec
tiv
e:
1 
Ja
n 
20
08
N
o
Th
e 
fo
r-
pr
ofi
t P
M
Is
 sh
al
l p
ay
 th
e 
en
te
rp
ris
e 
in
co
m
e 
ta
xe
s. 
H
ow
ev
er
, t
he
re
 is
 a
 N
ot
ic
e 
of
 th
e 
M
in
ist
ry
 o
f 
Fi
na
nc
e 
an
d 
th
e 
St
at
e 
Ad
m
in
ist
ra
tio
n 
of
 T
ax
at
io
n 
(2
00
0)
 p
ro
vi
di
ng
 a
 th
re
e-
ye
ar
 e
xe
m
pt
io
n 
of
 
ta
xa
tio
n 
fo
r f
or
-p
ro
fit
 P
M
Is
.
An
ti-
un
fa
ir 
C
om
pe
tit
io
n 
La
w
 o
f 
th
e 
Pe
op
le’
s R
ep
ub
lic
 o
f C
hi
na
St
an
di
ng
 C
om
m
itt
ee
 
of
 th
e 
N
at
io
na
l P
eo
pl
e’s
 
C
on
gr
es
s
La
w
s
Is
su
e:
 
2 
Se
pt
 1
99
3;
Eff
ec
tiv
e:
 
1 
D
ec
 1
99
3
N
o
In
 2
00
1,
 th
e 
St
at
e 
Ad
m
in
ist
ra
tio
n 
fo
r I
nd
us
tr
y 
&
 C
om
m
er
ce
 is
su
ed
 a
 re
pl
y 
(N
o.
 2
48
) t
o 
affi
rm
 
th
at
 a
ll 
PM
Is
 w
hi
ch
 h
av
e 
ta
ke
n 
a 
re
ba
te
 fr
om
 
pr
es
cr
ib
in
g 
m
ed
ia
tio
ns
 sh
al
l b
e 
th
e 
su
bj
ec
t t
o 
re
gu
la
tio
n 
by
 th
e 
An
ti-
un
fa
ir 
C
om
pe
tit
io
n 
La
w.
105
Re
gu
la
tin
g 
pr
iv
at
e 
m
ed
ic
al
 in
sti
tu
tio
ns
ta
bl
e 
5.
1 
La
w
s a
nd
 a
dm
in
ist
ra
tiv
e 
re
gu
la
tio
ns
 c
on
ce
rn
in
g 
PM
Is
 in
 C
hi
na
 (c
on
tin
ue
d)
n
am
e
Is
su
in
g 
A
ut
ho
ri
ty
Le
ve
l o
f A
ut
ho
ri
ty
D
at
e 
of
 Is
su
e 
an
d 
Eff
ec
ti
ve
R
ev
is
io
n
Su
m
m
ar
y
Re
gu
la
tio
n 
on
 th
e 
H
an
dl
in
g 
of
 
M
ed
ic
al
 A
cc
id
en
ts
St
at
e 
C
ou
nc
il
Ad
m
in
ist
ra
tiv
e 
Re
gu
la
tio
ns
Is
su
e:
 
4 
Ap
r 2
00
2;
Eff
ec
tiv
e:
 
1 
Se
pt
 2
00
2
N
o
Ar
tic
le
 7
 a
ffi
rm
s t
ha
t a
ll 
m
ed
ic
al
 in
sti
tu
tio
ns
 sh
ou
ld
 
se
t u
p 
re
le
va
nt
 d
ep
ar
tm
en
ts 
to
 c
on
tro
l t
he
 q
ua
lit
y 
of
 m
ed
ic
al
 tr
ea
tm
en
ts.
Ad
m
in
ist
ra
tiv
e 
Re
gu
la
tio
ns
 o
n 
M
ed
ic
al
 In
sti
tu
tio
n
St
at
e 
C
ou
nc
il
Ad
m
in
ist
ra
tiv
e 
Re
gu
la
tio
ns
Is
su
e:
 2
6 
Fe
b 
19
94
;
Eff
ec
tiv
e:
 
1 
Se
pt
 1
99
4
Ye
s
D
at
e:
 
6 
Fe
b 
20
16
Re
vi
se
d 
Ar
tic
le
 9
Th
e 
ce
nt
ra
l-l
oc
al
 se
pa
ra
tio
n 
of
 p
ow
er
s i
n 
te
rm
s 
of
 c
on
tro
lli
ng
 a
nd
 m
an
ag
in
g 
th
e 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t o
f 
m
ed
ic
al
 in
sti
tu
tio
ns
, i
nc
lu
di
ng
 fo
r-
pr
ofi
t P
M
Is
.
N
ur
se
s R
eg
ul
at
io
n
St
at
e 
C
ou
nc
il
Ad
m
in
ist
ra
tiv
e 
Re
gu
la
tio
ns
Is
su
e:
 
31
 Ja
n 
20
08
;
Eff
ec
tiv
e:
 
12
 M
ay
 2
00
8
N
o
Al
l p
ra
ct
isi
ng
 n
ur
se
s s
ho
ul
d 
pa
ss
 th
e 
pr
ac
tis
in
g 
nu
rs
e 
qu
al
ifi
ca
tio
n 
ex
am
in
at
io
n 
or
ga
ni
se
d 
by
 th
e 
he
al
th
 a
dm
in
ist
ra
tiv
e 
de
pa
rt
m
en
t o
f t
he
 S
ta
te
 
C
ou
nc
il 
an
d 
ap
pl
y 
fo
r r
eg
ist
ra
tio
n.
In
te
rim
 R
eg
ul
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
Pe
op
le’
s R
ep
ub
lic
 o
f C
hi
na
 o
n 
Bu
sin
es
s T
ax
St
at
e 
C
ou
nc
il
Ad
m
in
ist
ra
tiv
e 
Re
gu
la
tio
ns
Is
su
e:
 1
3 
D
ec
 
19
93
;
Eff
ec
tiv
e:
1 
Ja
n 
19
94
Ye
s
D
at
e:
 1
 Ja
n 
20
09
Th
e 
20
09
 re
vi
sio
n 
affi
rm
s t
ha
t t
he
 b
us
in
es
s t
ax
 o
f 
fo
r-
pr
ofi
t P
M
Is
 sh
al
l b
e 
ex
em
pt
ed
. 
Re
gu
la
tio
ns
 o
n 
th
e 
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
of
 M
ed
ic
al
 W
as
te
St
at
e 
C
ou
nc
il
Ad
m
in
ist
ra
tiv
e 
Re
gu
la
tio
ns
Eff
ec
tiv
e:
 
16
 Ju
n 
20
03
Ye
s
D
at
e:
 8
 Ja
n 
20
11
It 
ai
m
s a
t s
tre
ng
th
en
in
g 
th
e 
sa
fe
 m
an
ag
em
en
t o
f 
m
ed
ic
al
 w
as
te
 fo
r a
ll 
ki
nd
s o
f m
ed
ic
al
 in
sti
tu
tio
ns
.
So
ur
ce
: p
ku
la
w,
 p
le
as
e 
re
fe
r t
o 
ht
tp
://
en
.p
ku
la
w.
cn
/(
la
st 
ac
ce
ss
ed
 2
4 
M
ar
ch
 2
01
9)
.
106
C
ha
pt
er
 5
Following three waves (1958, 1970 and 1978) of decentralisation reform in China, the 
administrative power of central government has gradually been transferred to local govern-
ments and specific government agencies, in order to maximise overall social welfare and 
satisfy the diverse sets of preferences of local people (Feng, 2016, pp. 13–14). Reflected in 
healthcare, regulating PMIs involves a number of government agencies in China (Table 5.2). 
Some regulatory agencies control and manage many different PMIs but focus on different 
aspects. For example, the China Food and Drug Administration or CFDA oversees the 
use of drugs and medical devices,70 the General Administration of Quality Supervision, 
Inspection and Quarantine or AQSIQ is responsible for controlling the quality and safety of 
medical products,71 while the Ministry of Ecology and Environmental or MEE is responsible 
for medical waste.72 Various other government agencies are assigned to manage the differ-
ences between for-profit PMIs and not-for-profit PMIs (e.g. administrative processes and 
taxation). In terms of administrative processes, for-profit PMIs need to apply for registration 
and obtain a certificate from the State Administration for Industry and Commerce because 
they are temporarily regarded as business entities. The registration process for not-for-profit 
PMIs, on the other hand, is under the control of the Ministry of Civil Affairs and is com-
paratively simple. With regard to taxation, for-profit PMIs are required to pay corporate 
tax to the State Administration of Taxation, while not-for-profit PMIs are not. Although 
for-profit PMIs have a three-year exemption from taxation, very few for-profit PMIs benefit 
from that policy because the registration and other administrative processes normally take 
longer than three years. Such a self-contradictory policy endangers the reliability of relative 
regulatory agencies. Furthermore, due to the gap between the policy design and the real-life 
situation, more and more for-profit PMIs decide to become not-for-profit ones. Such a 
change would make it difficult to manage PMIs and thus challenges the capacity of relative 
regulatory agencies.   
As illustrated in Table 5.2, all involved government agencies have been assigned respon-
sibility for regulating PMIs. As such, the political structure seems to function well. However, 
there are certain overlapping areas where the professionalism and reliability of the involved 
government agencies encounter challenges. In order to ensure professionalism and reliability, 
the good performance of regulation expects these government agencies to work together to 
address the overlapping areas (Roberts, 2004, p. 253). In China however, due to the lack of a 
legislative authorised division of power among these involved government agencies, regulat-
ing overlapping areas usually results in disagreements, inaction and corruption rather than 
70 For more information about the main responsibilities of CFDA, please refer to https: / / en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ 
China_ Food_ and_ Drug_ Administration#Main_ responsibilities (last accessed 24 March 2019)
71 For more information about the main responsibilities of AQSIQ, please refer to http: / / english.aqsiq.gov.cn/ 
AboutAQSIQ/ Mission/ (last accessed 24 March 2019)
72 For more information about the main responsibilities of MEE, please refer to http: / / english.mee.gov.cn/ (last 
accessed 24 March 2019)
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checks and balances. Take drug policy for example, where the government agencies involved 
are CFDA, the National Development and Reform Commission, and the National Health 
and Family Planning Commission (Table 5.2). They all have some power to manage and 
supervise the distribution and utilisation of drugs in PMIs, but very few can be identified as 
the liable party in the event of a trade-off. This raises a question regarding the capacity of the 
Chinese government and the need to establish an independent regulatory body.
Overall, the issues raised (i.e. the inconsistency and weak coherence of legal rules and the 
lack of adequate government capacity) not only demonstrate that China does little to govern 
table 5.2 Main sector on the state level in regulating PMIs in China
Actor tasks Subject
State Administration for 
Industry and Commerce 
(SAIC)
It is responsible for issuing business licences and the registration 
of for-profit PMIs.
It is responsible for supervising the advertisement of for-profit 
PMIs.
For-profit PMIs
State Administration of 
Taxation (SAT)
It is responsible for taxing for-profit PMIs. For-profit PMIs
Ministry of Human 
Resources and Social Security 
(MOHRSS)
It is responsible for listing or delisting medical institutions for 
getting reimbursements from health insurance schemes. 
For-profit PMIs
Ministry of Civil Affairs 
(MCA)
It is responsible for the registration of not-for-profit PMIs. Not-for-profit 
PMIs
National Development 
and Reform Commission 
(NDRC)
It is responsible for developing PMIs.
It is responsible for controlling, monitoring and regulating drug 
prices.
PMIs
China Food and Drug 
Administration (CFDA) &
General Administration 
of Quality Supervision, 
Inspection and Quarantine 
(AQSIQ)
They are responsible for administrating and supervising the 
production, distribution and utilisation of drugs and medical 
devices. 
They work in cooperation to inspect and oversee the quality and 
safety of medical products.
PMIs
Ministry of Environmental 
Protection (MEP)
It is responsible for regulating medical waste. PMIs
National Health and Family 
Planning Commission 
(NHFPC)
It is responsible for making laws and regulations.
It is responsible for planning and distributing healthcare 
resources.
It is responsible for the health quality management.
It is responsible for developing drug policies.
PMIs
State Administration 
of Traditional Chinese 
Medicine (SATCM)
It is responsible for developing and supervising plans and 
policies concerning traditional Chinese medicine.
PMIs
Ministry of Education 
(MOE)
It is responsible for organising medical education, delivering 
continuous medical training and managing medical personnel 
development. 
PMIs
Source: Meng et al., (2015).
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and regulate the gradually increasing number of PMIs in healthcare, but more importantly 
highlights the need to address the regulatory role of the state in guiding the private sector 
towards achieving national health goals.     
5.4.2 Applying ICESCR General Comment No. 14 to improve legal regulatory 
strategies concerning PMIs in China and recommendations 
Considering the fact that China has signed and ratified all the relevant international trea-
ties regarding the protection and promotion of people’s health, provisions of those treaties 
should be applicable in guiding related health policies and law in China. In accordance 
with ICESCR General Comment No. 14, regulating PMIs must take the following aspects 
into consideration: identifying attribute, securing equity, ensuring quality and facilitating 
transparency (Albreht, 2009). First and foremost, enacting an umbrella health law is vitally 
important for strengthening the weak coherence of effective legal rules. The umbrella health 
law should include a separate section for regulating PMIs. In the Chinese legal system, the 
umbrella health law should be given a higher legal authority (the level of laws and adminis-
trative regulations) in order to link the fragmented legal rules in other legal fields.
Second, the PMIs section of the umbrella health law should include legal rules to clarify 
the attribute of PMIs, especially for-profit PMIs. If for-profit PMIs continue to be treated 
as business entities, then new legal rules should focus on how to control and guide the 
profit-seeking behaviour of for-profit PMIs for achieving national health goals. If for-profit 
PMIs are regarded as social institutions, then new legal rules should establish the distinc-
tion between for-profit PMIs and not-for-profit PMIs regarding the extent of their social 
responsibility.
Third, the PMIs section of the umbrella health law should include legal rules to ensure 
equal access to healthcare and other health-related services provided by PMIs. Due to profit-
seeking incentives, for-profit PMIs may limit access to healthcare services for certain groups 
of people or charge higher fees on the basis of age or gender. Legal rules on eliminating 
discrimination as such should be included in the PMIs chapter of the umbrella health law. 
Fourth, ensuring the quality of healthcare provided by PMIs should be an essential task 
of the umbrella health law. New legal rules should be enacted to control and regulate the 
marketing of PMIs, especially their profit-seeking activities after registration. Furthermore, 
requirements on the quality of healthcare services should be the same for both public and 
private medical institutions. Responsibility for monitoring the enforcement of related legal 
rules should be assigned to an independent regulatory body. ‘Independent’ means that the 
regulatory body should be independent of all regulatory agencies of central government and 
under the direct control of the State Council. In each local area (i.e. city or town level), the 
independent regulatory body should have its own branches for daily control. These branches 
should also be independent from local governments and other government agencies.
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Last but not least, the PMIs chapter of the umbrella health law and the independent 
regulatory body should aim at facilitating the transparency of the healthcare market. In the 
market of health services, information asymmetry impedes patients’ access to good quality 
healthcare. In the real-life situation, for instance, doctors tend to recommend conservative 
treatments to their patients to avoid the risk of medical accidents and disputes if there are 
no relative regulatory rules (Havighurst, 2003, p. 14). Even worse, doctors working for 
for-profit PMIs are ‘forced’ to prescribe treatments whose effects are relatively low but which 
generate high profits because they need to make a profit for their PMIs in order to keep 
their jobs. In this regard, new legal rules and the independent regulatory body need to be 
established to ensure that the involvement of PMIs does not limit people’s access to health-
related information and services. Future efforts can be devoted to making the price of health 
services transparent to patients, empowering patients to defend their medical rights and 
express other dissatisfactions, and to ensure that health professionals comply with the ethical 
codes of health services (Mills, 2002, p. 327).
5.5 COnCLUDIng REMARKS
The chapter begins by conceptualising privatisation and identifying potential benefits and 
risks it may entail. Once privatisation is recognised as an inevitable tendency in healthcare, 
what truly matters is how to guide the gradually increasing private sector to contribute to 
achieving desired public policy goals. In China, the rapidly growing PMIs demonstrate the 
huge impact of privatisation on healthcare and the tension between the rapid expansion of 
privatisation and the less effective legal regulatory strategies (i.e. effective legal rules and rela-
tive regulatory agencies). Thus, the overall aim of this chapter is to find out how the Chinese 
government fulfils its role in measuring the rapid growth of private medical institutions from 
a human rights perspective.
Through the case of PMIs, the chapter observes that gradually relying on the private 
sector in healthcare not only makes the Chinese healthcare system more efficient, but it also 
diversifies health services and thus expands the accessibility of healthcare and protects patient 
rights in China. Nevertheless, there are also related concerns about involving the private 
sector in healthcare in China, such as the risks of violating human rights and deteriorating 
public health delivery, which raise a range of regulatory issues. In assessing current legal 
regulatory strategies concerning PMIs in China, the chapter identifies three major concerns 
regarding effective legal rules (weak coherence, inconsistency and legislative vacancy) and 
three difficult issues regarding government capacity (the negative effects of decentralised 
political structure, the low professionalism of bureaucrats and lack of reliability) that impede 
the proper functioning of regulatory agencies in China. As a plausible response, the chapter 
recommends enacting an umbrella health law in which a separate section should be assigned 
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to regulating PMIs and also establishing an independent regulatory body to manage the is-
sues of PMIs in China. Detailed recommendations are the practical implications of ICESCR 
General Comment No. 14. 
The increasing involvement of the private sector in healthcare is not identified as purely a 
‘good’ or a ‘bad’ tendency in itself. In most cases, how the state plays its role in regulating and 
governing the rapidly developing private sector is the key issue and of crucial importance.
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ABStRACt
Aim: This chapter mainly focuses on assessing current effective legal norms and their role 
in governing China’s healthcare system and system reform. Thus, the question is framed as 
follows: to what extent is the performance of the Chinese healthcare system tied to China’s health 
law and how do we form a coherent health law that will best meet China’s new health reform 
initiatives?
Background: The Healthy China 2030 Blueprint points out that the Chinese healthcare 
system reform should be approached following the people-centred integrated care model. As 
a consequence, current fragmented legal norms in the sphere of health in China cannot face 
the challenge posed by this new reform initiative, which in turn is a practical requirement 
calling for a unified law-making model.
Methods: Classic legal analysis is used to evaluate laws and regulations on both national and 
international levels that are effective in governing health and healthcare in China. Further-
more, this chapter also adopts theoretical analysis on a heated debate over the coherence of 
health law.
findings: In health and healthcare, fragmentation is an attribution of legal norms. In China, 
the fragmented health law is likely to aggravate the inefficiency of reform efforts. New re-
form measures, such as the nationwide implementation of general practitioner services and 
encouraging the involvement of private actors in healthcare, need to be assessed and sup-
ported by a sufficiently coherent legal framework. All meaningful points raised by the debate 
over the coherence of health law deserve to be taken into account by lawmakers in China.
Keywords: Health law, fragmentation, coherence of health law, recommendations
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6.1 IntRODUCtIOn
Along with the ageing population and the increasing burden of non-communicable diseases, 
the traditional hospital-based model of healthcare delivery in China encounters great chal-
lenges. Prominent problems include: (1) the current division of labour is not clear causing 
an awkward situation in which large tertiary hospitals are overwhelmed with patients while 
many primary medical institutions are underutilised (Li & Xie, 2013); (2) a substantial 
geographic disparity exists in health facilities and health personnel; (3) the performance 
of the referral system is relatively poor; (4) people have limited access to claim their health 
benefits because the responsibility of each involved government agent is not clearly defined; 
(5) the dual problem of overprescription of certain drugs (e.g. antibiotics) and the defensive 
behaviour of doctors (or, defensive medicine). In order to solve these problems and increase 
the accessibility of high-quality healthcare, Healthy China 2030 (WB et al., 2015) was is-
sued by the Chinese government under the guidance of the World Health Organization and 
the World Bank Group. 
Healthy China 2030 points out that the Chinese healthcare system reform should be ap-
proached following the people-centred integrated care model, that is, reform efforts should 
be taken to integrate the current fragmented healthcare delivery. The integration direction of 
healthcare delivery calls for a coherent health law to secure the consistency of concrete policy 
measures. Given that there is no specific section of Healthy China 2030 devoted to analysing 
health law in China, this paper intends to fill the gap by discussing the necessity of cohering 
health law in China and how to consolidate the fragmented laws and regulations. Useful 
lessons will be drawn from an American debate on the coherence of health law.    
6.2 HEALtH LAw In CHInA
6.2.1 International health law that applies to China
China plays an active role in the international community, not only as a co-founder of many 
international governmental organisations (IGOs) but also as a state member of numerous 
multilateral international treaties and conventions. China has signed and ratified nearly all 
international treaties and conventions that protect people’s health benefits (Table 6.1). 
Among all international health regulations, the first section of Article 12 of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) affirms the general 
accountability of the state in protecting and promoting the right to health while the second 
section lists four steps towards protecting the right to health (Box 6.1).
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Box 6.1 The second section of the Article 12 of ICESCR: The Right to Health
The steps to be taken by the State Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full realisation of this 
right shall include those necessary for: 
(a)  The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and for the healthy 
development of the child; 
(b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene; 
(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases; 
(d)  The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical attention in 
the event of sickness.
From the list above, it is easy to see that the state accountability is mainly addressed in 
the following spheres: protecting maternal and infant health, preventing and curing special 
diseases, and creating supportive conditions. In these regards, China, as a signatory country 
of ICESCR, endeavours to meet the state accountability by enacting special laws and regula-
tions, such as the Law of Maternal and Infant Health Care (2009), the Law of the PRC on 
Prevention and Treatment of Infectious Diseases (2013 Amendment), and the Law of the 
PRC on the Prevention and Control of Occupational Diseases (2016 Amendment). 
Considering that Article 12 of ICESCR is a very general stipulation, the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights issued General Comment No. 14 to provide state 
members with a more detailed explanation on the right to health. Although state members 
are not legally obligated to comply with international documents like General Comments, 
they still provide authoritative guidance on how state members should fulfil their account-
ability.73 According to General Comment No. 14, state members should ‘respect, protect 
and fulfil’ the right to health of their citizens. Given that state members have different levels 
of development, General Comment No. 14 allows its state member to take steps towards 
achieving the ‘availability, acceptability, accessibility, and quality’ (AAAQ) of healthcare.
Besides ICSECR, many other international conventions and treaties that are signed 
and ratified by China have stipulations regarding health and healthcare (Table 6.1). For 
instance, Article 5 of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (1969), Article 6, Article 7, Article 9 and Article 10 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976), Article 1, Article 12 and Article 16 of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1981), 
Article 24 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1990), Article 25 of the Conven-
tion on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2008), and the Framework Convention on 
73 FXB Center for Health and Human Rights, Health and Human Rights: Resource Guide. (2013). p. 5. Retrieved 
from https: / / cdn2.sph.harvard.edu/ wp-content/ uploads/ sites/ 5/ 2013/ 09/ HHRRG-master.pdf (last accessed 
24 March 2019).
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Tobacco Control. Furthermore, there are many international organisations (e.g. the United 
Nations, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organizations, and the 
World Health Organization) that have their own standards regarding health and healthcare; 
China needs to comply with these standards to which it is a state party (Table 6.1). For in-
stance, as a permanent member of the United Nations, China needs to comply with Article 
3, Article 5 and Article 25 of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights; as a state party 
of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organizations, China needs to 
follow Article 14 of the Universal Declaration on Bioethics; as a state member of the World 
Health Organization, China needs to obey the international health regulations.
In principle, these international documents are legally binding for state members once 
they have ratified them. However, there is no explicit provision on how to implement them 
domestically and to what extent these international provisions impact the existing domes-
tic legal systems. The domestic implementation of these international treaties is a rather 
complicated issue and they differ from one another due to diverse economic-political-legal 
contexts (Tamanaha, 2004).74 In China, ratifying international treaties should follow a 
special legal procedure regulated by the Law of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the 
Procedure of the Conclusion of Treaties (1990) (Xue & Jin, 2009). Based on the procedure, 
the international treaties, except the Articles with reservations75 have – in principle – had 
a binding force in domestic China. However, there is no explicit provision affirmed by 
the Legislative Law of the PRC (2015 Amendment) on the substantive enforcement. As a 
consequence, the substantive enforcement of these international treaties is likely to be more 
intricate. Furthermore, implementing international treaties concerning protecting health as 
a human right may encounter an extra obstacle, because the human rights discourse is easily 
misunderstood as an imposition of Western ideology, which Eastern countries hesitate to 
adopt domestically (Cerna, 1994).
6.2.2 Domestic health-related laws and regulations
The Legislation Law of the PRC (2015 Amendment) affirms that the Chinese legal system 
has a multi-tier structure. There are mainly three official sources of law in China: statu-
tory law (e.g. laws, administrative regulations, local regulations, administrative rules, and 
military regulations), judicial interpretations, and treaties (Zhang, 2011). Influenced by 
the decentralisation reform of the administrative system, the central government, its State 
Council department and local governments have the power to issue legally binding rules and 
regulations (Yang, 2003).
74 Tamanaha, B. Z. (2004). On the rule of law: History, politics, theory. Cambridge University Press.
75 A reservation in international law refers to ‘a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, 
when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving, or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to 
modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in application to that State.’ For more analysis, please 
refer to Hylton (1994). 
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table 6.1 The international health-related documents joined by China
Documents Related Articles Date in force China
Binding Documents
Convention on the Rights of the 
Child 
Article 24 02/09/1990 Effective:
01/04/1992
Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women
Preamble, Article 1, 
Article 12, Article 16
03/09/1981 Signed: 17/07/1980
Ratified: 04/11/1980
Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities
Article 25 Signed: 30/03/2007; 
Effective: 03/05/2008
Signed: 30/05/2007
Ratified: 01/08/2008
Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control
Adopted: 21/05/2003 Signed: 11/2003 
Ratified: 01/2005
International Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination
Article 5 04/01/1969 Accession: 29/12/1981
Effective: 28/02/1982
International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights
Article 6, Article 7, 
Article 9, 
Article 10
23/05/1976 Signed: 05/10/1998
International Health Regulations Adopted: 2005
Entered into Force: 
15/06/2007
State Member of WHO
International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights
Article 12 03/01/1976 Signed: 27/10/1997
Ratified: 27/05/2001
non-Binding Documents
General Comment No. 20 (1992) replaces General Comment 7 concerning prohibition of torture and cruel 
treatment or punishment (Article 7)
General Comment No. 4 (2003) on adolescent health and development in the context of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, Committee on the Rights of the Child
General Recommendation No. 24 (20th session, 1999) (Article 12: Women and Health)
General Comment No. 3 (2003) HIV/AIDS and the rights of the child, Committee on the Rights of the Child
Recommendation No. R (1998) 71 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States concerning the ethical and 
organisational aspects of health care in prison 
The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health: General Comment No. 14 (2000) on Health; 
11/08/2000. E/C 12/2000/4.
Declaration on the Rights of 
Mentally Retarded Persons 
Proclaimed: 20/12/1971 State Member of UN
International Declaration on 
Human Genetic Data
Proclaimed: 16/10/2003 State Member of UN
Madrid Declaration on Ethical 
Standards for Psychiatric Practice 
(Declaration of Madrid)
Approved: 25/08/1996
Last Enhanced: 
21/09/2011
State Member of World 
Psychiatric Association 
(WPA)
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In health and healthcare, numerous laws and regulations from different levels of author-
ity have been enacted in China. Due to the vast spectrum of laws and regulations that 
govern healthcare in China, Table 6.2 merely lists the laws that were enacted by the National 
People’s Congress and its standing committee. As shown in Table 6.2, the National People’s 
Congress has enacted several special statutes for governing particular health spheres, includ-
ing the Law of the PRC on Blood Donation (1998), the Law on Practising Doctors of the 
PRC (2009 Amendment), the Law of Maternal and Infant Health Care (2009), the Law of 
the PRC on the Red Cross Society (2009 Amendment), Frontier Health and Quarantine 
Law of the PRC (2009 Amendment), the Mental Health Law of the PRC (2013), the Law 
of the PRC on Prevention and Treatment of Infectious Diseases (2013 Amendment), the 
Pharmaceutical Administration Law of the PRC (2015 Amendment), the Law of the PRC 
on Population and Family Planning (2015 Amendment), the Law of the PRC on the Preven-
tion and Control of Occupational Diseases (2016 Amendment), and the Law of the PRC 
on Traditional Chinese Medicine (2017).76 The eleven special statutes listed draw greater 
76 Before the enactment of the Law of the PRC on the Traditional Chinese Medicine (2017), scholars largely 
agree that there are eleven special health laws governing healthcare in China. According to this view, the Food 
Safety Law of the PRC (2015 Amendment) should be regarded also as one special health law. However, the 
author disagrees with this category by arguing that only certain Articles of the Food Safety Law of the PRC 
(2015 Amendment) are correlated to health and healthcare.
table 6.1 The international health-related documents joined by China (continued)
Documents Related Articles Date in force China
Principles for the Protection of 
Persons with Mental Illness and 
the Improvement of Mental 
Health Care
Adopted: 17/12/1991 State Member of UN
Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners
Rules 22–26, Rules 
82–83
First Adopted: 
30/08/1955
Most Recently Adopted: 
17/12/2015
State Member of UN
The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights
Article 3, Article 5, 
Article 25
Adopted and Ratified: 
10/12/1948
State Member of UN
Universal Declaration Bioethics 
UNESCO
Article 14 Adopted: 19/10/2005 State Member of 
UNESCO
United Nations Rules for the 
Protection of Juveniles Deprived 
of their Liberty 
Chapter H - Medical 
Care (Rule 49–55)
Adopted: 14/12/1990 State Member of UN
Source: Please refer to Den Exter (2011), Wan (2007). Originally from the International Human 
Rights Instruments, please refer to
 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx  last accessed 24 March 
2019). Human Rights Library, University of Minnesota, please refer to https://www1.umn.edu/hu-
manrts/research/ratification-china.html (last accessed 24 March 2019).
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table 6.2 The domestic health-related legal regulations in China
Laws (People’s Republic of 
China –  PRC) Related Articles Date Issued/ Effective
Health-related 
Aspect
Administrative Litigation 
Law of the PRC (2014 
Amendment)
Article 57 (advance enforcement 
on the social insurance for medical 
treatments) Article 21, Article 36, 
Article 45, Article 111, Article 119
Issued: 01/11/2014; 
Effective: 10/05/2015
Judicial Remedy
Anti-domestic Violence Law 
of the PRC
Article 7 (medical records), Article 
9, Article 14/ Article 35 (medical 
institutions’ responsibility to 
report and liability)
Issued: 27/12/2015;
Effective: 01/03/2016
Domestic Violence
Atmospheric Pollution 
Prevention and Control 
Law of the PRC (2015 
Amendment)
Article 8, Article 78, Article 95 Issued: 29/08/2015;
Effective: 01/01/2016
The Right to 
Health and Living 
Surroundings
Animal Epidemic Prevention 
Law of the PRC (2015 
Amendment)
Article 13, Article 67 Issued and Effective: 
24/04/2015
Public Health and 
the Right to Health 
of Employees
Agricultural Law of the PRC 
(2012 Amendment)
Article 83–84 Issued and Effective: 
28/12/2012
Health Protection in 
Rural China
Advertising Law of the PRC Article 10/ Article 40 (minors and 
disabled persons),
Article 15–16/Article 18–19 
(forbidden content in health-
related advertising),
Article 46, Article 55–59, Article 
62, Article 68–69
Issued: 24/04/2015;
Effective: 01/09/2015
Health-related 
Advertising, Minors 
and Disabled Persons
Constitution of the PRC 
(2004 Amendment)
Article 21, Article 36, Article 45, 
Article 111, Article 119
Issued: 14/03/2004 
Issued: 01/11/2014; 
Effective: 10/05/2015 
General Regulation
Criminal Procedure Law of 
the PRC (2012 Amendment)
Part Five (Chapter IV: Procedures 
for Involuntary Medical Treatment 
of Mental Patients Legally 
Exempted for Criminal Liability)
Issued and Effective: 
14/03/2012
Mental Patients
Criminal Law of the PRC 
(1997 Revision) (Revised 
with Nine Amendments)
Article 18 (Mental Patients),
Section 1. (Crimes of 
Manufacturing and Selling Fake 
and Shoddy Goods): Article 
141–148, Article 290 (Crimes of 
Disturbing Medical Order),
Section 5. (Crimes of Endangering 
Public Heath): Article 330–336, 
Article 339, Article 409
Issued: 14/03/1997;
Effective: 25/12/1999
Health-related 
Crimes and Liability
Charity Law of the PRC Article 63 Issued: 16/03/2016; 
Effective: 01/09/2016
Health and Charity
Counterterrorism Law of the 
People’s Republic of China
Article 65 Issued: 27/12/2015; 
Effective: 01/01/2016
Victims and 
Relatives’ Right to 
Health
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table 6.2 The domestic health-related legal regulations in China (continued)
Laws (People’s Republic of 
China –  PRC) Related Articles Date Issued/ Effective
Health-related 
Aspect
Civil Procedure Law of the 
PRC (2012 Amendment)
Article 73 (deposition exempted), 
Article 106, Article 206
Issued and Effective: 
31/08/2012
Judicial Remedy
Construction Law of the 
PRC (2011 Amendment)
Article 47 Issued and Effective: 
22/04/2011
Occupation Health
Coal Industry Law of the 
PRC (2013 Amendment)
Article 8 Issued and Effective: 
29/06/2013
Occupation Health
Employment Promotion 
Law of the PRC (2015 
Amendment)
Article 30 Issued and Effective: 
24/04/2015
Occupation Health
Education Law of the PRC 
(2015 Amendment)
Article 45 (health facilities), 
Article 46/ Article 53 
(governmental responsibility)
Issued and Effective: 
27/12/2015
Children
Environmental Protection 
Law of the PRC (2014 
Revision)
Article 39, Article 47 Issued: 24/04/2014; 
Effective: 01/01/2015
Public Health
Frontier Health and 
Quarantine Law of the PRC 
(2009 Amendment)
Issued and Effective:
27/08/2009
Public Health
Food Safety Law of the PRC 
(2015 Revision)
Article 10 (healthy lifestyle),
Article 14, Article 24, Article 26, 
Article 45, Article 104, 
Article 123/Article 126 (sanctions 
and liability)
Issued: 24/04/2012;
Effective: 01/01/2015
Healthy Lifestyle
General Principles of the 
Civil Law of the PRC (2009 
Amendment)
Section 4 (Personal Rights: Article 
98. Citizens shall enjoy the right 
of life and health)
Issued and Effective: 
27/08/2009
The Right of Life 
and Health
Insurance Law of the PRC 
(2015 Amendment)
Article 91 Issued and Effective: 
24/04/2015
Medical Fees and 
Occupation Health
Law of the PRC on Regional 
National Autonomy 
(Revised)
Article 11 (religious), 
Article 40/Article 42/ Article 
50 (self-government organs’ 
responsibility)
Issued: 31/05/1984;
Effective: 28/02/2001
Ethnic Minority
Law of the PRC on the 
Protection of Disabled 
Persons (Revised)
Article 17/Article 18/ Article 48 
(local governments’ responsibility)
Issued: 24/04/2008;
Effective:
01/07/2008
Disabled Persons
Law of the PRC on the 
Protection of Minors (2012 
Amendment)
Article 11 (parents’ responsibility), 
Article 19/Article 22 (schools’ 
responsibility), 
Article 27/Article 32/ Article 33/
Article 38/ Article 41 (social and 
governmental responsibility),
Article 68/Article 71 (liability)
Issued: 26/10/2012; 
Effective: 01/01/2013
Children
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table 6.2 The domestic health-related legal regulations in China (continued)
Laws (People’s Republic of 
China –  PRC) Related Articles Date Issued/ Effective
Health-related 
Aspect
Law of the PRC on the 
Protection of Women’s 
Rights and Interests (2005 
Amendment)
Article 17 (female adolescents),
Article 26 (employers’ 
responsibility),
Article 28 (governmental 
responsibility),
Article 38 (women’s right to life 
and health),
Article 51 (reproductive right)
Issued: 28/08/2005; 
Effective: 01/12/2005
Women and 
Children
Labour Law of the PRC 
(Revised)
Article 41/Article 42 (the limited 
working hours of employees and 
its exceptions),
Chapter 6 (labour safety and 
sanitation), Chapter 7 (special 
protection for female staff and 
workers, and juvenile workers)
Issued: 05/07/1994; 
Effective: 27/08/2009
Occupation Health, 
Women and 
Children
Labour Law of the PRC 
(Revised)
Article 41/Article 42 (the limited 
working hours of employees and 
its exceptions),
Chapter 6 (labour safety and 
sanitation),
Chapter 7 (special protection 
for female staff and workers, and 
juvenile workers)
Issued: 05/07/1994; 
Effective: 27/08/2009
Occupation Health, 
Women and 
Children
Law of the PRC on Maternal 
and Infant Health Care
Issued: 27/10/1994;
Effective: 27/08/2009
Women and Infants
Law of the PRC on the 
Protection of the Rights and 
Interests of the Elderly (2015 
Amendment)
Article 15, Article 29–31, Article 
34, Article 37, Article 49–50, 
Article 53, Article 56 (the elderly 
first as the principle of priority 
setting), Article 61, Article 69
Issued and Effective: 
24/04/2015
The Elderly
Law of the PRC on 
Population and Family 
Planning (2015 Amendment)
Issued and Effective: 
27/12/2015
Public Health and 
Reproductive Rights
Law of the PRC 
on Promoting the 
Transformation of 
Scientific and Technological 
Achievements (2015 
Amendment)
Article 12 (government supports 
the advanced technology in 
health)
Issued and Effective: 
29/08/2015
Health Technology
Law of the PRC on 
Tobacco Monopoly (2015 
Amendment)
Article 5 (children), Article 17 Issued and Effective: 
24/04/2015
Tobacco Control and 
Children
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table 6.2 The domestic health-related legal regulations in China (continued)
Laws (People’s Republic of 
China –  PRC) Related Articles Date Issued/ Effective
Health-related 
Aspect
Law of the PRC on the 
Protection of Consumer 
Rights and Interests (2013 
Amendment)
Article 45, Article 49, Article 51, 
Article 55
Issued and Effective: 
25/10/2013
Consumer’s Health-
Related Rights
Law of the PRC on 
Prevention and Treatment 
of Infectious Diseases (2013 
Amendment)
Issued and Effective: 
29/06/2013
Public Health
Labour Contact Law of the 
PRC (2012 Amendment)
Article 32, Article 40, Article 42 Issued and Effective: 
28/12/2012
Occupation Health
Law of the PRC on 
Prevention of Juvenile 
Delinquency (2012 
Amendment)
Article 3, Article 30–32, Article 
52–54
Issued and Effective: 
26/12/2012
Children
Law of the PRC on the 
Prevention and Control of 
Occupational Diseases (2016 
Amendment)
Issued and Effective: 
07/02/2016
Public Health and 
Occupational Health
Law of the PRC on 
Traditional Chinese 
Medicine
Issued: 25/12/2016;
Effective: 01/07/2017
Medicine
Law on Practising Doctors of 
the PRC (2009 Revision)
The main body of the law remains 
the same as 1998 version except a 
minor change of Article 40
Issued and Effective: 
6/26/1998
Medical Professionals
Law of the PRC on Blood 
Donation
Issued: 29/12/1997;
Effective:
01/10/1998
Public Health
Law of the PRC on the 
Red Cross Society (2009 
Amendment)
Issued and Effective
27/08/2009
Humanitarian and 
Public Health
Law of the PRC on 
Protecting Against and 
Mitigating Earthquake 
Disasters (2008 Revision)
Article 50 Issued 27/12/2008; 
Effective: 01/05/2009
Public Health
Mine Safety Law of the PRC 
(Revised)
Article 31 (employers’ 
responsibility)
Issued: 07/11/1992;
Effective: 27/08/2009
Occupation Health
Mental Health Law of the 
PRC
Issued: 26/12/2012; 
Effective: 01/05/2013
Mental Health
Military Service Law of the 
PRC (2011 Amendment)
Article 21, Article 53, Article 57 Issued and Effective: 
29/10/2011
Military
National Security Law of 
the PRC
Article 29, Article 31 Issued and Effective 
01/07/2015
Public Health
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attention to protecting vulnerable groups and expanding the accessibility and availability of 
healthcare services for all residents of China.
All in all, health-related laws and regulations in China have a characteristic of frag-
mentation. In some circumstances, the characteristic of fragmentation is designed for the 
sake of checks and balances. For instance, in some Western countries where goals suggested 
by policies are always achieved through enforcing related laws and regulations (Bledsoe & 
Prosterman, 2000, p. 3; Parmet, 2016), the fragmentation of health law may enhance the 
performance of health policies because the disparate parts of health law are likely to be more 
specific than a general legislation for governing the different aspects of healthcare issues. 
However, the goal of achieving checks and balances may be hard to attain in China because 
China maintains a tradition of launching new policies, instead of enforcing law, to reach the 
target of previous policies. Furthermore, the Chinese government issued a new reform plan, 
table 6.2 The domestic health-related legal regulations in China (continued)
Laws (People’s Republic of 
China –  PRC) Related Articles Date Issued/ Effective
Health-related 
Aspect
National Defense 
Mobilisation Law of the PRC
Article 45 (a medical rescue 
and healthcare system which is 
applicable to both peacetime and 
wartime)
Issued: 26/02/2009; 
Effective: 01/07/2010
Public Health
Organic Law of the Villagers’ 
Committees of the PRC 
(2010 Revision)
Article 7 (subcommittees for 
public health)
Issued and Effective: 
28/10/2010
Health-related 
Organisation in rural 
China
Prison Law of the PRC 
(2012 Amendment)
Article 53, Article 54 Issued: 26/10/2012; 
Effective: 01/01/2013
Prisoners
Pharmaceutical 
Administration Law of the 
PRC (2015 Amendment)
Issued and Effective: 
24/04/2015
Pharmaceutical 
Regulations
Social Insurance Law of the 
PRC
Article 38, Article 42, Article 48, 
Article 64,
Chapter III (Basic Medical 
Insurance),
Chapter VI (Maternity Insurance)
Issued: 28/10/2010;
Effective: 01/07/2011
Medical Insurance
State Compensation Law of 
the PRC (2012 Amendment)
Article 34 (compensation on the 
infringements of citizen’s right to 
life and health)
Issued: 26/10/2012;
Effective: 01/01/2013
Remedy
Tourism Law of the PRC Article 6, Article 15 (tourists’ 
responsibility), Article 26, Article 
66
Issued: 25/04/2013;
Effective: 01/10/2013
Public Health 
and Tourists’ 
Responsibility
Tort Law of the PRC Chapter VII (Liability for Medical 
Malpractice)
Issued: 26/12/2009; 
Effective: 01/07/2010
Patient’s Rights
Source: pkulaw, please refer to http://en.pkulaw.cn/ (last accessed 24 March 2019). Also, please refer to 
http://www.cdpf.org.cn/special/6dh/2013-09/15/content_30451989.htm (in Chinese, last accessed 
24 March 2019).
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Healthy China 2030, with a main goal of integrating the fragmented healthcare delivery. 
The integration direction of healthcare delivery calls for a coherent health law to secure the 
consistency of concrete policy measures. 
6.3 tHEOREtICAL ARgUMEntS: AMERICAn DEBAtE On COHERIng 
HEALtH LAw
In academia, much literature is centred on questioning and justifying the coherence of 
health law (Kennedy & Grubb, 2005; Bloche, 2003, 2009; Hervey & McHale, 2004; 
Elhauge, 2006; Parmet, 2009; Gatter, 2016). Arguments raised by American scholars are 
relatively straightforward and appealing, which generates advantages in practical applica-
tions. Prominent proposals include the law and economic approach from Clark Havighurst 
(1988, 1995), a trust-based paradigm from Mark Hall (2002), a rescue-oriented framework 
from Maxwell Bloche (2003), an international human rights framework from Wendy Mari-
ner (2009), and the social justice perspective proposed separately by Rand Rosenblatt (1988) 
and Lindsay Wiley (2014, 2016). 
6.3.1 Clark Havighurst’s law and economic approach 
Respecting and protecting individual choices are the core values underpinning Havighurst’s 
framework. According to him, it is of great importance to consider the effects of market 
factors in reforming healthcare systems. Efficiency should be given priority because the in-
strumental value of health law is to maximise medical benefits. Yet, as Robert Gatter (2016, 
p. 1138) observes, Havighurst’s law and economic approach is rational and practical, which 
provides sufficient justification for spheres such as health insurance and certain clinical 
decision-making processes, but it is unable to account for the entire scope of health law. For 
example, vaccination against rare diseases where beneficiaries are normally small groups of 
people. From a cost-effective point of view, this kind of vaccination has a low efficiency and 
should be abandoned no matter how desperate people are when suffering from those rare 
diseases. It is cruel and has been criticised by many scholars, such as Jonathan Montgomery 
(2006, p. 14) who argues in favour of legitimating health law by its potential function in 
preserving morality, and Maxwell Gregg Bloche who is strongly against abandoning patients 
by emphasising that the prime goals of health law should include ‘rescue, support and com-
fort, personal dignity’ (Bloche, 2003, p. 256) besides promoting and restoring health. As a 
response, Clark Havighurst (1988) defends his framework by denying that the missing parts 
are the essential elements of health law. Nevertheless, neglecting the missing parts, such as 
public health, is a major defect that devalues the whole framework in cohering health law.
126
C
ha
pt
er
 6
6.3.2 Mark Hall’s trust-based paradigm
According to Hall and Schneider (2004), the coherence of health law cannot be proved by 
one or more basic principle(s) but the disparate parts of health law can be integrated by 
sharing a thematic factor. In this regard, Hall proposes that the focus of lawmaking efforts 
should return to the core of healthcare services: the doctor-patient relationship. Restoring 
the trust between doctors and patients should be the key point for the coherence of health 
law. Addressing the importance of restoring trust is derived from ‘therapeutic jurisprudence’ 
developed by David Wexler and Bruce Winck (1992, p. 9; 1996, p. xvii). Therapeutic juris-
prudence is an analytical framework with a main focus on analysing how the legal system 
affects the emotion, behaviour and mental health of people. Hall intends to implement and 
extend the therapeutic jurisprudence paradigm by exploring the role of trust in structuring 
health law. Therapeutic jurisprudence addresses the importance of caring for patients’ feel-
ings and clinical experience. Accordingly, Hall argues that lawmaking efforts should also take 
the performance of healthcare services into account. Compared with commercial activities, 
the fragile and insecure feelings of patients highlights the instrumental value of trust to the 
performance of healthcare services. Nevertheless, critics claim that trust cannot be used to 
justify the inherent coherence of health law because trust is also the essential element of 
other department laws.    
6.3.3 Maxwell Bloche’s rescue-oriented framework
Argued by Bloche (2003, p. 306), rescue should be one of the essential aims of healthcare 
delivery (and health law). He strongly criticises the argument that lawmaking activity should 
mainly focus on population-wide health maximisation regardless of the possibility of over-
riding any identified individual health interests (Bloche 2003, p. 306). The limited recogni-
tion capacity of human beings and the uncertainty of diagnosis and treatments would make 
it difficult to identify ‘welfare maximisation’ which would in turn impede the effectiveness 
of health law. Thus, he claims that healthcare lawmaking should be clear about the following 
issues: ‘medical uncertainty, people’s cognitive constraints and emotional needs, and persist-
ing moral disagreements limit the possibilities for rational health policymaking’ (Bloche, 
2003, p. 254). He addresses that healthcare lawmaking should reflect people’s real hopes and 
expectations and, more important, build a rich empathic relationship with people (Bloche, 
2003, p. 304). Specifically, besides the goal of protecting and promoting health, healthcare 
lawmaking must carefully consider the following four goals: rescue, support and comfort, 
regard for the dignity of the vulnerable, and universal access to basic medical services 
(Bloche, 2003, p. 256, p. 304). Admittedly, curing and caring should be the essential aims 
of health services. Yet, lawmaking efforts for cohering health law should adopt a boarder 
perspective, otherwise it may neglect some indispensable parties in healthcare delivery, such 
as pharmaceutical companies and health insurance companies. 
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6.3.4 Wendy Mariner’s international human rights framework
Notably, public health has a close relationship with human rights (Gostin, 2004, p. 511; 
Hervey & McHale, 2004, p. 234). In this regard, the international human rights law frame-
work may perform the best in organising health law as a coherent legal field. Developed by 
the scholar Wendy Mariner (2009, pp. 70–78), this framework borrows three concepts from 
the international human rights law to set the scope of health law. These three concepts are 
actually three aspects of the state accountability in protecting and promoting the right to 
health: respect, protect and fulfil. This framework is designed to make health law clearer by 
acknowledging the norms shared with other legal fields (Gatter, 2016, p. 1137). However, 
the human rights discourse is incompatible with the market dimension of the healthcare 
system, such as for-profit medical institutions. As a consequence, health law based on human 
rights needs to be confined to a limited scope (Montgomery, 2006, p. 10). Recognising the 
limitation, Wendy Mariner (2014, 2016a, 2016b) defends her framework by narrowing her 
attention to the sphere of public health and social determinants in her recently published 
research. Nevertheless, there exists another defect. She previously agreed with Einer Elhauge 
(2006, p. 371) in terms of admitting that heath law is a legal field dependent on tailoring 
the doctrines of other legal fields. Although both Einer Elhauge and Wendy Mariner hold 
the position that health law should be a coherent legal field, tailoring the doctrines of other 
legal fields de facto denies the legitimacy of the coherence and independence of health law.
6.3.5 Rand Rosenblatt’s social justice perspective
Rosenblatt (1988) categorises the historical development of health law in America into three 
stages with their own distinct priorities. During the first stage, health law in America was de-
signed and implemented with a focus on the professional autonomy of doctors because doctors, 
during that time, dominated the healthcare system and had a sort of privilege in deciding 
healthcare distribution owing to their powerful knowledge. During the second stage, lawmak-
ing efforts gradually took patient rights and social interest into consideration. Health law in this 
stage gave a special attention to mitigating the conflicts between patients and other parties that 
arose from information asymmetry and unequal power status. This legislative priority implied 
that health law in this stage was likely to adopt a ‘social contract model’. During the third stage, 
market forces were addressed for the sake of solving the low-efficiency issue and the infringement 
of individual rights. There is no better or worse approach, as each one has its own advantages 
and limitations. Yet, Rosenblatt (1988, p. 491) observes that there are four factors driving the 
development of health law in America: ‘economic behaviour, individual self-determination, 
social choice, and social justice.’ Based on it, Rosenblatt proposes the perspective of social 
justice as the new distinct priority in conceptualising health law. From the perspective of social 
justice, the focus of healthcare law-making should include but not be limited to improving the 
engagement of patients in healthcare, addressing the importance of consumerism in protecting 
self-determination and protecting the interests of vulnerable groups.
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6.3.6 Lindsay Wiley’s social justice framework
According to Wiley’s (2014, 2016) social justice framework, health law and policy should 
mainly focus on decreasing health disparity, especially where disparity exists in accessing 
healthcare. Given that the social determinants of health (SDH)77 are often regarded as key 
factors causing health inequalities (Sage, 2017, p. 10), Lindsay advises lawmakers to take 
SDH seriously when drafting new laws regarding health and healthcare. Considering that 
social determinants are also the key driving forces behind social justice, there must exist a 
kind of connection between health law and social justice. In this regard, Wiley (2014, p. 
47) argues that health law is an instrument for achieving social justice. Furthermore, she 
argues that traditional health law often weighs more on protecting and promoting patient 
rights while inevitably falling short of addressing the protection of the common good (e.g. 
the sustainability of the healthcare system) (Wiley, 2016). Thus, she claims that healthcare 
lawmaking needs to be further improved in the following aspects: taking into account public 
interests when drafting the treatment plan, and securing the sustainability of the healthcare 
system before expanding the accessibility of certain health services. 
Overall, each of the above proposals has appealing aspects and potential limitations. All 
meaningful points raised by each proposal equally deserve to be taken into account when 
cohering health-related laws and regulations. 
6.4 PRACtICAL IMPLICAtIOnS fOR EnACtIng A BASIC HEALtH LAw 
In CHInA
As Porter (2010, p. 3477) argues, having a shared goal that could unite the interests of all 
involved parties is of great importance for performance improvement in any field. Thus, in 
healthcare lawmaking, recent literature regarding China’s health law largely concentrates on 
exploring the fundamental value or the unifying theme (Dong, 2014; Wang, 2016; Liu, 2017).
6.4.1 A clear unifying theme for cohering health law in China?
Learnt from the above theoretical arguments, different values can be derived as unifying 
themes to link the fragmented health law, including efficiency, trust, rescue, human rights 
and social justice. Are these values, or any one of them, suitable for cohering the fragmented 
health law in China?
77 Defined by the World Health Organization (WHO), SDH are the conditions in which people are born, grow 
up, live, work and age, and the systems put in place to deal with illness, For more information on the social 
determinants of health, please refer to http: / / www.who.int/ social_ determinants/ thecommission/ finalreport/ 
key_ concepts/ en/ (last accessed 24 March 2019).
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Efficiency. If value in healthcare in China is defined with a priority given to cost reduction, 
then China’s fragmented health law should be consolidated encompassing efficiency. How-
ever, if taking efficiency as the unifying theme for law coherence, some treatment techniques 
for a minority population, such as orphan drugs, would be left entirely to the market without 
legal protection. As a consequence, the health interests of these minority groups would be 
clearly at stake and lawmaking efforts would be ultimately in vain.   
Trust, as an essential attribute of a good physician-patient relationship, plays a vital role in 
enhancing the quality of healthcare (Hall, 2002, p. 470). Preserving and restoring trust has 
long been one prominent theme of health laws (Mehanic, 1998). Although restoring trust 
is of significant importance for reviving the current tense relationship between doctors and 
patients in China, it is still questionable to use trust to unite China’s health law as it is also 
a central value for laws that govern other areas, such as commercial transactions. In order to 
defend trust, as the unifying theme, Mark Hall (2002, p. 471) explains the different roles 
that trust plays in healthcare and in the other areas by arguing that people are likely to have 
less control over decisions in healthcare than in other areas. This argument is gradually losing 
its point along with the increasing accessibility of medical information and the people’s 
developing health literacy. As Chinese public hospitals are ‘one-stop shops’ and patients 
can access walk-in services, more and more people tend to search for the information about 
physicians first and then make their choice over the one they want to visit. The original 
source of trust in healthcare is similar to that in the field of business: patient/client decisions 
are made based on investigating previous evaluations. Thus, trust lacks a distinguishing force 
in cohering health law in China.
Rescue. In healthcare, the tension between cost-effectiveness and the ‘Rule of Rescue’ often 
raises serious questions for health policymakers, such as how to allocate public funding 
to competing health technologies, such as costly new cancer drugs versus lifesaving thera-
pies.78 Decisions have to be made explicitly for specific health policies. Yet, a general health 
law should be framed with a neutral framework, which essentially means that both cost-
effectiveness and the Rule of Rescue should be taken into account and equally weighted. 
Thus, rescue only is not adequate for cohering health law in China. 
Human Rights. To appeal to human rights often happens when there is a strong claim for 
having one’s basic medical needs fulfilled. If the basic health law takes the human rights 
discourse as its unifying theme, major obstacles may be created for law enforcement. One 
major obstacle is created by the difficulty in defining ‘basic health needs’. From Wilkinson’s 
78 In literature, the tension between cost-effectiveness and the ‘Rule of Rescue’ has been extensively discussed in 
diverse contexts. For detailed analysis, please refer to Hadorn, (1991); Cookson et al., (2007).
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(1999, p. 264) analysis about the difficulty of defining the ‘social value criterion’, defining 
basic health needs either in a subjective or objective way may raise different but equally hard 
questions.79 Although the difficulty of defining basic health needs is not unique to China, 
it is likely to be even greater when taking into account the size of its population. Another 
related difficulty concerns patients’ unlimited health needs. By referring to human rights, 
patients or their surrogates could argue for accessibility for all services independent of degree 
of necessity within the population. It is not clear to what extent the unlimited health needs 
by patients create obligations on others to provide them.80 Taking human rights as the 
unifying theme of the basic health law is likely to cloud, rather than clarify, its boundary. 
In most cases, it is the public health law that intertwines with the human rights discourse 
since it has a focus on protecting and promoting the population’s health. Controversial issues 
may appear when one turns to an individual’s focus of healthcare, the field of patient care 
which is governed by medical law (Mann, 1997). Although some research effort has been 
put into consolidating medical law and public health law (Ezer & Cohen, 2013; Peled-Raz, 
2017), through the lens of human rights principles, more discussions on further justification 
are still needed. Given that the primary goal of enacting a basic health law in China is to 
link the Constitution to specific health laws and regulations (Meng et al., 2015, p. 18), the 
unifying theme should be framed in a broader way than the human rights discourse in order 
to cover both medical law and public health law. Thus, a human rights approach is likely to 
be unsuitable for cohering China’s health law.
Social justice. According to Lindsay’s analysis, health law and social justice have a close 
relationship through the lens of correcting health disparities. Social justice is a general term 
which can be extensively interpreted for the sake of covering every aspect of healthcare. 
Yet, due to the diverse possibilities of interpreting social justice, a context-based standard 
on what accounts for social justice needs to be developed first. Since the standard would 
be developed as a kind of context-specific standard, problems may occur when the context 
changes. Thus, it is likely to be impossible to generalise the approach of law coherence.     
79 If one defines ‘basic health needs’ as necessities in health, one may easily fall into a ‘majority tyranny’ situation; 
that is, the chosen basic health needs are actually reflecting what the majority needs while failing to represent 
minority views. If one attempts to define basic health needs in the objective way, then one may confront a more 
controversial issue: procedural justice. Questions, such as who should decide and how to use procedural justice 
to justify outcomes, remain to be answered. 
80 Although the General Comment No. 14, a comment on Article 12 of the ICESCR, specifies the content of 
the human right to health as containing ‘both freedoms and entitlements’ and correspondingly addresses the 
obligation of the state to facilitate its healthcare system towards the AAAQ standard of protection of the right 
to health, the issue of how to interpret and implement this General Comment is still no easy task, given that 
state parties to the ICESCR are at different stages of economic development with diverse cultures and values. 
For more analysis on this argument, please refer to Kinney (2001).
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Besides these considerations that are derived from the American debate on cohering health 
law, are there any other considerations that need to be taken into account when cohering 
health law in China?
6.4.2 Traditional Chinese ethics as one essential consideration
Ethics has a great impact on the formulation of health law.81 It would thus generate a great 
deficiency if China’s basic health law was drafted without any concern for traditional Chinese 
ethics. Greatly influenced by Confucian traditions, China attaches great importance to close 
family ties and the role of family in its healthcare system (Wong et al., 2009). Taking a new 
reform measure for example, a family-based general practitioner service has been expanded 
from pilot areas to the whole nation for the sake of strengthening primary healthcare in 
China. The GP system in China is designed quite differently from that of Western countries 
in terms of addressing the role of family. According to the system’s design, it is each household 
rather than the individual patient, which is encouraged to contract with a GP who practises 
medicine in the neighbourhood. Such a reform measure implies that the role of family has 
been inherently suggested by reform policies in China. Using policies as instruments to imple-
ment themselves is not conformity to the ‘rule of law’. The state, under the rule of law, should 
embody legal rules and regulations in concrete implementation. This is what the Chinese 
government has been doing and will continue to do. Ethical values, such as preserving the 
family ties, are not only important for framing health policies but also should be embedded in 
the basic health law in order to ensure the effectiveness of practical implementation. Lawmak-
ers in China shall take the values of family seriously when drafting basic health law.
6.5 COnCLUDIng REMARKS
Cohering health law in China is a complex process requiring careful attention not only to the 
intrinsic morality of law but also to the special value in healthcare. Before embarking on any 
substantial legislative actions, it is worth reminding lawmakers in China of at least two points. 
First, identifying a clear theme to ensure the consistency and coherence of health law. Learnt 
from the above practical implications, social justice is likely to be a suitable candidate. Yet, 
lawmakers in China need to develop a context-specific content of social justice. In this regard, 
family-oriented ethical values need to be well addressed. Second, being aware of the distinction 
between law and welfare policy in healthcare in China. Considering China’s basic conditions, 
especially its large population, health law in China at the current stage should first fulfil its aim 
of deterring or reducing future harms rather than being a powerful tool enabling people to 
claim additional health benefits.
81 In literature, many discussions focus on studying the relationship between health law and ethics, for instance 
Montgomery (2000), Miola (2007) and Coggon (2012). 
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7.1 IntRODUCtIOn
Chapters 2 to 6 of this thesis closely examine five crucial questions concerning the progres-
sive reforms of the Chinese healthcare system (Table 7.1).
table 7.1 Five subquestions of this thesis
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Addressing Personal Responsibility for Health
Patient Empowerment 
and Engagement
Q 1. To what extent should personal responsibility be addressed for the sake 
of advancing the reforms of the Chinese healthcare system?
Ch. 2
Q 2. Given that empowering and activating patients is at the top of Healthy 
China 2030, how do we place personal responsibility in healthcare in China 
to make this health reform initiative more effective?
Ch. 3
Correcting Structural Injustice by Regulatory Interventions
H
ea
lth
ca
re
 D
el
iv
er
y
Primary 
Healthcare
Q 3. Will the implementation of general practitioner (GP) services 
strengthen China’s primary healthcare delivery and how do we structure 
regulatory interventions to secure the successful nationwide implementation 
of GP services?
Ch. 4
Private Sector Q 4. Given the great influence of privatisation on the Chinese healthcare 
system, how does the Chinese government fulfil its role in measuring the 
rapid growth of private medical institutions (especially using legal/regulatory 
measures) from a human rights perspective?
Ch. 5
Supportive Legal 
Environment
Q 5. To what extent is the performance of the Chinese healthcare system tied 
to China’s health law and how can a coherent health law be formed that will 
best meet China’s new health reform initiatives?
Ch. 6
The two major perspectives designed (personal responsibility and structural injustice) and 
three specific themes (patient empowerment, healthcare delivery and supportive legal envi-
ronment) enable this thesis to ‘hang together’ these five distinct but equally crucial questions 
and, thereby, to tell a more coherent and compelling story surrounding the central question:
In the context of Chinese healthcare system reforms, how should the conflict between 
the protection of individual rights (e.g. satisfying patient needs) and the sustain-
ability of healthcare resources from ethical and legal perspectives be mitigated?
In this final chapter, the findings in Chapters 2 to 6 will be briefly summarised. Thereafter, 
some reflections on the central question and the subquestions addressed by each individual 
chapter will be offered. Derived from these findings and reflections, future directions for 
research and national health policy will also be proposed. 
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7.2 A SYntHESIS Of fInDIngS
‘A good analysis will attend both personal and structural factors’ (Nussbaum, 2011, p. xii) 
According to Young’s (2011, p. 4) argument about poverty, disadvantages are most likely to 
be rooted in both personal responsibility and structural injustice rather than merely one of 
these two. Thus, discussions in this thesis take both factors into account. As clearly presented 
in Table 7.1, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 give special attention to addressing personal respon-
sibility while Chapters 4 to 6 focus on correcting structural injustice.
In the general introduction (Chapter 1), discussions make it clear that addressing 
personal responsibility in healthcare generally means letting individual human beings be 
responsible for their own health, especially holding them accountable for their health-related 
choices. Raising the issue of personal responsibility in healthcare essentially aims at encour-
aging people to be more active in taking care of their own health and being more active in 
healthcare.
In Chapter 2, discussions reveal the reality and necessity of addressing personal respon-
sibility in advancing the reform of the Chinese healthcare system:
(1) The ageing population and the increasing burden of non-communicable diseases 
gradually change the goal of healthcare delivery from curing diseases to preventive 
care. 
(2) Advancing the Chinese healthcare system reform needs to escape from its back-
and-forth feature by including driving forces other than the state and the market. 
Given the reality and necessity of addressing personal responsibility, the question of concern 
is raised: To what extent should personal responsibility be addressed in advancing the reform of 
the Chinese healthcare system? To answer this question, discussions resort to three prominent 
philosophical theories – liberal egalitarianism, luck egalitarianism and communitarianism – 
and explore their policy implications for the Chinese healthcare system. Practical advice is 
summarised as follows: 
(1) Suggested by liberal egalitarianism, addressing personal responsibility in healthcare 
can be achieved through taxing unhealthy choices. Yet, taxing unhealthy choices 
needs more empirical evidence before implementing in China since it has generated 
controversial results in other nations. 
(2) Personal responsibility in healthcare should be addressed from an ex ante perspec-
tive. Meaningful lessons can be drawn from Germany’s experience in empowering its 
citizens to be more active in their own health and healthcare (e.g. launching health 
incentive schemes and enacting special laws).
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(3) Suggested by communitarianism, personal responsibility in healthcare should be 
addressed, compatible with the aim of fostering the shared value of the community 
such as China’s long tradition of valuing family ties.
In Chapter 3, discussions further explore the policy implications revealed in Chapter 2 for 
addressing personal responsibility in advancing Chinese healthcare system reforms. 
In 2016, the new health reform plan, Healthy China 2030 (WB et al., 2016), was 
launched with a special focus put on empowering and engaging patients in healthcare. Yet, 
this health reform initiative lacks detailed contextual elaboration which may limit its effec-
tiveness. The question addressed by Chapter 3 therefore is raised: Given that empowering and 
activating patients is at the top of Healthy China 2030, how do we place personal responsibility in 
healthcare in China to make this health reform initiative more effective? Discussions in Chapter 
3 argue that compared with the individual and community levels, empowering and activat-
ing patients at the household level is likely to be more compatible with the reality of national 
conditions of China (e.g. Chinese bioethics, household registration system, the integrated 
health insurance schemes and related domestic legislations).82 The preliminary idea behind 
engaging patients at the household level is to emphasise the patient’s personal responsibility 
in managing their own health, while adopting family support as a supplementary consider-
ation to prevent the individual patient from being abandoned by the healthcare system. To 
answer the question concerned, personal responsibility should be addressed together with 
the involvement of family for the sake of achieving the effectiveness of the targeted health 
reform initiative. Thus, different from what is recommended in Healthy China 2030, we 
try to approach the recommended areas by laying more emphasis on the role of the family. 
Corresponding recommendations for future reform efforts are as follows: 
(1) cultivating health literacy as a family asset; 
(2) emphasising family support in promoting a patient’s self-management skills; 
(3) involving families in shared decision-making; 
(4) developing healthy families as a parallel pathway for creating the supportive environment 
for patient engagement.
Discussions hitherto mainly focus on exploring the personal factor, especially through 
the lens of personal responsibility, in advancing the reform of the Chinese healthcare system. 
In the second part, discussions switch to the other essential factor that a good analysis should 
take into account – the structural factor – and explore how to adjust it for the sake of 
advancing the reform of the Chinese healthcare system. The rapid ageing population and the 
increasing burden of non-communicable diseases have driven the Chinese healthcare system 
to transform from a profit-driven public hospital-centred model to an integrated high-
quality and value-based model (Yip & Hsiao, 2014, p. 805). Prominent reform initiatives 
82 The detailed analysis on the practical evidence for proving the feasibility of engaging patients at the household 
level in China is included in Chapter 3 of this thesis.
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include strengthening primary healthcare, improving the referral system and encouraging 
the development of the private sector in delivering healthcare. To assess and enhance their 
effectiveness, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 are designed to explore these initiatives from the 
regulatory perspective.
In Chapter 4, discussions mainly focus on assessing the effectiveness of the newly 
launched general practitioner services with special attention given to the regulatory aspect. 
Different from other countries, the general practitioner services in China are introduced 
with a strong context-based characteristic: household-oriented. Initial achievements are 
made in the pilot areas (Shanghai, Chongqing and Guangzhou), which encourages central 
government to consider a nationwide implementation. The question concerned is thus 
raised: Will the implementation of general practitioner (GP) services strengthen China’s primary 
healthcare delivery and how do we structure regulatory interventions to secure the successful 
nationwide implementation of GP services? To answer this question, discussions compare 
the old model of primary healthcare delivery and the household-oriented GP services, and 
thereby indicate the necessity of using household-oriented GP services to strengthen China’s 
primary healthcare delivery. Yet, the selected pilot areas are largely well-developed cities 
where people enjoy a higher level of social welfare, including education and medical care, 
Financing 
Payment 
Organization 
Regulation 
Behavior 
THE HEALTH SYSTEM 
Efficiency 
Quality 
Access 
TARGET  
POPULATION 
Health Status 
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Satisfaction 
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figure 7.1 The control knob framework
Source: Adapted from Figure 2.2 in Roberts et al. (2004), p. 27.
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than the average person in China. Situations will be more complicated when implementing 
GP services nationwide. Thus, key prerequisites such as appropriate regulatory strategies 
need to be fulfilled to secure and enhance the effectiveness of nationwide implementation 
of GP services. Based on the ‘control knob framework’ (Figure 7.1) developed by Roberts 
and colleagues, a comprehensive assessment of China’s current regulatory interventions for 
GP services is performed; that is, a thorough analysis of the internal factors (i.e. a set of 
related regulations and the legislative method) and the external factors (i.e. cultural attitude, 
government capacity and interest groups) that may influence regulatory success.     
Results indicate that currently, China’s regulatory interventions for GP services are 
far from adequate. Major deficiencies revealed by the assessment include the problematic 
relationship between regulations and health policies, the lack of coherent laws, the low rate 
of social acceptance of GP services, and the lack of continuing support for GP services from 
both formal and informal interest groups. As a response, discussions recommend that, prior 
to the nationwide implementation of GP services, efforts should be devoted to, but not 
limited to, the following two directions: enacting a specific law, and creating an independent 
regulatory supervisory body.
Another prominent reform initiative, encouraging the development of the private sector 
in healthcare delivery, is the focus of Chapter 5. The motivation behind this reform initia-
tive is to stimulate the efficiency of healthcare delivery by using private sector competition 
(Yip & Hsiao, 2014, p. 807). Nevertheless, without effective regulatory interventions, this 
reform initiative may not produce any enhancement for China’s healthcare delivery. Thus, 
the focus of discussions in this chapter is still primarily on structuring regulatory inter-
ventions to secure and enhance the effectiveness of this reform initiative. Furthermore, in 
order to develop a better understanding of this reform initiative, private medical institutions 
(PMIs) is chosen as a study subject for analysis. The question addressed by this chapter is: 
Given the great influence of privatisation on the Chinese healthcare system, how will the Chinese 
government fulfil its role in measuring the rapid growth of private medical institutions from a 
human rights perspective? Slightly different from that of Chapter 4, the question is mainly 
approached from the perspective of human rights which means the perspective on human 
rights set out in international human rights law. Thus, a study of international human rights 
law is included in discussions. Findings indicate that the state is required to assume an 
active regulatory role rather than play a ‘provider’ role in controlling and supporting the 
development of the private sector in healthcare delivery. To identify what can be improved, a 
comprehensive assessment (the diagnostic process, see Figure 5.1) of China’s current regula-
tory interventions for PMIs is performed.
Findings indicate that there are three major concerns regarding effective legal rules – 
weak coherence, inconsistency and legislative vacancy – and three difficult issues regarding 
government capacity – the negative effects of decentralised political structure, the low pro-
fessionalism of bureaucrats and lack of reliability – that impede the effectiveness of China’s 
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current regulatory interventions for PMIs. Corresponding recommendations for addressing 
the regulatory role of the Chinese government are made in the following two aspects: enact-
ing an ‘umbrella health law’ in which a separate section should be assigned to regulating 
PMIs, and establishing an independent regulatory body to manage the issues of PMIs in 
China. Further details on these two recommendations are summarised as follows:
(1) Enacting an umbrella health law is of significant importance for strengthening the weak 
coherence of effective legal rules. The umbrella health law should include a separate 
section for regulating PMIs.
(2) The PMI section of the umbrella health law should include legal rules to clarify the 
attribute of PMIs, especially for-profit PMIs.
(3) The PMI section of the umbrella health law should include legal rules to ensure equal 
access to healthcare and other health-related services provided by PMIs.
(4) Responsibility for monitoring the enforcement of related legal rules should be assigned 
to an independent regulatory supervisory body.
(5) The PMI section of the umbrella health law and the independent regulatory body should 
aim at facilitating the transparency of the healthcare market.
Drawn from discussions in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, there is a great need for enacting a 
basic law of healthcare to secure and enhance the effectiveness of China’s new health reform 
initiatives. The question in concern is thus raised: To what extent is the performance of the 
Chinese healthcare system tied to China’s health law and how do we form a coherent health law 
that will best meet China’s new health reform initiatives? By studying all relevant laws and 
regulations that govern healthcare in China, discussions identify that ‘health law’83 in China 
has a characteristic of fragmentation and argue that the growing fragmentation is a serious 
problem that will limit the effectiveness of China’s new health reform initiatives because it 
is unlikely to be compatible with the integration direction of health reform in China. Thus, 
how do we form a coherent health law that could best meet China’s new health reform 
initiatives? To answer this question, we carefully examined six prominent proposals (i.e. the 
law and economic approach from Clark Havighurst, the trust-based paradigm from Mark 
Hall, the rescue-oriented framework from Maxwell Bloche, the international human rights 
framework from Wendy Mariner, and the social justice perspective proposed separately by 
Rand Rosenblatt and Lindsay Wiley) and their practical implications for cohering health law 
in China. In the end, three final remarks are made for lawmakers in China: 
(1) Cohering health law in China is a complex process requiring careful attention not only 
to the intrinsic morality of law, but also to the special value in healthcare.
(2) It is of significant importance to first identify a clear theme of health law before embark-
ing on any substantial lawmaking activities.
83 ‘Health law’ here refers to a wide array of laws and regulations that govern health and healthcare in China. 
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(3) Be aware of the distinction between law and welfare policy; that is, considering the basic 
conditions of China, especially its large population, health law in China at the current 
stage should first fulfil its aim of deterring or reducing future harm rather than being a 
powerful tool enabling people to claim additional health benefits.
7.3 REfLECtIOnS On tHE RESEARCH QUEStIOn AnD 
SUBQUEStIOnS
7.3.1 To mitigate rather than resolve the conflict
As Williams (2008, p. 650) has noted, ‘conflicts do exist over issues including funding, 
treatment, duties, rights and preferences.’ These conflicts cannot be simply resolved because 
patient need is limitless but healthcare resources are not, or even scarce in some cases. For 
most current healthcare systems, the scarcity of healthcare resources is likely to be perma-
nent on account of the ageing population, the increasing burden of non-communicable 
diseases and the rapid development of advanced health technologies. These conflicts cannot 
be simply resolved also because not all of them generate bad consequences. Just as Tidwell 
(1998, p. 4) has argued, a given conflict may be good if it meets other desired outcomes. 
Thus, the general aim of this thesis is to mitigate rather than resolve the conflict between the 
protection of individual rights and the sustainability of healthcare resources.
7.3.2 The appropriateness of addressing personal responsibility is context-specific
Based on the historical review of Chinese healthcare system reforms, discussions in Chapter 
2 reveal the reality and necessity of addressing personal responsibility in healthcare in China. 
Furthermore, in Chapter 3 where discussions focus on exploring policy implications, the 
feasibility of applying personal responsibility in healthcare in China is also justified by 
resorting to traditional Chinese ethics. As a consequence, addressing personal responsibil-
ity in healthcare is likely to be context specific which may limit its generalisation to other 
social settings. Yet, other nations can still draw useful lessons from the findings when similar 
problems occur.
7.4 LIMItAtIOnS AnD fUtURE DIRECtIOnS fOR RESEARCH 
DEvELOPMEnt
I know and do admit that discussions in this thesis are not completely adequate in some 
aspects. From a positive perspective, however, potential limitations outlined below can also 
be viewed as defining areas for future study. First, discussions in both Chapter 2 and Chapter 
3 may be challenged because they are largely rooted in the restoration argument. In both 
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Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, we intend to mitigate the conflict between the protection of 
individual rights and the sustainability of the Chinese healthcare system by raising the issue 
of personal responsibility. One key reason behind this intention is that people who live 
an unhealthy lifestyle may generate additional costs to their counterparts (i.e. people who 
maintain a healthy lifestyle) and it is unfair to let ‘innocent’ people pay for others’ unhealthy 
lifestyle choices. So as Wilkinson (1999, p. 256) makes clear in his analysis of smokers’ rights 
to healthcare:
So, to sum up, what the restoration argument says is that we ought to reduce smokers’ 
entitlements to healthcare because not to do so would mean unfairly making non-
smokers ‘pay the price’ for smokers’ unhealthy lifestyles.
The restoration argument is appealing to libertarians partially because it merely focuses on 
preventing harm to people who maintain a healthy lifestyle while not forcibly preventing 
people from engaging in an unhealthy lifestyle (Wilkinson, 1999, p. 257). However, the 
argument of ‘additional costs’ is challenged by empirical evidence showing that people who 
live an unhealthy lifestyle may actually save healthcare resources by dying earlier than people 
who maintain a healthy lifestyle.84 This controversial issue may result in conflicting health 
policies. Thus, it deserves to be further analysed with more empirical evidence. 
Second, discussions that raise the issue of personal responsibility may be challenged 
because social bias may play an essential role in judging whether a behaviour is healthy or 
not; that is, greatly influence the attribution of personal responsibility. This concern is raised 
by Ubel (1997; et al., 1999) in his analysis of alcoholics and transplant allocation, and was 
further addressed by Friesen (2016) recently. Ubel (1997, p. 345) argues that if a behaviour 
is socially desirable, then people are highly likely not to resort to personal responsibility 
but may even agree to give that person a priority in receiving organs. Thus, he warns that 
health policies should be careful to adopt the principle of personal responsibility since such 
policies may merely reflect social bias on certain behaviours. Suggested by Friesen (2016, 
p. 57), further study needs be conducted either including certain kinds of socially desirable 
behaviours associated with health disadvantages, or explaining why those behaviours those 
behaviours are excluded.  
Third, the proper concept of social justice needs to be further defined. In Chapter 6, 
we have studied six prominent proposals for justifying the coherence of health law, among 
which the social justice framework is likely to be most compatible with the Chinese context. 
Yet, the meaning of social justice needs to be clarified in order to unite the interests of all 
involved parties in law-making for healthcare, which raises more interesting questions that 
need to be explored. For instance, who should decide and through what kind of procedure? 
84 Related researches can be found in the following literature: Persaud (1995); Barendregt et al. (1997): Rezayat-
mand et al. (2017).
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Can we rely on the justice of a procedure to determine the definition of social justice? So as 
Wilkinson (1999, p. 264) argues in his analysis about defining the ‘social value criterion’, we 
will encounter more questions where we either appeal to ‘what people in fact value (prefer, 
desire etc.) or to what is (objectively) valuable.’ Wilkinson explains his two concerns: if we 
attempt what we in fact value, we may easily fall into a ‘majority tyranny’ situation; that is, 
the chosen values and preferences are what the majority of us happen to have. If we attempt 
what is objectively valuable, then we need to figure out who should decide which behaviours 
are valuable and how to decide. Thus, we will potentially face similar questions when we 
attempt to define social justice. In this regard, further studies are needed.
Fourth, the ‘Accountability for Reasonableness’85 (A4R) framework. Rather than strug-
gling with the substantive principles of allocating healthcare resources, research on how to 
build a fair and equitable decision-making process is an alternative perspective which is based 
on the conviction that procedural justice is of vital importance in achieving the legitimacy 
of any substantive outcome. We have done research discussing this topic.86 In that study, 
we use the A4R framework to evaluate the decision-making process used in the Chinese 
healthcare system reform (2006–2009). Nevertheless, as many studies have indicated, the 
A4R framework merely offers ground rules, not practical guidelines (Friedman, 2008). In 
practice, its four conditions need to be adapted, or even revised, in order to be compatible 
with different social contexts which also indicates areas for further study. 
Besides these four directions, which are pointed out by the potential limitations of this 
thesis, there are also some interesting evolving themes of healthcare in China that are relevant 
to mitigate the conflict between the protection of individual rights and the sustainability of 
healthcare systems, such as to ‘nudge’ people for better health. 
Fifth, adapting ‘nudge’ in the Chinese healthcare system. Nudge is a policy design with 
an aim of pushing individuals softly to opt for choices that are better for them without 
limiting their liberty.87 One typical example of Nudge is organising the display of foods 
in school cafeterias. The display can be arranged according to different aims: maximising 
profits, most healthy for customers, or just randomly without any aims. Given that item 
arrangement influences people’s choices, Nudge will suggest to the person who is responsible 
for food display to arrange them with the aim of encouraging customers to make more 
healthy choices. In this regard, Nudge is likely to pave a third way besides coercive policies 
and laws to not only protect people’s health but also save money and resources. Thus, it 
deserves more attention from both policymakers and researchers.  
85 The ‘Accountability for Reasonableness’ framework is proposed by Norman Daniels and James Sabin with an 
attempt to ensure the fairness and legitimacy of decisions by setting ground rules for a just procedural. For 
more detailed explanation, please refer to Daniels & Sabin (2002).
86 Please refer to Wei & Liu (2018). 
87 For more about ‘Nudge’, please refer to Thaler & Sustein (2003, 2008), and Sustein & Thaler (2003). 
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Last but not least, given that this thesis is largely a context-specific analysis, future 
research may be conducted to include more comparative studies. 
As a final remark, I would not be surprised if people hold different opinions, even critical 
arguments, regarding the questions discussed in this thesis. All I wish is to provide different 
perspectives and, thereby, to help people to think about the questions raised more deeply 
and thoroughly. This is what I intend to revive.
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SUMMARY
In the sphere of healthcare, there exists an inevitable conflict between protecting individual 
rights (e.g. satisfying the unlimited patient needs) and sustaining healthcare resources when 
taking the scarcity of healthcare resources into account. This conflict becomes particularly 
apparent in the context of the current Chinese healthcare system because of China’s rapidly 
ageing population and the increasing burden of non-communicable diseases. 
The general aim of this thesis is to develop proper strategies for balancing the protec-
tion of individual rights (e.g. satisfying patient needs) and the sustainability of healthcare 
resources in the context of Chinese healthcare system reforms. Special attention is given to 
drawing a fair ‘cut’ between personal responsibility and state accountability in order to make 
the reforms of the Chinese healthcare system more effective. Thus, the central question is as 
follows: In the context of Chinese healthcare system reforms, how should the conflict between the 
protection of individual rights (e.g. satisfying patient needs) and the sustainability of healthcare 
resources from ethical and legal perspectives be mitigated?
This thesis is composed of seven chapters. Beside the general introduction (Chapter 1) 
and the conclusion (Chapter 7), Chapters 2 to 6 are independent but interrelated papers, 
which closely examine five crucial questions concerning the progressive reforms of the 
Chinese healthcare system. These five questions are further categorised into two parts of this 
research (personal responsibility and structural injustice). 
Part I (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3) provides theoretical reflections on addressing personal 
responsibility in healthcare in China. Discussions in this part reveal the reality and necessity 
of addressing personal responsibility in advancing the reform of the Chinese healthcare sys-
tem. Chapter 2 mainly provides a theoretical understanding of the importance of addressing 
personal responsibility in healthcare while Chapter 3 examines the policy implications of the 
theoretical understanding and proposes a feasible way of addressing personal responsibility 
to advance China’s healthcare system reform.  
Part II (Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6) is framed with a special concern given 
to the role of the state in correcting the structural injustice of the healthcare system in 
China. Discussions in this part mainly explore how to adjust structural factors for the sake of 
advancing the reform of the Chinese healthcare system. Among reform initiatives, strength-
ening primary healthcare, improving referral system and encouraging the development of 
the private sector in delivering healthcare are the prominent ones. To assess and enhance 
their effectiveness, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 are designed to explore these reform initiatives 
from the regulatory perspective. The aim of these two chapters is to emphasise the impor-
tance of regulatory interventions in securing and enhancing the effectiveness of this reform 
initiative. Chapter 4 evaluates the regulatory sector for the effectiveness of the nationwide 
implementation of GP services while Chapter 5 focuses on exploring the regulatory sector 
for China’s ever-growing private medical institutions. Drawn from discussions in Chapter 
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4 and Chapter 5, there is a great need for enacting a basic law of healthcare to secure and 
enhance the effectiveness of China’s new health reform initiatives. Therefore, how to draft 
basic health law that could best meet China’s new health reform initiatives becomes the 
main question of Chapter 6. Chapter 6, therefore, reviews all health-related laws and regula-
tions on both national and international levels, draws lessons from representative theoretical 
debate on the coherence of health law, and thereby makes corresponding recommendations. 
As a concluding chapter, Chapter 7 provides a synthesis of all findings, makes reflections 
on the research question and five subquestions, summarises the potential limitations of this 
thesis, and points out some interesting evolving themes of healthcare that are relevant to 
balance patient rights and the sustainability of China’s healthcare system as future directions 
for research development.
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SAMEnvAttIng
Wanneer de schaarste van gezondheidszorgvoorzieningen in aanmerking wordt genomen, 
kan op het gebied van de gezondheidszorg worden gesproken van een onvermijdelijk 
spanningsveld tussen de bescherming van individuele rechten (bijvoorbeeld voorzien in de 
ongelimiteerde behoeften van patiënten) en behoud van gezondheidszorgvoorzieningen. In 
de context van het huidige Chinese zorgstelsel komt dit spanningsveld vooral tot uiting door 
de rap vergrijzende bevolking van China en de stijgende last van niet-overdraagbare ziekten. 
Het algemene doel van dit proefschrift is om in de context van de hervorming van het 
Chinese zorgstelsel goede strategieën te ontwikkelen om de bescherming van individuele 
rechten (bijvoorbeeld voorzien in de behoeften van patiënten) in evenwicht te brengen met 
de duurzaamheid van gezondheidszorgvoorzieningen. Er wordt met name gezocht naar een 
redelijk evenwicht tussen persoonlijke verantwoordelijkheid en de verantwoordingsplicht 
van de staat met als doel de hervorming van het Chinese zorgstelsel effectiever te laten verlo-
pen. De centrale vraag is derhalve als volgt: Hoe kan, in de context van de hervorming van het 
Chinese zorgstelsel, het spanningsveld tussen de bescherming van individuele rechten (bijvoorbeeld 
voorzien in de behoeften van patiënten) en de duurzaamheid van gezondheidszorgvoorzieningen 
vanuit een ethisch en juridisch perspectief worden verminderd?
Dit proefschrift bestaat uit zeven hoofdstukken. Naast de algehele inleiding (d.w.z. 
hoofdstuk één) en de conclusie (hoofdstuk zeven) zijn hoofdstuk twee t/m zes op zichzelf 
staande maar met elkaar samenhangende artikelen, waarin vijf cruciale vragen met betrekking 
tot de geleidelijke hervorming van het Chinese zorgstelsel nauwkeurig worden onderzocht. 
Deze vijf vragen worden verder onderverdeeld in de twee delen van dit onderzoek (d.w.z. 
persoonlijke verantwoordelijkheid en structurele onrechtvaardigheid). 
Deel I (hoofdstuk twee en drie) biedt theoretische beschouwingen over het belang van 
persoonlijke verantwoordelijkheid in de gezondheidszorg in China. In de discussies in dit 
deel wordt in het kader van de hervorming van het Chinese zorgstelsel de realiteit rond 
persoonlijke verantwoordelijkheid belicht alsook de noodzaak om hier invulling aan te 
geven. Hoofdstuk twee biedt in de eerste plaats een theoretische duiding van het belang 
van persoonlijke verantwoordelijkheid in de gezondheidszorg terwijl in hoofdstuk drie de 
beleidsimplicaties van de theoretische duiding worden onderzocht en een voorstel wordt 
aangereikt voor een haalbare manier om persoonlijke verantwoordelijkheid te bevorderen 
teneinde de hervorming van het Chinese zorgstelsel te kunnen bewerkstelligen. 
In deel II (hoofdstuk vier, vijf en zes) draait het vooral om de rol van de staat bij het weg-
nemen van de structurele onrechtvaardigheid binnen het zorgstelsel in China. In de discus-
sies in dit deel wordt met name verkend hoe structurele factoren kunnen worden aangepast 
om de hervorming van het Chinese zorgstelsel gestalte te kunnen geven. De voornaamste 
hervormingsinitiatieven zijn gericht op het versterken van de primaire gezondheidszorg, het 
verbeteren van het verwijzingssysteem en het stimuleren van de ontwikkeling van particu-
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liere instellingen die gezondheidszorg verlenen. Om de effectiviteit van deze initiatieven te 
kunnen beoordelen en vergroten worden deze hervormingsinitiatieven in hoofdstuk vier 
en vijf vanuit een regelgevingsperspectief verkend. Het doel van deze twee hoofdstukken 
is te benadrukken dat regulerende interventies een rol van grote betekenis spelen bij de 
totstandkoming van dit hervormingsinitiatief en het verbeteren van de effectiviteit ervan. 
Hoofdstuk vier bevat een evaluatie van de regelgevende sector toegespitst op de effectiviteit 
van de landelijke invoering van huisartsendiensten; in hoofdstuk vijf wordt de regelgevende 
sector verkend in het kader van het steeds verder toenemende aantal particuliere medische 
instellingen in China. Uit de discussies in hoofdstuk vier en vijf komt naar voren dat er 
een grote behoefte is aan basiswetgeving inzake gezondheidszorg om de effectiviteit van 
de nieuwe hervormingsinitiatieven op het gebied van gezondheidszorg in China te kun-
nen bewerkstelligen en te verbeteren. De belangrijkste vraag van hoofdstuk zes is derhalve 
hoe een basiswet inzake gezondheidszorg kan worden opgesteld die het meeste recht doet 
aan nieuwe hervormingsinitiatieven op het gebied van gezondheidszorg. In hoofdstuk zes 
wordt dus alle wet- en regelgeving op het gebied van gezondheidszorg onderzocht, zowel 
op nationaal als op internationaal niveau, worden lessen getrokken uit het representatieve 
theoretische debat over de samenhang van de wetgeving inzake gezondheidszorg en worden 
bijbehorende aanbevelingen gedaan. 
Hoofdstuk zeven, de conclusie, bevat een synthese van alle bevindingen. In dit slothoofd-
stuk wordt gereflecteerd op de onderzoeksvraag en de vijf subvragen, worden de potentiële 
beperkingen van dit proefschrift samengevat en wordt gewezen op enkele belangwekkende 
thema’s met betrekking tot gezondheidszorg die zich beginnen af te tekenen en die van belang 
zijn bij het vinden van een evenwicht tussen de rechten van patiënten en de duurzaamheid 
van het zorgstelsel in China, en die wijzen op toekomstige richtingen voor de ontwikkeling 
van onderzoek. 
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